State v. Reimer

962 N.W.2d 196

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Seth Mars REIMER, Appellant.

A19-1801

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: July 14, 2021

Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, Saint Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

MOORE, III, Justice.

This case asks us to decide whether a Blakely violation committed by the district court at a sentencing hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury found the appellant, Seth Mars Reimer, guilty of two counts of criminal sexual conduct. At sentencing, the district court determined that Reimer's offenses were committed after August 1, 2006, even though the complaint alleged that the offenses were committed sometime between 2004 and 2018. The court of appeals found that the district court's determination of Reimer's offense dates was a Blakely violation, but concluded that, even though the presumptive sentence under the applicable sentencing guidelines increased on August 1, 2006, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore affirmed Reimer's sentence. Because we agree with the court of appeals that the district court's Blakely violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.

FACTS

The State charged Reimer with three counts of criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that he sexually abused his girlfriend's three minor daughters: M.M., E.R., and D.R. The first count alleged that Reimer committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct against M.M. between January 1, 2004, and March 31, 2018. The second count alleged that Reimer committed second-degree criminal sexual conduct against E.R. between January 1, 2006, and June 16, 2018. The third count alleged that Reimer committed first-degree criminal sexual conduct against D.R. between January 1, 2012, and June 16, 2018.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, M.M. testified that Reimer sexually assaulted her numerous times over the course of his relationship with her mom, beginning in 2012 when she was in fourth or fifth grade. E.R. testified that Reimer started sexually assaulting her in 2009 and continued to sexually assault her over several years. The jury found Reimer guilty of the two counts of criminal sexual conduct against M.M. and E.R.¹ The jury was not asked to determine the dates or range of dates that Reimer assaulted either of the victims.

The recommendation in the presentence investigation report was to sentence Reimer in accordance with the sentencing guidelines that were in effect before August 1, 2006, based on the date range set forth in the complaint (2004 to 2018). Based on the pre-August 1, 2006 sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentences for the two convictions would be 161 months in prison and 57 months in prison, respectively. At sentencing, the State argued that Reimer should be sentenced in accordance with the sentencing guidelines in effect after August 1, 2006, because the evidence presented during the jury trial suggested that the earliest offense occurred in 2009. Based on the post-August 1, 2006 sentencing guidelines, the presumptive sentences for the two convictions would be 360 months in prison and 140 months in prison, respectively.

The district court found that "there was absolutely no evidence that any of these offenses happened in 2006," "probably not in 2007 [or] 2008" and "the earliest that these offenses ... occurred was maybe 2010." The district court observed "that there was a mistake made in ... not amending the Complaint to change the date of the offenses" and suggested that "ideally, there should have been a special interrogatory or something like that to the jury asking them for each victim when did these offenses occur." Ultimately, the district court sentenced Reimer in accordance with the sentencing guidelines that existed after August 1, 2006, and imposed the presumptive sentences of 360 months in prison and 140 months in prison, to run concurrently.

On appeal, Reimer argued that the district court violated Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and its progeny by finding that the earliest offense occurred after August 1, 2006. In a nonprecedential opinion, the court of appeals agreed with Reimer that the district court's finding that the offenses occurred after August 1, 2006 violated Blakely . The court concluded, however, that the district court's error was harmless due to "the unique circumstances in this case" where the record "simply contains no evidence to support a jury finding that any of the offenses occurred before August 1, 2006, and Reimer makes no claim to the contrary." State v. Reimer , No. A19-1801, 2020 WL 7019403, at *5 (Minn. App. Nov. 30, 2020). We granted Reimer's petition for review on the Blakely issue.

ANALYSIS

Under Blakely , a criminal defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be sentenced based solely upon factual findings made by a jury. 542 U.S. at 303–05, 124 S.Ct. 2531. A violation of that right—what we have described as a Blakely violation, see State v. Houston , 702 N.W.2d 268, 273–74 (Minn. 2005) —occurs when a court determines "any disputed fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential sentence," including factual findings related to offense dates, without the defendant waiving the right to a jury's determination of that issue. State v. DeRosier , 719 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13, 25, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) ) (emphasis omitted). "If the determination of which presumptive sentence applies depends on a fact issue ... such an issue is for the jury to decide." Id.

In this case, the court of appeals found, and the parties agree, that a Blakely violation occurred when the district court determined that Reimer's offenses against M.M. and E.R. occurred after August 1, 2006. The jury was never asked to determine the date of the offenses. Therefore, the district court determined a "presumptive sentence" based "on a fact issue," resulting in a Blakely violation. Id. ; State v. Robinson , 480 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1992) (explaining that defendants have the "right to let the jury authoritatively decide the" date on which an offense occurred).

Thus, the sole issue presented in this case is whether the Blakely violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that the Blakely error was harmless because there was no evidence presented that Reimer's offense occurred before August 1, 2006. Reimer, citing to our decisions in State v. DeRosier , 719 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 2006) and State v. Osborne , 715 N.W.2d 436 (Minn. 2006), counters that any factual determination made by a court that results in a higher sentence for a criminal defendant is per se prejudicial.

Our harmless error doctrine reflects the fact that "most constitutional errors can be harmless." State v. Finnegan , 784 N.W.2d 243, 259–60 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ). We apply the harmless error doctrine to a constitutional error when that error does not qualify as a "structural" error, which deprives a defendant "of ‘basic protections’ without which ... ‘no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’ " Neder , 527 U.S. at 8–9, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Rose v. Clark , 478 U.S. 570, 577–78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) ). Blakely violations do not rise to the level of a structural error and are therefore subject to our harmless error standard. See Washington v. Recuenco , 548 U.S. 212, 222, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ; State v. Chauvin , 723 N.W.2d 20, 30 (Minn. 2006) ; see also Neder , 527 U.S. at 15, 19–20, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (applying a harmless error analysis to the district court's determination of an element of a crime when the defendant "did not contest" that element at trial nor did he "suggest that he would introduce any evidence" related to that element if he was re-tried).

Under our harmless error standard, "[a]n error is not harmless if there is any reasonable doubt the result would have been different if the error had not occurred." DeRosier, 719 N.W.2d at 904. If a district court's error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the case must be remanded for resentencing. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d at 30–31 ; see also Recuenco , 548 U.S. at 222, 126 S.Ct. 2546.

In this case, the complaint alleged that Reimer committed criminal sexual conduct against M.M. between January 1, 2004, and March 31, 2018, and against E.R. between January 1, 2006, and June 16, 2018. At trial, the State presented no evidence that Reimer committed acts of criminal sexual conduct against either victim before 2009. And Reimer has not argued "that he would introduce any evidence" related to the timing of his offense if he was re-tried. Neder , 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Accordingly, there is no "reasonable doubt the result would have been different if the error had not occurred" and the error is therefore harmless. DeRosier, 719 N.W.2d at 904.

We disagree with Reimer's argument that our DeRosier decision stands for the proposition that a Blakely violation is not harmless if a defendant's sentence is increased by the violation, which would in effect transform Blakely violations into structural errors mandating automatic reversal. In DeRosier , the defendant committed multiple acts of criminal sexual conduct against a teenage girl during 2000. Id. at 901. At trial, the State presented evidence that the conduct "began in June 2000" and there was at least one act that occurred in August 2000. Id. at 901–02. On August 1, 2000, the sentencing guidelines were amended and DeRosier's crime carried a presumptive sentence that was 58 months longer...