State v. Smith

251 N.J. 244

276 A.3d 1114

STATE of New Jersey

v.David L. SMITH, a/k/a Mont, Defendant-Appellant.

A-4 September Term 2021

085635

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 26, 2022

Decided June 28, 2022

Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).

William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; William P. Cooper-Daub, of counsel and on the briefs, and Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, on the briefs).

Karen Thompson argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Karen Thompson, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Jonathan Romberg submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 prohibits operation of a vehicle with any "non-transparent material" on the front windshield or front side windows.

Although the statute predates automotive window tinting, it commonly serves as the statutory basis for tinted window citations. See State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375, 379-81, 790 A.2d 202 (App. Div. 2002). In this appeal, the Court considers whether a purported violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 based on tinted windows justified an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.

Trenton detectives stopped defendant David Smith's motor vehicle for a purported tinted windows violation after the detectives observed dark tinting on defendant's rear windshield. Despite the rear windshield's tint, the detectives were able to see that defendant was alone in the car and was making a furtive "shoving" motion, raising suspicions that he was trying to conceal a weapon. When the detectives searched the vehicle, they found a firearm. The detectives cited defendant for a tinted windows violation and charged him with various weapons offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the motor vehicle stop was unlawful because the detectives could not have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the tinting on defendant's rear windshield violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-74.

The trial court denied defendant's motion, concluding that the car stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation pursuant to adjacent statute N.J.S.A. 39:3-75. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun pursuant to a plea agreement with the State and was sentenced in accordance with the State's recommendation. The Appellate Division later affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

We now reverse the Appellate Division's judgment. We hold that the stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.¹ We further hold that N.J.S.A. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations. Finally, consistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, we hold that reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle's front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.

I.

A.

The record before the motion judge reveals that in November 2018, at approximately 10:20 p.m., four detectives were patrolling in a marked Trenton Police SUV. All four detectives were assigned to the Street Crimes Unit, which Detective Brieer Doggett described as being focused on "more proactive policing" aimed at "apprehend[ing] individuals ... in regards to narcotic, weapons, and other related offenses." Doggett, who was riding in the front passenger seat, later characterized their location as a "high drug area" and a "high weapons-related offenses area."

As the detectives approached an intersection with a red traffic light, they pulled up behind a Ford Taurus with its left turn signal activated. The Taurus was "[d]irectly in front of" them, and Doggett observed that "the windows were tinted on the vehicle." When the light turned green, the Taurus proceeded slowly, turning left at the intersection. The detectives then "activated [their] emergency lights and sirens ... [b]ecause the vehicle had tinted windows." Detective Doggett later testified that he was close enough to see that the vehicle's rear windshield was tinted. Notwithstanding the tinted windows, with the police SUV's headlights and the lighting on the street Doggett was able to see that there was "just the driver" inside the car.

The driver of the Taurus initially kept proceeding slowly before pulling over. When Doggett started to exit the police car, the driver began to pull away again but then stopped. Two detectives approached the Taurus on the driver's side, while Detective Doggett and another detective approached the passenger side.

Illuminating the car's interior with his flashlight, Detective Doggett "[saw] a lot of motion still going on through the rear window." As he got closer, he looked through the rear-passenger window and "[saw] the defendant shoving an object in between the driver's seat and the center console." Doggett could not see what the object was but could see what defendant was doing by "the way he was moving his right arm."

Upon observing defendant's motions, Detective Doggett grew concerned that defendant was trying to conceal a firearm or other type of weapon. Doggett drew his gun and ordered defendant to roll down his windows. Defendant continued his shoving motion between the seat and the console, and Detective Doggett ordered him to roll down the windows twice more before defendant complied. After removing defendant from the Taurus, the detectives searched between the seat and the console and found a .38 caliber revolver loaded with hollow-point bullets. The detectives then arrested defendant and towed the Taurus to headquarters.

A grand jury indicted defendant for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, third-degree theft by receiving stolen property, fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets, and second-degree certain person not to possess a firearm. In addition to the criminal charges, defendant was given a motor vehicle summons for a tinted windows violation.

B.

Defendant moved to suppress the seized firearm, arguing that the State failed to justify the stop of his vehicle. Detective Doggett was the sole witness at the suppression hearing and testified to having observed tint only on the rear windshield, which is permitted under N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. Doggett further testified that he was able to see clearly enough through the rear windshield to observe defendant moving his hand between the seat and the console. Defendant contended that, because Doggett had "clear vision," the State did not establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. The court deemed credible Detective Doggett's testimony and concluded that the motor-vehicle stop was lawful because "defendant's vehicle appeared to have tinted windows in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-75."² The court did not find which of the car's windows were tinted or discuss the degree of window tinting.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State, pursuant to which he pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun and was sentenced to the recommended five years in prison with a three-and-one-half year period of parole ineligibility.

C.

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the State failed to justify the car stop because Detective Doggett did not testify to specific facts supporting his belief that the window tint on defendant's vehicle violated the motor vehicle code.

In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division affirmed. Relying on Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. at 380, 790 A.2d 202, the court reasoned that an actual violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 is not necessary to support the initial stop so long as the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation. The court further noted that the "companion statute" N.J.S.A. 39:3-75 provided an additional basis for the stop because the "unsafe distortion of visibility under this statute is not apparently limited to only the windshield and front windows, as it is in N.J.S.A. 39:3-74." The court found, based on Detective Doggett's "unrefuted testimony," that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation.

D.

This Court granted defendant's petition for certification, limited to the question of whether the State established a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the car stop. 248 N.J. 386, 259 A.3d 285 (2021). We subsequently granted leave to participate as amici curiae to the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) and the Seton Hall School of Law Center for Social Justice (CSJ).

Following this Court's grant of certification, the State moved for a limited remand to the trial court to vacate defendant's convictions and dismiss the charges against him. We granted that motion, reserving the right to proceed with the appeal regardless of the outcome of the remand proceedings.

Although the parties agree there was no reasonable suspicion for the car stop in this case, the issue presented is "of sufficient public importance, likely to surface again, to warrant our deciding it, even in the absence of an actual controversy between the litigants." State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 486, 453 A.2d 521 (1982). Thus, we consider the issues presented by this appeal...