State v. Weyland

240 A.3d 841

STATE of Maine

v.Kandee A. WEYLAND

Docket: Yor-19-459

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: September 15, 2020

Decided: November 3, 2020

Verne E. Paradie, Jr., Esq. (orally), Paradie & Rabasco, Lewiston, for appellant Kandee A. Weyland

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] Kandee A. Weyland, also known as Kandee A. Collind, appeals from a judgment of conviction of murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2020), entered by the trial court (York County, Douglas, J. ) following her plea of guilty. She argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. She also appeals her sentence of thirty-two years in prison, arguing that the court abused its discretion and misapplied sentencing principles in its decision. See State v. Weyland , No. SRP-19-460 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Jan. 2, 2020) (granting leave to appeal the sentence). We affirm the judgment and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶2] We draw the following facts from the State's recitation of the evidence, which was undisputed except as noted below at the time of Weyland's guilty plea. See M.R.U. Crim P. 11(b)(3), (e). Weyland and the victim were married and had two children, a son and a daughter, together. The couple separated in April 2016. On February 21, 2017, Weyland received in the mail notice of a judicial decision granting the victim primary physical residence of the children. She was upset by the decision and told her mother that she "wanted [the victim] dead." At that time, family members convinced her not to confront the victim.

[¶3] The following day, Weyland and the children were driving to visit family members when the son called the victim. During the call, the victim told the son about the decision granting the victim custody of the children. Weyland became aware of the conversation, and when she realized what the victim had told their son, she changed direction and drove to the victim's home. She exited the vehicle upon arriving and confronted the victim in his driveway. The victim began recording a video of her on his cell phone. Weyland then stabbed the victim in the chest, causing his death.

[¶4] The victim dropped his cell phone, and Weyland began stabbing it. While the son attempted to provide emergency care to his father, he saw Weyland doing something by a nearby barn.¹ Maine State Police eventually recovered the victim's phone near the barn where the son had seen her.

[¶5] In February 2017, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Weyland with one count of knowing or intentional murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), and one count of violation of a protective order (Class C), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(4) (2020). In April 2017, a grand jury indicted her on the same charges.

[¶6] Weyland and the State eventually reached a plea agreement pursuant to which she would plead guilty to murder and the State would dismiss the count for violation of a protection order and recommend a term of imprisonment for the murder of between twenty-five and thirty-two years. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 11A(a)(1), (3), (d). On August 27, 2018, the court held a hearing, pursuant to Rule 11, at which Weyland entered an unconditional guilty plea to the charge of murder. During the Rule 11 hearing, the court asked Weyland whether she was taking any prescription medications. She replied that she was taking Zyprexa, an antipsychotic medication, Vistaril, an anti-anxiety and antidepressant medication, and Tylenol.

A. Motion to Withdraw

[¶7] On October 26, 2018, before her sentencing, Weyland filed a motion to withdraw her plea. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 32(d). She asserted that she had not taken her prescribed medication on the day of the Rule 11 hearing and that she has limited cognitive capacity. Accordingly, she claimed that she had not entered a knowing plea because she did not understand the mens rea element of the murder charge.

[¶8] The court held an evidentiary hearing on her motion in June 2019. It admitted two exhibits: Weyland's medication records for August 2018 and a written summary of the phone calls she made while in jail. The evidence at the motion hearing focused on Zyprexa, Vistaril, and Topamax, a seizure medication. The State presented evidence that Weyland took her medications as prescribed during the days leading up to the Rule 11 hearing.

[¶9] In its written decision issued after the motion hearing, the court made the following findings of fact, which are supported by evidence in the record. See Wuestenberg v. Rancourt , 2020 ME 25, ¶ 8, 226 A.3d 227. The court found that Weyland was "coherent, engaged, cooperative, and responsive" at the Rule 11 hearing. Further, the court noted that Weyland's plea attorneys confirmed that they believed that she was entering a knowing and voluntary plea.

[¶10] The court found that Weyland had taken her medications as prescribed before the Rule 11 hearing and that she had not established that her medications, either alone or in combination, affected her ability to enter a knowing plea.² She "demonstrated sufficient awareness during the Rule 11 proceeding to challenge portions of the State's summary of facts [and] to question the court's explanation of the mens rea element [of murder]."

[¶11] In its findings, the court noted that Weyland entered her plea roughly sixteen months after indictment and that she filed a motion to withdraw the plea fifty-seven days after entering it. Despite this delay, the court found that she had misgivings about her plea "almost immediately" after the Rule 11 hearing.

[¶12] Based on its findings, the court entered an order denying Weyland's motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

B. Sentencing

[¶13] The court held a sentencing hearing in October 2019. At the hearing, the court made oral findings as to Weyland's commission of the offense. It determined that the basic sentence was forty-five years in prison. However, once the court weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors, it concluded that the maximum term of incarceration was thirty-two years. The court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Weyland to thirty-two years in prison.

[¶14] Weyland filed a timely appeal from the judgment of conviction, see 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), and an application to allow an appeal of her sentence, see 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151 - 2153 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 20. The Sentence Review Panel granted leave to appeal the sentence. State v. Weyland , No. 19-SRP-460 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Jan. 2, 2020).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶15] Weyland makes three primary arguments on appeal. The first is that she has a valid claim of innocence because she suffered from an abnormal condition of the mind and that the court should have allowed her to pursue that theory at trial. Second, she argues that the evidence in the motion record demonstrates that she wanted to withdraw her guilty plea almost immediately after the Rule 11 proceeding and that the State would not have experienced prejudice if her motion had been granted. Finally, she argues that the court misapplied sentencing principles. We conclude that her arguments are unpersuasive.

A. Motion to Withdraw Plea

[¶16] We review the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lambert , 2001 ME 113, ¶ 5, 775 A.2d 1140.

[¶17] Before a sentence is imposed, a criminal defendant may seek leave to withdraw a guilty plea. M.R.U. Crim. P. 32(d) ; State v. Bradstreet , 521 A.2d 679, 682 (Me. 1987). "Although relief should be granted liberally, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea." State v. Hillman , 2000 ME 71, ¶ 7, 749 A.2d 758. Instead, the trial court's decision must be "based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case with the ultimate purpose of furthering justice." State v. Malo , 577 A.2d 332, 333 (Me. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).

[¶18] "Trial courts evaluate four factors when deciding motions to withdraw pleas, and we similarly evaluate those factors when reviewing the trial court's exercise of its discretion." Hillman , 2000 ME 71, ¶ 8, 749 A.2d 758. They are (1) the length of time between the defendant's entering the plea and seeking to withdraw it; (2) any prejudice to the State that would result if the plea were withdrawn; (3) the defendant's assertion of innocence; and (4) any deficiency in the Rule 11 proceeding. Id. ; see Malo , 577 A.2d at 333 (citing cases relevant to each factor). No one factor is necessarily dispositive. See State v. Giroux , 2015 ME 28, ¶ 8, 113 A.3d 229. However, one factor's weight alone may tip the scale in the defendant's favor. See id. [¶19] We begin with the length of time between Weyland's entering the plea and her decision to withdraw it. See Hillman , 2000 ME 71, ¶¶ 8-9, 749 A.2d 758 ; Lambert , 2001 ME 113, ¶ 6, 775 A.2d 1140. We have favored a case-by-case approach when evaluating whether a defendant's delay in seeking to withdraw the plea was so lengthy as to weigh against allowing withdrawal.³ State v. Comer , 584 A.2d 638, 640 (Me. 1990). The trial court made several factual determinations when coming to its ultimate finding on the length of time between the entry of the plea and Weyland's decision to request its withdrawal. We review these determinations for clear error. True v. State , 457 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1983).

[¶20] In evaluating Weyland's motion, the trial court found that her "first definitive indication that [she] had made a firm decision to seek to withdraw her plea" occurred on October 21, 2018, fifty-two days after the Rule 11 proceeding. The court based its finding on evidence of an October 21 phone call with her son, during which she said, "I told my ... lawyers that I wanted ... a trial." However, there was also evidence that, in a recorded telephone conversation on September 18, 2018,...