Steward v. State, A19-1401

950 N.W.2d 750

Raymond Cortez STEWARD, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

A19-1401

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: November 12, 2020

Raymond Cortez Steward, Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

A Ramsey County jury found appellant Raymond Cortez Steward guilty of first-degree premediated murder, second-degree intentional murder, and second-degree felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Talvous McKinney. The district court convicted Steward of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life with the possibility of release after 30 years. On direct appeal, we affirmed his conviction. Seventeen years later, Steward moved to correct his sentence, claiming that his conviction violated Minn. Stat. § 611.02 (2018). Under section 611.02, when "there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty," a defendant shall be convicted of only the lowest degree offense. The district court denied Steward's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so, we affirm.

FACTS

On July 4, 2000, Steward fatally shot Talvous McKinney.¹ A grand jury indicted Steward for first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree intentional murder. Steward pleaded not guilty. During the trial, the district court instructed the jury on the two charged offenses. Steward also asked for, and the district court agreed to, a jury instruction on the offense of second-degree felony murder. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three offenses.

The district court entered a judgment of conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and imposed a sentence of life with the possibility of release after 30 years.² The court dismissed the second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder offenses, and no sentence was imposed in connection with those offenses.

On direct appeal, Steward claimed that he was denied a fair trial. Steward argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Steward's gun-shaped jewelry. State v. Steward , 645 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 2002). He also argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Id. We affirmed Steward's conviction.³ Id. at 125.

In 2019, Steward, representing himself, moved to correct his sentence under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, which states: "The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law." In his supporting affidavit, Steward claimed that his sentence was "un-authorized" because the jury returned multiple guilty verdicts for one single behavioral act. According to Steward, the three verdicts showed that the jury had a "reasonable doubt" about which degree of murder he was guilty. Based on this alleged doubt, Steward argued that his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder violated Minn. Stat. § 611.02 ("[W]hen ... there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees the defendant is guilty, the defendant shall be convicted only of the lowest [degree]."). The State did not directly respond to Steward's section 611.02 argument. Instead, the State argued that Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2018), expressly allows a court to enter a sentence for one crime arising from a single behavioral incident. Because Steward was convicted of and sentenced on only the first-degree premeditated murder offense, the State argued that Steward's conviction and sentence were lawful.

Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Steward's motion to correct his sentence. The district court explained: "In this case, Petitioner was found guilty by jury of all three [offenses]. There was no reasonable doubt as to which offense he was found guilty. He was lawfully convicted of and sentenced to the most serious offense." Steward appealed.

ANALYSIS

Steward argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to correct his sentence without an evidentiary hearing. Steward renews the claim that his first-degree murder conviction is unlawful because it violates Minn. Stat. § 611.02. Steward also claims, for the first time on appeal, that the three guilty verdicts in his case violate both the prohibition against multiple convictions for a crime and a lesser degree of the same crime as provided in Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018), as well as the prohibition against multiple punishments for a single act as provided in Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the first-degree murder conviction does not violate Minn. Stat. § 611.02, Steward forfeited review of his claims that the three guilty verdicts violate sections 609.04 and 609.035, and even if he had not forfeited review, these claims fail on the merits.

I.

We first address Steward's claim that his conviction and sentence violate section 611.02. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.03, subdivision 9, authorizes a court, at any time, to correct a sentence not authorized by law.⁴ "For a sentence to be unauthorized, it must be contrary to law or applicable statutes." State v. Schnagl , 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015). The defendant must prove the facts necessary to show that the sentence is unauthorized. See Williams v. State , 910 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 2018).

We review a district court's denial of a motion to correct a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. 2018). We will reverse the district court only when it has "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Evans v. State , 925 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Reed v. State , 793 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010) ).

We begin with a recitation of the three offenses under which the jury returned guilty verdicts. The first-degree premeditated murder statute makes it a crime to cause "the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another." Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (1) (2000). By contrast, the second-degree intentional murder statute makes it a crime to cause "the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation. " Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018) (emphasis added). Finally, the second-degree felony murder statute makes it a crime to cause "the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting." Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2018) (emphasis added).

Relying on the "without" clauses for the second-degree offenses, Steward claims that the three guilty verdicts show that the jurors could not decide whether he committed the murder with premeditation and intent or without premeditation and intent. Based on this alleged doubt, Steward renews his argument that his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder violates Minn. Stat. § 611.02. But Steward's argument is founded on a mistaken belief that the "without" clauses of the second-degree offenses make them legally inconsistent with one another and with the first-degree murder offense.

Multiple guilty verdicts on various degrees of murder offenses can be logically inconsistent without being legally inconsistent. See State v. Moore (Moore I ), 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). Convicting a defendant after a jury renders logically inconsistent verdicts is not an error, but doing so after a jury renders legally inconsistent verdicts is an error. See State v. Crowsbreast , 629 N.W.2d 433, 440 (Minn. 2001) ; State v. Leake , 699 N.W.2d 312, 325-26 (Minn. 2005). Whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law, which we review de novo. Leake , 699 N.W.2d at 325.

Verdicts are legally inconsistent only "when proof of the elements of one offense negates a necessary element of another offense." State v. Cole , 542 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. 1996). For example, we have held that guilty verdicts on both first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree manslaughter are legally inconsistent because the first offense requires the State to prove that a death was caused with premeditation and intent, while the second offense requires the State to prove that a death was caused through negligent or reckless conduct. State v. Moore (Moore II ), 458 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 1990). The elements of those two offenses negate each other because it is not possible to commit an act both negligently and intentionally. Id. But a "without" clause in which existence of the fact referenced in the clause would constitute a more serious offense does not set out an element of the offense—it merely causes one offense to be a lesser-included offense to the other.⁵ State v. Hall , 931 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 2019).

In Moore I , we specifically addressed the "without premeditation" clause in the second-degree intentional murder statute, holding that the clause is not an essential element of the crime—the State need not prove that the murder occurred "without premeditation." 438 N.W.2d at 108. Thus, "[g]uilty verdicts for first and second degree murder are not legally inconsistent." Id. And in Cole , we specifically addressed the "without intent to effect the death of any person" clause in the second-degree felony murder statute, holding that the clause did not constitute an element that the State must prove. 542 N.W.2d at 50-51. Thus, second-degree felony murder is not legally inconsistent with second-degree intentional murder or first-degree premeditated murder. Second-degree intentional murder...