Stringfellow v. State

199 Md.App. 141

20 A.3d 825

Reginald STRINGFELLOW

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 0139

Sept. Term

2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 27, 2011.

Piedad Gomez (Paul DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for appellant.Daniel J. Jawor (Douglas Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.Panel: MEREDITH, WOODWARD, PAUL E. ALPERT (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.PAUL E. ALPERT (Retired, Specially Assigned), J.

Reginald Stringfellow, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. The court subsequently sentenced appellant to five years of imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, and a concurrent three year term, respectively. Appellant asks two questions on appeal:

I. Did the trial court err in asking the venire panel during voir dire: “Does any member of the panel believe that the State is required to utilize specific investigative or scientific techniques such as fingerprint examination in order for the defendant to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?”

II. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions?

Because we answer both questions in the affirmative, we shall reverse appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

Detectives Sherrod Biggers and Augustus Lake, both with the Baltimore City Police Department, testified that around 7:00 p.m. on November 21, 2009, they were in an unmarked police car in the 5300 block of Beaufort Street. Detective Lake was driving; Detective Biggers was in the passenger seat; both were wearing plain clothes. As they approached the dead-end portion of the street, the detectives saw four men, including appellant, standing on the sidewalk to the right of the car. Both detectives testified that they saw appellant holding a handgun in his hands.

The detectives described what happened next. Detective Biggers testified that appellant's gun was “out like [ ] down towards his side” and that “[o]nce he seen our vehicle, he tried to pass it off to somebody else [who] dropped it and took off running.” Detective Lake testified similarly that appellant took the silver handgun from his right hand at “his side and he ... made a handing type motion to the guy that was standing just in the front of him, but that individual either batted it down or he pushed it down to the ground and he started to run.” While the one man ran, appellant and the other two men “just stood there[.]”

The detectives stopped their car about four feet from appellant. While arresting appellant, Detective Biggers testified that he did not have any conversation with the other two men but remembered one of the men, who appeared to be in his 40's, telling the detective that appellant was his brother. Detective Lake did not remember having any conversation with the two men, but did remember asking them to step back, which they did. Detective Lake recovered the semiautomatic pistol from the sidewalk; it had seven live rounds in it. Detective Biggers did not request a fingerprint analysis on the gun, explaining that he had recovered 20 handguns and on none of those were suitable fingerprints ever found.

Michael McKay, appellant's friend for over ten years, testified for the defense. McKay testified that he and appellant were “hanging out” and walking around when two men in their mid 20's approached McKay from behind. Appellant and McKay were in their late 30's to early 40's. One of the younger men pulled out a gun, held it to McKay's back, and told him to get on the ground. McKay put his hands up in the air and told him, “I ain't have no money on me.” The police arrived about that time and the man immediately dropped the gun and ran. Much to McKay's dismay, the police did not chase after the man but arrested appellant. McKay told the police: “He was with me. Why you all locking him up?” McKay was impeached with convictions in 1999 and 2004 for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it asked the voir dire panel, over defense counsel's objection: “Does any member of the panel believe that the State is required to utilize specific investigative or scientific techniques such as fingerprint examination in order for the defendant to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?” According to appellant, the question signaled to the potential jurors that they should convict him and “minimized the State's ultimate burden of proof by informing jurors that they need not expect evidence of scientific quality[.]” Appellant cites Charles and Drake v. State, 414 Md. 726, 997 A.2d 154 (2010), in support of his argument. The State argues that the question did not dilute the State's burden of proof but only “attempt[ed] to identify those biased in favor of forensic evidence to the exclusion of all other evidence.” ¹ The State argues that Charles and Drake is inapposite and cites Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1946), in support of its argument. For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that the question posed is not distinctively different from the question posed in Charles and Drake, and so we shall reverse appellant's convictions.

“ ‘Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.’ ” White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 240, 821 A.2d 459 (2003)(quoting Rosales–Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981))(italics omitted), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 904, 124 S.Ct. 262, 157 L.Ed.2d 189 (2003). “[T]he ‘overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury.’ ” Wright v. State, 411 Md. 503, 508, 983 A.2d 519 (2009)(quoting Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819 (2000)). “Indeed, the only purpose of voir dire in Maryland is to illuminate to the trial court any cause for juror disqualification.” Id. See White, 374 Md. at 240, 821 A.2d 459 (“Without adequate voir dire, the trial judge is unable to fulfill his or her responsibility to eliminate those prospective jurors who will be unable to perform their duty impartially.”) (Italics omitted).

The manner of voir dire is governed by Md. Rule 4–312. That Rule provides, in pertinent part:

The trial judge may permit the parties to conduct an examination of qualified jurors or may conduct the examination after considering questions proposed by the parties. If the judge conducts the examination, the judge may permit the parties to supplement the examination by further inquiry or may submit to the jurors additional questions proposed by the parties. The jurors' responses to any examination shall be under oath.

Md. Rule 4–312(d)(1).

“In the absence of a statute or rule prescribing the questions to be asked of the venire persons during the examination the subject is left largely to the sound discretion of the court in each particular case.” Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 644, 989 A.2d 1150 (2010)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “That discretion extends to both the form and the substance of questions posed to the venire.” Wright, 411 Md. at 508, 983 A.2d 519 (citations omitted). As to the “abuse of discretion” standard, the Court has recently explained that the standard:

is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways. It has been said to occur “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result,” when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” or when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.”

There is a certain commonality in all these definitions, to the extent that they express the notion that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.

North [ v. North ], 102 Md.App. [1] at 13–14, 648 A.2d [1025] at 1031–32 [ (1994) ] (alterations in original)(internal citations omitted).

King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697, 967 A.2d 790 (2009).

Although it is impermissible to commit prospective jurors to a decision in advance, they may be questioned about their attitudes concerning key issues to be raised at trial, issues such as whether a prospective juror has strong feelings regarding violations of narcotic laws, State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 798 A.2d 566 (2002); whether sexual abuse charges stir up strong emotional feelings, Sweet v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9–10, 806 A.2d 265 (2002); whether a prospective juror may give more weight to a State's witness's testimony, Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 989 A.2d 1150 (2010); or whether a prospective juror may give more weight to a police officer's testimony, Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 378 A.2d 1338 (1977).

In Charles and Drake v. State, 414 Md. 726, 997 A.2d 154 (2010), the Court of Appeals recently addressed the propriety of a voir dire question aimed at addressing the “CSI effect.” ² In that case, the trial court asked the following venire question:

I'm going to assume that many of you, from having done a few of these, watch way too much TV, including the so-called realistic crime shows like CSI and...