Stuart v. Pierce

587 F.Supp.3d 127

Gary STUART

v.David PIERCE, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-934 (LFR)

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Signed February 24, 2022

Jason Carden Jowers, Justin C. Barrett, Bayard, P.A., Wilmington, DE, for Gary L. Stuart.

Ryan T. Costa, Kenneth Lee-Kay Wan, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for David Pierce.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

L. Felipe Restrepo, United States Circuit Judge

Plaintiff Gary Stuart ("Stuart"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("JTVCC"), brought this action against Defendant David Pierce ("Pierce"), the former warden of JTVCC, seeking compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Stuart alleges three violations: I) deliberate indifference to his serious medical need; II) deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide; and III) cruel and unusual conditions of confinement and a violation of his right to due process. Before the Court is Pierce's motion to dismiss Stuart's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In addition to arguing Stuart fails to allege claims upon which relief can be granted, Pierce asserts the claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to qualified immunity on all three counts. For the reasons outlined in this opinion, Pierce's motion to dismiss and request for qualified immunity are denied as to Counts I and III. However, Pierce is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count II and his motion to dismiss is granted as to that claim.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

Pierce was the warden of JTVCC from August 2013 to February 2017. Comp. ¶ 4. Stuart is presently an inmate at JTVCC and was an inmate there at all times related to this lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 3. For most of his life, Stuart has suffered from severe mental health issues; he has engaged in self-harm since the age of eleven and has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder, depression, and attention deficit disorder. Id. at ¶ 9-10. In 2000, while incarcerated for an unrelated crime, he committed self-harm by jumping off his cell block, which led to a year and half stay in the Delaware Psychiatric Center. Id. at ¶ 11-12. After his release, he was again incarcerated at JTVCC in 2003 for a probation violation. Id. at ¶ 13. JTVCC classified Stuart as a "seriously mentally ill person" and kept him on the mental health roster. Id. at ¶ 14.

In April 2006, Stuart was moved to JTVCC's Security Housing Unit ("SHU") after he was convicted of murdering his cellmate. Id. at ¶ 15. Although inmates could earn their way out of the SHU with good behavior, Stuart would remain in the SHU for the next decade. Id. at ¶ 17-18. During this time, he repeatedly cut himself and even painted on the walls of his cell with his own blood. Id. at ¶ 20. Stuart alleges his mental health conditions were exacerbated by the small cell dimensions, the near-constant light and noise, and the lack of adequate recreation, hygiene, and rehabilitative programs in the SHU. Id. at ¶ 21. Most significantly, Stuart alleges he was denied adequate mental health treatment. Id.

Between 2006 and 2013, Stuart alleges his only access to mental health treatment in the SHU was the ability to put in a "sick call." Id. at ¶ 25. After making a sick call and waiting several days, Stuart could have a short, non-confidential talk with a mental health provider standing outside of his solid cell door. Id. These conditions allegedly took a toll on Stuart's mental health. He was placed on suicide watch in 2012 and 2013 and engaged in self-harm through his ten years in the SHU. Id. at ¶ 23. Stuart alleges that Pierce was made aware of these facts as the prison warden. Id. Outside of the SHU, prisoners in the Special Needs Unit ("SNU") had greater access to treatment, including daily access to therapy and group sessions. Id. at ¶ 24.

Beginning in 2013 and coinciding with Pierce's arrival at JTVCC, Stuart was afforded a marginal increase in treatment. Id. at ¶ 26. He received weekly visits—still non-confidential and through his solid cell door—and saw a psychiatrist every 90 days. Id. He alleges this treatment did little to assuage his mental health problems, and he continued to commit self-harm and have suicidal thoughts. Id. In 2014 and 2015, the prison's Institutional Based Classification Committee ("IBCC") classified Stuart as medium security, finding that he did not need to remain in the SHU and recommending that he be transferred to a lower security unit so he could receive treatment. Id. at ¶ 32. On both occasions, Pierce exercised his statutory power to unilaterally "veto" Stuart's reclassification without explanation. Id.

Stuart also consistently advocated for his own reclassification.² In October 2014, he filed a medical grievance discussing his psychological troubles and need for treatment. Id. at ¶ 28. He filed two more medical grievances, as well as wrote personal letters to Pierce and Deputy Warden Parker in November and December of 2015. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31, 33. In the November grievance, Stuart highlighted his need for confidential care and the ineffectiveness of the visits at his cell door. Id. at ¶ 29. In the December grievance, he wrote that he "doesn't know how much more longer he can hold on ... suffering from a great deal of depression, stress, and a abundance of very very unhealthy thoughts." Id. at ¶ 31. Deputy Warden Parker responded to the letter by writing that he was declining to reclassify Stuart because of his prior murder conviction, despite his record of good behavior as recognized by the IBCC. Id. at ¶ 34-35. Pierce did not respond. Id. at ¶ 34.

Stuart remained in the SHU and, in January 2016, attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself. Id. at ¶ 37. Following this attempt, prison mental health professionals lobbied Pierce to reclassify Stuart. Id. Pierce still did not permit the reclassification until June 2016. Id. at ¶ 38. Despite being reclassified, Stuart alleges the toll of his decade-long stay in the SHU was severe: he attempted suicide three more times between August 2017 and August 2018 and continued to engage in self-harm. Id. at ¶ 39-42. After more trips to the Delaware Psychiatric Hospital and Kent General Hospital, Stuart returned to JTVCC in 2018, where he remains. Id. at ¶ 42, 43.

On July 11, 2017, Stuart filed his original complaint against Pierce and Warden Perry Phelps, seeking monetary relief. Def. Br. at 1. He filed his first amended complaint in February 2019, adding a request for injunctive relief. Id. He filed his second amended complaint, the operative complaint, in October 2019, alleging the three counts now at issue. Id. The basis of Stuart's complaint is that Pierce knew of his mental health needs because of, inter alia , the prison records of his suicide attempt, his regular self-harm at JTVCC, his requests for improved treatment, and the instances he was placed on suicide watch. Comp. at ¶ 45-54. Stuart alleges that Pierce, by keeping him in the SHU for a decade and failing to address his mental health needs, was deliberately indifferent to his health and his risk of suicide. Id. at ¶ 55-75. Stuart further alleges that Pierce violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by keeping him in the SHU for so long and vetoing the IBCC's reclassifications without providing him sufficient process. Id. at ¶ 76-84.

Defendants Pierce and Phelps moved to dismiss the complaint, and the Court granted a stipulation to dismiss all claims asserted against Defendant Warden Phelps. Def. Br. at 2. The Court denied the motion as to Pierce but allowed him to file a renewed motion to dismiss after the parties had met and conferred. Id. Pierce filed the renewed motion in September 2021, which has since been fully briefed. Id. This decision follows.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Under this standard, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint "must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). However, the requirement that a court accept the allegations in a complaint as true "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

To summarize, a court takes three steps when it considers a motion to dismiss under the current pleading standard. First, the court "must take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). Second, it "should identify allegations that, because they are no more than legal conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (quotations omitted). Lastly, "when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (quotations and brackets omitted).

III. Discussion

Pierce's motion to dismiss raises three arguments. First, that any of Stuart's claims arising from events before July 11, 2015, are barred by the statute of limitations. Second, that each of Stuart's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be...