Swift v. Old Dominion Freight Lines, Inc.

583 F.Supp.3d 1125

Andre SWIFT, as Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Janeisha Rogers, and as next friend and guardian of A.S., A.S., A.R., and A.R., four minor children, Plaintiff,

v.OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINES, INC. and George R. Allison, Jr., Defendants.

Case No. 2:20-cv-2758-MSN-tmp

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

Signed January 31, 2022

Brenna Lynn Sanchez, Orville O. Dunk, The Dunk Law Firm, LLP, Houston, TX, Michelle Ford, Dunk Law Firm, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Carl Wyatt, Glassman Wyatt Tuttle & Cox, P.C., Memphis, TN, Lewis Wilkinson Lyons, Glassman Edwards Wade and Wyatt, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARK S. NORRIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment¹ ("Motion") (ECF No. 50) filed October 22, 2021. Plaintiff responded in opposition on November 18, 2021 (ECF No. 55). Defendants filed a reply in support on November 30, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident on February 13, 2020 on Shelby Drive in Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 318.) On that day, Janeisha Rogers ("Ms. Rogers") and her four children were driving westbound on Shelby Drive, approaching the intersection of Shelby Drive and Boeingshire, and Defendant George Allison ("Mr. Allison") was driving eastbound on Shelby Drive in a tractor trailer owned by Defendant Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. ("Old Dominion"). (Id. ) As Mr. Allison approached the intersection of Shelby Drive and Boeingshire, the traffic light was green and remained green as he went through the intersection. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 319.) As Mr. Allison proceeded through the intersection, two vehicles ahead of him passed Ms. Rogers, after which she began turning left across oncoming traffic towards the driveway of a gas station. (Id. ; ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 416.) Three seconds later, Ms. Rogers’ vehicle was hit by the Old Dominion tractor trailer driven by Mr. Allison. (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 417.) In other words, from the time Ms. Rogers began her left turn to the time of impact was three seconds; Mr. Allison thus had three seconds to perceive, react, and slow to avoid the collision. (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 417.) Mr. Allison did not apply his brakes until within the last second before the collision. (Id. ) An additional one second was needed for Ms. Rogers to complete her turn into the gas station's driveway. (Id. )

In the seconds before the collision, Mr. Allison was driving at 46 miles per hour along Shelby Drive where the posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 320.) It is undisputed that a driver with an average perception-reaction time of two seconds, traveling at 40 miles per hour in Mr. Allison's vehicle would have had sufficient time to avoid the collision. (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 417.) Because Mr. Allison was traveling at 46 miles per hour, it is undisputed that he needed to have an above-average perception reaction time to avoid the collision. (Id. )

According to Defendants, there is no evidence that Ms. Rogers activated her left turn signal before she attempted to make the left turn. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 319.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, disputes this and argues the evidence is inconclusive as to whether Ms. Rogers activated her left turn signal. (Id. ) Mr. Allison did not see Mr. Rogers begin her turn, as he turned his eyes away from his forward view when he was coming through the intersection at Shelby Drive and Boeingshire. (ECF No. 56-1 at PageID 418.) According to Defendants, at the time Ms. Rogers began her left turn, the Old Dominion tractor trailer driven by Mr. Allison was close enough to the entrance of the gas station driveway to constitute an "immediate hazard" to Ms. Rogers. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 320; ECF No. 50-3 at PageID 228.)

As of the date of the accident, Mr. Allison had more than 40 years of experience as a commercial truck driver, with more than 30 of those years as an employee of Old Dominion. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 318.) Mr. Allison had a valid commercial driver's license from the state of Mississippi on the date of the accident, and there were no mechanical problems with the Old Dominion tractor trailer. (Id. at PageID 319.) Old Dominion holds monthly safety meetings that Mr. Allison attends. (Id. at PageID 319.) There are no allegations or evidence that Mr. Allison was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the accident. (Id. at PageID 320.)

Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Rogers died, and her four children suffered severe personal injuries, because of the collision. (ECF No. 26 at PageID 97.) In support of their Motion, Defendants have submitted a video from a dash camera on the Old Dominion tractor trailer driven by Mr. Allison. (ECF No. 55-1 at PageID 320.)

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW

The Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of different states "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Plaintiff is Administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of Janeisha Rogers, who was a citizen of Tennessee. (See ECF No. 58 at PageID 423.) Plaintiff is also the next friend and guardian of A.S., A.S., A.R., and A.R., four minor children, all of whom are citizens of Tennessee. (See id. ) Defendant George Allison is a citizen of Mississippi (see ECF No. 26 at PageID 96), and Defendant Old Dominion Freight Lines, Inc. is a citizen of Virginia (see ECF No. 26 at PageID 97) and North Carolina (see ECF No. 58 at PageID 424). The parties are completely diverse.

State substantive law applies to state law claims brought in federal court. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Where there is no dispute that a certain state's substantive law applies, the Court will not conduct a choice-of-law analysis sua sponte. See GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co. , 139 F.3d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998). The parties assumed in their motion, response, reply, and in their respective memoranda, that Tennessee substantive law applies to Plaintiff's claims and have made their arguments accordingly. Thus, the Court will apply Tennessee substantive law. In applying Tennessee substantive law, this Court is "bound by controlling decisions" of the Tennessee Supreme Court, "and in the absence of a decision addressing the issue, must predict how that court would rule by looking to ‘all available data.’ " Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc. , 930 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 696 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2012) ).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a party to move for summary judgment — and the Court to grant summary judgment — "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc. , 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply "by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot "rest upon its ... pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Moldowan v. City of Warren , 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ). The nonmoving party must present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over material facts remain and must be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ); see also White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc. , 617 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2010). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Moldowan , 578 F.3d at 374.

The Court's role is limited to determining whether there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, if the evidence in the case "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Such a...