Targonski v. City of Oak Ridge

921 F.Supp.2d 820

Christina TARGONSKI, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF OAK RIDGE, Defendant.

No. 3:11–CV–269.

United States District Court,

E.D. Tennessee,

Knoxville Division.

Feb. 5, 2013.

Michael S. Shipwash, Law Office of Michael Shipwash, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin K. Lauderback, Emily A. Cleveland, Watson, Roach, Batson, Rowell & Lauderback PLC, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEON JORDAN, District Judge.

This civil rights action is set for trial on February 13, 2013. Now before the court are sixteen motions in limine filed by the defense [docs. 37–52]. In addition, the defense moves for a pretrial conference to address the pending motions [doc. 54]. Plaintiff has responded to the motions in limine [doc. 59], and the defense has submitted a reply [doc. 60].

Also before the court is a six-pronged motion in limine filed by plaintiff [doc. 56]. Defendant has responded to that filing.

I.Pertinent Background

The facts underlying this employment dispute were summarized at length in the court's summary judgment ruling [doc. 22, 2012 WL 2930813] and will be referenced herein only to the extent necessary to address the instant motions. Plaintiff's complaint contained twelve counts: hostile work environment; retaliation; disparate treatment; harassment; constructive discharge; extreme and outrageous conduct; negligent infliction of emotional distress; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring; negligent supervision; negligent training; and gross negligence. The court granted defendant's summary judgment motion in part, dismissing ten of the twelve claims. An eleventh claim (harassment) was noted by the court to be simply a component of plaintiff's other Title VII claims, as opposed to a freestanding cause of action.

Therefore, in accordance with the court's summary judgment ruling, only one claim remains for trial—hostile work environment under Title VII. Regarding that count, the court has explained,

A plaintiff may show a violation of Title VII via a hostile work environment claim without having to prove that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir.2000). The elements of a prima facie hostile work environment claim are: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the employee's gender; (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and (5) respondeat superior liability. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., 400 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir.2005). Regarding the fifth prong, “[a]n employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the charged [coworker] harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.” Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir.1999) (citation and quotations omitted).

[Doc. 22, p. 15–16]. With that framework in mind, the court will address the pending motions in turn.

II.Analysis

A. Defendant's First Motion in Limine

Defendant moves to exclude any reference or evidence pertaining to the EEOC's investigation of plaintiff's complaints [doc. 37]. Plaintiff's exhibit list includes her EEOC charge (item 2), her EEOC intake questionnaire (item 14), and letters to and from an EEOC investigator (items 11, 12, and 15).

In response to the motion, plaintiff mentions three ways in which her EEOC file is purportedly relevant: (1) the filing of her EEOC charge evidences that she complied with Title VII's procedural requirements; (2) her allegation that defendant “was petitioning to have my certification revoked” is evidence of a hostile work environment; and (3) defendant's response to the EEOC is probative of defendant's “good faith.” These arguments are without merit.

First, plaintiff's compliance with Title VII's procedural hurdles is not an issue in this trial. Second, plaintiff alleges that defendant “was petitioning to have my certification revoked” a few weeks prior to December 30, 2010, which would have been several months after she quit her job. Plaintiff offers no explanation as to how this issue could be relevant to a purported hostile work environment from several months in the past. In fact, when she notified the EEOC by letter, she deemed the certification revocation issue “one more case of retaliation to report to you.” However, plaintiff's retaliation claim in this court has been dismissed.

Lastly, plaintiff offers no explanation as to how the defendant's “good faith” in dealing with the EEOC would be relevant to her hostile work environment claim—the only claim that will be in front of the jury. The sole case cited by plaintiff—Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp.—involved falsified documents and “trumped-up charges” by the employer to the EEOC. See340 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir.2003). Plaintiff points to no similar happenings in this case. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir.1997) (“It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.”).

Plaintiff's EEOC charge complained of retaliation in addition to hostile work environment. Because the retaliation claim in this case has been dismissed, the EEOC investigation pertains at least in part to irrelevant matters. Further, plaintiff will be available to testify at trial, so it is unclear to the court why admission of EEOC documents would be necessary or what probative value those documents would have. See Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47 Fed.Appx. 716, 723 (6th Cir.2002). In her motion response, plaintiff has failed to persuasively explain why any EEOC evidence should be admitted. The court therefore concludes that any probative value of evidence relating to the EEOC investigation would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defense, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasted time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence. SeeFed.R.Evid. 403.

Defendant's first motion in limine will therefore be granted. Plaintiff shall not attempt to introduce any evidence or testimony pertaining to the EEOC's investigation of her complaints.

B. Defendant's Second Motion in Limine

Defendant moves to exclude “any reference to an investigation by this Defendant and/or complaints from Plaintiff arising out of purportedly harassing phone calls she received in January of 2010 from a blocked telephone number” [doc. 41]. The motion will be granted.

In her pretrial theory of the case, plaintiff contends that the alleged hostile work environment resulted, in part, from “having harassing phone calls made to her.” [Doc. 29, p. 2]. The court discussed this issue in its summary judgment ruling:

In January 2010, plaintiff also complained to Sergeant Tedford that she had received six unwanted calls on her cell phone “with heavy breathing and giggling,” perhaps “having been made by a male disguising his voice in a manner to sound scary.” The record does not indicate that the calls were sexual in nature. Sergeant Tedford opened a criminal investigation and subpoenaed plaintiff's cell phone records in order to identify the caller.

...

For unknown reasons, plaintiff's cell phone records were not received by defendant until May 14, 2010. The records showed that the calls were actually placed from the phone of Ms. Bridges [ a non-employee friend of plaintiff's]. On June 17, 2010, Bridges appeared at the police department to be interviewed by Sergeant Tedford. However, Bridges was accompanied by plaintiff and refused to be interviewed outside of plaintiff's presence. Sergeant Tedford and Captain Mike Uher explained to plaintiff that it would be inappropriate for her to be present during the interview since she was the victim of the alleged crime. Plaintiff admittedly became agitated. Bridges refused to be interviewed alone, and the investigation was closed.

[Doc. 22, p. 2–3].

Plaintiff will not be permitted to discuss the harassing phone calls at trial because the issue is irrelevant to her gender-based hostile work environment claim. The phone calls were placed from the phone of a person not employed by defendant. Defendant investigated the complaint, but that investigation was ultimately thwarted by plaintiff's interference and her friend's non-cooperation. The phone calls have not been shown to have any relevance to plaintiff's gender-based claim against the defendant. SeeFed.R.Evid. 401. Even if relevant, proof on this issue would be excluded because any conceivable probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant, potential confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, undue delay, and waste of time. SeeFed.R.Evid. 403. Plaintiff's response to this motion gives the court no reason to conclude otherwise. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir.1997) (“It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its bones.”).

Defendant's second motion in limine will be granted. Plaintiff will not be permitted to offer any proof regarding the alleged January 2010 harassing telephone calls.

C. Defendant's Third Motion in Limine

Defendant moves to exclude “any reference to lost wages, back pay, front pay, and constructive discharge, and any testimony from Plaintiff and/or other witnesses that Plaintiff was ‘forced to resign’ ” [doc. 38]. The motion will be granted.

At summary judgment, the court dismissed plaintiff's constructive discharge claim and ruled that she was not subjected to an adverse employment action such as termination. [Doc. 22, p. 10–14]. Plaintiff's contention in her pretrial theory of the case, that she was “forced to resign,” disregards the court's prior ruling.¹ Because plaintiff was neither terminated nor constructively discharged (nor “forced to resign”), damages for lost wages are not available to her. See, e.g., Lulaj v. Wackenhut Corp., 512 F.3d...