Temple v. Hudson View Owners Corp.

222 F.Supp.3d 318

Hildred TEMPLE and Diana–Brown–Temple, Plaintiffs,

v.HUDSON VIEW OWNERS CORPORATION, Hudson North Management, and Eric Giordano, Defendants.

No. 16–CV–3203 (CS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed November 28, 2016

Hildred Temple, Diana Brown–Temple, Yonkers, New York, Plaintiffs Pro Se.

Carl L. Finger, Finger & Finger, White Plains, New York, Counsel for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Seibel, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

A. Facts

Plaintiffs Hildred Temple and Diana Brown–Temple are husband and wife who live at a complex called Hudson View, on Warburton Avenue in Yonkers, New York ("Hudson View"). (Doc. 15, at 2; Ps' Mem. 2.)¹ Plaintiffs are both disabled and over the age of sixty-five. (Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 15, at 2.) For approximately thirteen years, with the permission of the Board of Hudson View (the "Board"), Plaintiffs have paid for and made use of parking spaces # 4 and # 265 at Hudson View. (Doc. 11 Ex. A; Ps' Mem. 2.)

On January 26, 2016, Plaintiffs received a letter from Defendant Hudson North Management stating that as of May 3, 2016, Plaintiffs would no longer be able to use parking space # 265. (Doc. 1 Ex. A.) The letter indicated that Plaintiffs needed to surrender the space for use by another Hudson View resident. (Doc. 15, at 2; Ps' Mem. 2.) In April 2016, Plaintiffs were approached by the superintendent of Hudson View, who informed them that they had to remove their personal belongings from the storage area next to parking space # 4, thereby triggering Plaintiffs' concern about both parking spaces. (Doc. 1 Ex. A.) On April 21, 2016, Ms. Brown–Temple asked the Board, including the manager and superintendent, to not take away her parking space because she is disabled. (Id. ) The Board requested medical documentation of Ms. Brown–Temple's disability before making its decision. (Id. ) Ms. Brown–Temple's request for an extension of time from the Board to submit such documentation was denied, as was Plaintiffs' request to remain in parking space # 265. (Id. ) On May 3, 2016, after the commencement of this action, the superintendent told Ms. Brown–Temple to " ‘[e]mpty out the storage space attach[ed] to parking space # 4 immediately.’ " (Ps' Mem. 4.)

B. Procedural History

On April 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their pro se complaint. (Doc. 1.) They appear to be asserting a reasonable accommodation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (the "FHA"), seeking injunctive relief in the form of continued use of a second parking space at Hudson View. (Id. ) On April 29, 2016, Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against Defendants to allow Plaintiffs' continued use of both of their parking spaces. (Doc. 3.) On May 3, 2016, a show cause hearing was held and the Court declined to grant the requested relief, finding no imminent irreparable harm. At the show cause hearing the Court indicated that not having two parking spots may be an inconvenience to Plaintiffs but that it was unclear to the Court why Plaintiffs could not coordinate to make use of one parking space.

On May 23, 2016, the Court waived the pre-motion conference requirement and set a briefing schedule for Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 6.) On June 22, 2016, Defendants filed their motion. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiffs submitted their brief in opposition on July 22, 2016, reiterating that due to aging and their disabilities two parking spots have become a necessity. (Docs. 15, 16.) Defendants replied on August 5, 2016. (Doc. 17).

II. Legal Standards

The standard for assessing a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills , 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001) ; Accelecare Wound Ctrs., Inc. v. Bank of N.Y. , No. 08–CV–8351, 2009 WL 2460987, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009).²

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8"marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court "begin[s] by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth," and then determines whether the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true, "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Deciding whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

On a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court may ordinarily only consider "the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case." L–7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC , 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A complaint is also deemed to include any ... materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A document is "integral" if the complaint "relies heavily on its terms and effects." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court will consider Plaintiffs' written requests for the accommodation, (Ps' Mem. Exs. C, D), which provide details on the accommodation requested and Plaintiffs' explanation of why that accommodation would help them to use and enjoy their apartment. Consideration of the remaining documents is not necessary.

Complaints by pro se plaintiffs are to be examined with "special solicitude," and interpreted "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest," Shibeshi v. City of N.Y. , 475 Fed.Appx. 807, 808 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). While pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam), dismissal of a pro se complaint is nevertheless appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to meet minimum pleading requirements, see Rodriguez v. Weprin , 116 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1997) ; accord Honig v. Bloomberg , No. 08–CV–541, 2008 WL 8181103, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2008), aff'd , 334 Fed.Appx. 452 (2d Cir. 2009).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for them under the ADA and FHA. While the former statute refers to "disability" and the latter to "handicap," they are analyzed the same way. Logan v. Matveevskii , 57 F.Supp.3d 234, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). "To state a prima facie case for discrimination based on a failure to reasonably accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he suffers from a [disability or] handicap as defined by the [statutes]; (2) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the plaintiff's [disability or] handicap; (3) accommodation of the [disability or] handicap may be necessary to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants refused to make such accommodation." Sinisgallo v. Town of Islip Hous. Auth. , 865 F.Supp.2d 307, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For purposes of this motion, Defendants dispute only the third element. (Ds' Mem. 5.)³ Whether a requested accommodation is required is "highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case determination." Hubbard v. Samson Mgmt. Corp. , 994 F.Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). An accommodation is reasonable when it "gives the otherwise qualified plaintiff with disabilities meaningful access to the program or services sought." McElwee v. Cty. of Orange , 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs bear "the burden of identifying an accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits." Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. , 63 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995).

Provision of a parking space for a disabled individual has been found to be a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 894–95 (7th Cir. 1996) (parking space...