Thomas v. Amazon.com. Servs., Inc.

462 F.Supp.3d 828

Savon THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-CV-01696

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed May 21, 2020

Christopher J. Lalak, Nilges Draher, Cleveland, OH, Shannon M. Draher, Hans A. Nilges, Nilges Draher, Massillon, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Kevin F. Gaffney, Pro Hac Vice, Sari M. Alamuddin, Pro Hac Vice, Gabriel Shechter, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Chicago, IL, Richard G. Rosenblatt, Joseph A. Nuccio, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Princeton, NJ, Andrew J. Barber, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

PAMELA A. BARKER, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") of Defendants Amazon.com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. No. 16.) Plaintiffs Savon Thomas and Colleen McLaughlin (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’ Motion on November 25, 2019, to which Defendants replied on December 23, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.) On January 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, to which Defendants responded on January 30, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22.) On February 13, 2020, Defendants also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, to which Plaintiffs replied on February 20, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 25, 26.)

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

a. Factual Allegations

Defendants jointly operate logistics facilities throughout Ohio (the "Ohio Amazon Fulfillment Centers"). (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 13.)¹ Defendants employ Plaintiffs and other similarly situated warehouse workers to perform tasks related to merchandise stored and eventually shipped to customers from the Ohio Amazon Fulfillment Centers. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Defendants require warehouse workers to "clock in" by the beginning of their scheduled shift and to "clock out" at the end of their scheduled shifts. (Id. at ¶ 18.) After clocking out, Defendants require warehouse workers to proceed through a screening process prior to exiting the Ohio Amazon Fulfillment Centers. (Id. at ¶ 19.) In addition, Defendants require warehouse workers to proceed through the same screening process prior to taking their lunch breaks. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

As part of this mandatory post-shift and pre-lunch screening process, warehouse workers must wait in lines leading up to the security screening areas, proceed through a metal detector, and submit to an inspection of all bags and personal items the employee is carrying. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-24.) The security screening process routinely takes ten to twenty minutes to complete and can take longer with delays. (Id. at ¶ 27.) However, Defendants have never paid warehouse workers for time spent proceeding through this required post-shift and pre-lunch screening process. (Id. at ¶ 28.) For example, warehouse workers’ lunch breaks are significantly reduced due to the required pre-lunch security screening, but Defendants always deduct a full thirty minutes for such lunch breaks. (Id. at ¶ 29.)

b. Procedural History

On July 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Defendants in this Court, setting forth a single claim under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act ("OMFWSA"). (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert that because Defendants have not paid warehouse workers for the time spent going through the mandatory screening process described above, warehouse workers were not paid for all hours worked, and such time was not counted for purposes of determining their entitlement to overtime. (Id. at ¶ 30.) According to Plaintiffs, this resulted in the underpayment of overtime compensation for every week in which warehouse workers otherwise worked forty hours in a workweek in violation of the OMFWSA. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 39-53.)

On October 1, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Doc. No. 14.) Therein, Defendants allege that warehouse workers are not required to pass through a security screening prior to taking their meal breaks because Defendants provide on-site break room facilities inside the secured area where employees, including Plaintiffs, can take their meal breaks without having to pass through security screening. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendants assert that only those employees who choose to leave the secured area during meal breaks must pass through security screening. (Id. )

Shortly after filing their Answer, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking to dismiss the sole count in Plaintiffs’ Complaint on several bases. (Doc. No. 16.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim fails because (1) Ohio law has incorporated the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA") overtime standards, under which post-shift time spent passing through security screening is not compensable; (2) Plaintiffs were not required to pass through security screening when taking meal breaks; and (3) time spent walking through security screening is not "work" because it requires no exertion. (Doc. No. 17.) Defendants’ Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration.

II. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment."

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget , 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

The same standard for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim applies to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Roth v. Guzman , 650 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 2011). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’ " Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC , 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—whether the complaint raises a right to relief above the speculative level—"does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in conjunction with the "well-established principle that ‘ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." ’ " Gunasekera v. Irwin , 551 F.3d 466, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ). Nonetheless, while " Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Analysis

a. Whether the OMFWSA Incorporates the Portal-to-Portal Act

First, Defendants argue that Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") § 4111.03, under which Plaintiffs bring their claim, incorporates Section 7 of the FLSA, as amended, which includes the Portal-to-Portal Act. (Doc. No. 17 at 6-15.) As a result, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claim for the underpayment of overtime compensation fails because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Portal-to-Portal Act to mean that post-shift time spent passing through security screening is not compensable time. (Id. ) In response, Plaintiffs contend that O.R.C. § 4111.03 does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act. (Doc. No. 19 at 3-12.) The Court agrees with Defendants that O.R.C. § 4111.03 incorporates the Portal-to-Portal Act, and, therefore, Plaintiffs’ claim based on time spent proceeding through the post-shift screening process fails as a matter of law.

When enacted in 1938, "the FLSA established a minimum wage and overtime compensation for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek." Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk (Busk I) , 574 U.S. 27, 31, 135 S.Ct. 513, 190 L.Ed.2d 410 (2014). However, the FLSA did not define "work" or "workweek," and the Supreme Court initially interpreted these terms broadly, which "provoked a flood of litigation." Id. In response, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act, finding that "the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and retroactive in operation, upon employers." 29 U.S.C. § 251(a). The Portal-to-Portal Act "exempted employers from liability for future...