Tisdale v. State

354 Ga.App. 735

841 S.E.2d 82

TISDALE

v.The STATE.

A19A2109

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 12, 2020

Certiorari Denied February 1, 2021

Noah Howard Pines, Atlanta, Andrew Santos Fleischman, for Appellant.

Lee Darragh, Gainesville, Conley Julian Greer, Dawson County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

Rickman, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Nydia Tisdale was convicted on one count of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer.¹ She filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Tisdale argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, the trial court erred in denying her motion in arrest of judgment to the indictment, and the trial court committed plain error by instructing the jury that the question of whether she was trespassing was irrelevant to the issue of whether she was guilty of obstructing an officer. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Tisdale's conviction.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Tisdale was a "citizen-journalist" who attended candidate debates, meet and greets, and other events held for candidates running for political office. Tisdale video recorded and posted the events, unedited and without commentary, onto her website and other social media platforms.

In 2014, Tisdale attended a political rally at Burt's Pumpkin Farm, a farm owned by Mr. and Mrs. Burt in Dawson County. The event included several elected officials as well as candidates running for office, was opened to the public, and had been advertised as an event to which everyone was invited to attend. Tisdale and her camera attended.

Upon arriving, Tisdale introduced herself to Mrs. Burt and relayed her plan to video record and post footage of the rally, explaining that she had previously filmed and posted recordings of similar rallies. Mrs. Burt voiced no objection, although she would later testify that she understood Tisdale to be working for one of the elected officials. Nevertheless, there was no signage or other indication that filming was prohibited, and at least one other person was recording the event.

Tisdale sat in the front row and filmed the rally without incident until one of the speakers disparaged a political rival and allegedly complained to an event organizer about Tisdale's recording of his comments.² Shortly thereafter, a staffer approached Tisdale, sat in an unoccupied chair next to her, and quietly requested that she stop filming. Tisdale informed the staffer that she had received permission from the property owner and continued recording.

The event organizer relayed the speaker's complaint to Mr. and Mrs. Burt and obtained their authorization to direct Tisdale to stop filming. He thereafter sat in the row directly behind Tisdale and spoke over her shoulder to inform her that the property owners had requested that she stop recording; she signaled the man to be quiet so as to not interrupt her filming and continued undeterred.

A captain from the Dawson County Sheriff's Office was providing security at the event and had been informed of the speaker's complaint. He heard the owners’ directions for Tisdale to stop filming or leave, and witnessed the unsuccessful attempts to get her to do so. The captain – dressed in a black polo-style shirt with a badge embroidered over his chest and a police belt with a badge, gun, and radio – sat directly next to Tisdale, informed her that he was with the sheriff's office, and stated that the property owner had requested that she stop filming or leave the farm. When Tisdale responded, "no," the captain informed her that her third option was to go to jail. After Tisdale still failed to comply, the captain grabbed Tisdale out of her seat and forcefully removed her from the venue as she struggled with him and demanded that he identify himself. The captain took Tisdale into an adjacent barn, where he physically restrained her until additional officers arrived and transported her to jail.

Under Georgia law, "a person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer ... in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." OCGA § 16-10-24 (a). "[W]hether the actions of a defendant actually had the effect of hindering or impeding the officer is a decision for the trier of fact." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State , 291 Ga. App. 363, 367 (2) (b) 662 S.E.2d 185 (2008). In this case, the indictment alleged that Tisdale "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ed] and hinder[ed] [the captain] in the lawful discharge of his official duties by refusing to leave ... Burt's Pumpkin Farm when asked to do so by [the captain], who was an authorized representative of the property owner in making that request. ..."

1. Tisdale contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. Specifically, she asserts that she was given insufficient time to comply with the captain's instruction, he failed to provide her with "proper identification," and his requests were too ambiguous to constitute commands.

To be sure, the record contains ample evidence to suggest that the situation involving the complaining speaker – who appeared to be virtually alone in his objection to the video recording – and Tisdale could have been addressed differently. Nevertheless, it is not the role of this Court to explore alternative outcomes or to comment upon the facts; rather, our sole duty is to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for any rational juror to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Heidt v. State , 292 Ga. 343, 345 (1), 736 S.E.2d 384 (2013). We conclude that it was.

(a) Tisdale argues that she was not given enough time to comply to the captain's instruction prior to her arrest. But before the captain ever approached Tisdale, he observed as two different individuals, at least one of whom specifically told Tisdale that he was acting as a representative of the property owners, requested that she stop filming. The captain testified that when he then addressed Tisdale, he identified himself as law enforcement, directed her to stop filming or leave the event three separate times, and specifically advised her that her failure to comply would result in her arrest before he forced her from the venue while she struggled against him. These facts authorized the jury to conclude that Tisdale was given adequate time to comply with the captain's demands that she stop filming or leave the event prior to her arrest. See generally West v. State , 296 Ga. App. 58, 61-62 (2), 673 S.E.2d 558 (2009), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State , 304 Ga. 862, 823 S.E.2d 291 (2019) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's obstruction conviction based upon evidence that, although he was not committing a crime, he ignored the officer's repeated commands that he leave the scene, and was advised that his failure to do so would result in arrest).

Tisdale relies on Coley v. State , 178 Ga. App. 668, 344 S.E.2d 490 (1986), to argue that her failure to "respond immediately" to an officer's command could not amount to obstruction. Although we recognize that certain language in Coley may support her position, it does not change the result in this case. Since Coley was decided, the law governing misdemeanor obstruction has evolved. See Harris v. State , 314 Ga. App. 816, 820-821, 726 S.E.2d 455 (2012) (discussing the history of the obstruction law and noting that, prior to a 1986 statutory amendment, a showing of violence or its equivalent was an essential element of the crime). The examination of what conduct rises to the level of misdemeanor obstruction of an officer necessarily involves a continuum of facts and events, specific to each case, from which the jury must determine whether the elements of the crime are satisfied. See generally Timberlake v. State , 315 Ga. App. 693, 695 (1), 727 S.E.2d 516 (2012) ("We have held that argument and stubborn obstinance are all examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

(b) Tisdale asserts that the captain failed to provide "proper identification" because, although he informed her that he was with the sheriff's office, he failed to give his name. Her argument is based upon the criminal trespass statute, OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (3), which provides that "[a] person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority ... [r]emains upon the land or premises of another person ... after receiving notice ..., upon proper identification, [from] an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart."

Tisdale was not convicted of criminal trespass, however, and the obstruction statute under which she was convicted does not contain any such identification requirement. See OCGA § 16-10-24 (a). Rather, as indicted, the State was required to prove that Tisdale "knowingly and willfully" obstructed the captain in the lawful discharge of his official duties by refusing to leave when told to do so by himself, acting as an authorized representative of the Burts. Evidence that the captain identified himself as a law enforcement officer while displaying a badge on his person and informed Tisdale that he was acting on behalf of the property owners was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that she had the requisite knowledge of his identity. See id.; see generally Frayall v. State , 259 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2), 576 S.E.2d 654 (2003).

Tisdale nevertheless argues that because the indictment injected elements of the crime of criminal trespass – i.e., alleged that she "refus[ed] to leave ...when asked to do so by [the captain]" – the State was required to prove that the captain lawfully asked her to leave, necessarily invoking the identification elements of the criminal trespass statute. To be sure, the State...