United States v. Alaniz

961 F.3d 998

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Alejandro ALANIZ, also known as Alex, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-1439

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: February 10, 2020

Filed: June 5, 2020

Stephen C. Moss, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

Brian P. Casey, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO (Timothy A. Garrison, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

[Published]

PER CURIAM.

In 1997, Alejandro Alaniz was convicted of various drug offenses and received a life sentence, which is precisely what the Sentencing Guidelines required at the time. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (1995). In 2014, the Guidelines changed and retroactively reduced the range to 360 months to life. U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 782, 788; U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. Alaniz, hoping to take advantage of the amendment, filed a motion asking the district court¹ to reduce his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He received a shorter sentence—384 months—but believed it should be even lower and moved unsuccessfully for reconsideration.² We affirm.

Alaniz's first argument is that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before it ruled on his motion. See U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 3. We review this due-process challenge de novo, United States v. Tollefson , 853 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir. 2017), but it does not get far. There is no "constitutionally protected liberty interest" in a discretionary sentence reduction, so the Due Process Clause does not afford procedural protections to those who seek one. United States v. Johnson , 703 F.3d 464, 471 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (providing discretion to "modify a term of imprisonment"); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales , 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) ("[A] benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.").

Reframing the issue as an abuse of discretion does not help Alaniz either. To be sure, we have held that a district court abuses its discretion when there is no "opportunity [for a movant] to respond to [prejudicial] information" because he or she lacks access "to the material on which the court will base its sentencing decision." United States v. Foster , 575 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2009). But here, Alaniz had the Probation Office's eligibility report—which was the basis of the district court's decision—before filing a motion for reconsideration. At that point, he had "an opportunity to respond" to the "prejudicial" information in the report. Id. He took advantage by disputing the relevance and accuracy of some of the conduct it described. This sequence of events gave the district court another chance to "review[ ] ... the motion[ and] the record," even if the motion proved unpersuasive. The movant in Foster , by contrast, never had this opportunity. See id. at 864 (involving a situation in which the movant was "unable to respond" because he was "not aware" of the report's existence.").

Alaniz's second argument is that the district court should have explained why it did not reduce his sentence further. See United States v. Burrell , 622 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion). The court must consider "any applicable" sentencing factors and provide some rationale for its ruling, but it "need not give lengthy explanations" or "categorically rehearse" the factors. Id. at 963–64 (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). What matters for us is having enough information for meaningful appellate review. See United States v. Boyd , 819 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

There is enough here. Although Alaniz claims that the district court failed to "cite a single fact or circumstance" specific to either him or his offenses, the eligibility report, which the district court quoted, filled in the details. It described, among other things, that Alaniz "was the leader of a [large] drug conspiracy" and "issued multiple threats" to codefendants, an attorney, and a government agent in an attempt to obstruct the investigation against him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B). Even if the court could have said more, it did...