United States v. Manyfield, 19-2096

961 F.3d 993

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Lawrence MANYFIELD, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-2096

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted April 28, 2020

Decided June 11, 2020

Shy Jackson, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Peter W. Henderson, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Easterbrook, Ripple, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Ripple, Circuit Judge.

After Lawrence Manyfield admitted several violations of his supervised release, the district court revoked his term of supervision and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. The parties agree on appeal that the court neither gave adequate notice of the conditions of supervision (many of which we have deemed vague) nor sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing them. They disagree, however, about the proper scope of the remand. We conclude that the court properly justified the prison sentence and term of supervised release and, therefore, remand only for further consideration of the release conditions.

Mr. Manyfield pleaded guilty in 2011 to one count of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) ; he was sentenced to 120 months in prison and a fifteen-year term of supervision. Within a year of Mr. Manyfield's release from prison, his probation officer twice found him in possession of a cell phone with internet connectivity, in violation of his conditions of release. A forensic exam of one phone showed that Mr. Manyfield had created several email and social-media accounts and accessed pornographic websites—actions that his release conditions also prohibited. Through those accounts, Mr. Manyfield also had sent messages to several people asking for pictures of them with their children, and the officer found five hard-copy photos of what "appear[ed] to be minor females in sexually provocative poses."¹

Mr. Manyfield's probation officer filed a petition to revoke his supervised release based on these and other violations. Supplemental reports further noted that Mr. Manyfield failed to attend a sex-offender-treatment program and followed Twitter accounts advertising images of underage girls. Given Mr. Manyfield's repeated disregard for the conditions of his release and the apparent risk he posed to the community, the officer recommended eighteen months’ imprisonment (above the range recommended by the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines) to be followed by a lifetime term of supervised release with twenty-two mandatory, discretionary, and special conditions. Mr. Manyfield did not dispute the allegations but argued that the recommended sentence was excessive in view of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and emphasized a need for treatment instead of reincarceration. He further asked that supervised release, if any, be limited to another fifteen-year term, and he objected to a few of the proposed conditions.

At the hearing that followed, Mr. Manyfield admitted a total of eight violations, and the district court heard sentencing arguments. Citing concerns about the seriousness of the offense, Mr. Manyfield's risk to the community, and the need for specific deterrence, the Government recommended a twenty-four-month sentence—the maximum allowed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). For his part, Mr. Manyfield noted that the range under the applicable policy statements was four to ten months’ imprisonment, explained that he needed a phone to schedule doctor appointments, and emphasized that he had not acted on the fantasies reflected in the pornographic materials. He acknowledged that he must follow the conditions and, in light of his age (sixty-seven) and medical conditions, requested a prison sentence within the range and a fifteen-year term of supervision.

The court revoked Mr. Manyfield's supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison, explaining that he was a danger to the community and that the maximum term was necessary to deter him. The court noted that it did not intend to further punish Mr. Manyfield for past conduct, but his criminal history—including abusing his minor stepdaughter—was still a "relevant factor."² It further explained that if Mr. Manyfield needed a cell phone, he should have asked his probation officer for help getting one without internet capabilities. The reports, moreover, showed that Mr. Manyfield used an encrypted internet connection to conceal his internet use. In light of Mr. Manyfield's "rampant" violations, the court concluded that this was not a situation in which he had "tried his best."³ "[T]he only reason I'm going to impose a 24-month sentence," the court stated, "is because I can't impose more. ... If I could impose a 48-month sentence, I would ... ."⁴

Without further explanation, the court also imposed "lifetime supervised release with the same conditions that were imposed before."⁵ The court neither read the conditions aloud nor asked whether Mr. Manyfield (who had counsel present) waived reading. When the written judgment issued, it contained many conditions that had not been proposed in the revocation petition. Further, several of these conditions have been questioned or deemed vague since Mr. Manyfield's original sentencing.⁶ The written judgment also reflected the imposition of eight concurrent prison sentences and terms of supervision (one for each violation), but, at the hearing, the district court referred only to one sentence for all eight violations.

Mr. Manyfield has appealed, arguing that the district court did not explain adequately its reasons for imposing the conditions of supervised release. Although he did not object to these conditions at the sentencing hearing, we do not apply the waiver doctrine. The challenged conditions were neither included in the revocation petition, nor read aloud at the hearing. Indeed, the Government concedes that "the district court imposed numerous conditions of supervised release without defendant having sufficient notice of those conditions and their precise formulation."⁷ Consequently, Mr. Manyfield had no "meaningful opportunity" to object. United States v. Flores , 929 F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining that "[w]e will find waiver ... when the defendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful opportunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions, waives reading of those conditions and their justifications, challenges certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object"), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 504, 205 L.Ed.2d 327 (2019).

Turning to the merits, we agree with the parties that the district court did not justify properly its imposition of the conditions of supervised release. We have said that, in imposing conditions of supervised release, sentencing judges should consider four factors:

(1) the importance of advance notice of conditions being considered; (2) the need to justify the conditions and the length of the term at sentencing by an adequate statement of reasons, reasonably related to the applicable § 3553(a) factors; (3) the goal of imposing only specific, appropriately-tailored conditions—which is to say, avoiding the imposition of vague or overbroad conditions; and (4) the requirement to orally pronounce all conditions, with the written judgment only clarifying the oral pronouncement in a manner that is not inconsistent with an unambiguous oral provision.

United States v. Kappes , 782 F.3d 828, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2015) ; see also United States v. Thompson , 777 F.3d 368, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the court summarily imposed "the same conditions that were imposed before,"⁸ so we cannot tell from the sentencing transcript whether it...