United States v. Cruz

757 F.3d 372

UNITED STATES of America

v.Abraham CRUZ, Appellant.

No. 13–4378.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued June 10, 2014.

Filed: July 10, 2014.

Frederick W. Ulrich, Esq., (Argued), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.

Stephen R. Cerutti, II, Esq., (Argued), Kim D. Daniel, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellee.

BEFORE: FISHER, COWEN AND TASHIMA ^*, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

We here confront an issue of first impression: whether the Government, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), can have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing. Under the facts presented in this case, we answer that question in the affirmative and we will affirm.

I.

A.

Cruz was arrested in August of 2011 and indicted on one count of assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security Administration (“SSA”) employees, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (“Count I”), and two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115 (respectively, “Count II” and “Count III”). The District Court granted Cruz a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III.

In August of 2012, after the District Court received but before Cruz could raise objections to the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”), the Government raised concern about and moved for a determination of Cruz's competency.¹ Its motion was granted, and Cruz was evaluated by Dr. William J. Ryan, a forensic psychologist working for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Dr. Ryan, as reflected in a report submitted to the District Court, concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent because he suffered from schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type. Upon receipt of Dr. Ryan's report, the District Court scheduled a competency hearing. Following that hearing, it concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent and found that he could not proceed with sentencing.

The District Court received a second competency evaluation and report from the BOP in May of 2013, which was co-authored by forensic psychologist Angela Weaver and BOP staff psychologist Robert Lucking. Drs. Weaver and Lucking concurred with Dr. Ryan's diagnosis, noted Cruz's ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication recommended by BOP personnel, and concluded that without such medication Cruz would remain mentally incompetent. They also concluded that “there is a substantial probability that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced medication. (App. 70.) The Weaver/Lucking report included a proposed treatment plan and a request that the Government seek a court order under Sell, authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz involuntarily.

B.

The Government filed a motion on May 29, 2013, seeking an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz against his will. ( See App. 68–142.) The papers filed by the Government included, inter alia, its “Omnibus Motion and Brief,” related exhibits, and, pursuant to the District Court's local rules, a certificate indicating that Cruz's lawyer was contacted and expressed Cruz's non-concurrence in the motion. The Omnibus Motion and Brief made clear that the Government sought two forms of relief: first, a hearing pursuant to Sell; and second, following the hearing, a court order authorizing forced medication.

The District Court promptly scheduled an evidentiary hearing, which was continued three times (twice at Cruz's request) and ultimately held on October 22, 2013. In the intervening five months—i.e., the period following the May 29, 2013 filing of the motion and preceding the October 22, 2013 hearing—Cruz failed to file a petition, motion, brief, or other document indicating that he opposed the Government's ultimate request for relief.

The District Court began the October 22, 2013 hearing by informing the parties that it was “held pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Sell v. United States” and providing “the Sell criteria sort of as a backdrop to the testimony” that would be presented. (App. 145, 147.) It reminded the parties that “involuntary medication of nondangerous individuals should only occur when four conditions are satisfied” and recited those factors for their benefit:

First, the court must find that important governmental interests are at stake. Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those interests, and this second factor includes determining that medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent and that the treatment is unlikely to have side effects that impair the defendant's ability to assist counsel.

Third, the court must determine that involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests because alternative[,] less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve the same results. And fourth, the court must find that involuntary medication is medically appropriate, or, in other words, in the patient's medical interests in light of his medical condition.

The first factor, whether the government has advanced sufficiently important interests to justify forcible medication, is a question of law, and the remaining three factors are factual questions which the government must prove with clear and convincing evidence....

So in light of those factors and that background, ... I'll turn to the government and ask ... if [it] would like to present testimonial evidence in support of [its] motion.

(App. 147–49.)

Drs. Weaver and Lucking testified for the Government, which introduced, among other documents, both the PSR and the May 2013 Weaver/Lucking report. Cruz, who was represented by the Federal Public Defender, did not object to the introduction of either of those documents. However, he noted through counsel that he “didn't necessarily agree with that guideline range.” (App. 229.) Shortly thereafter, again acting through counsel, he declined the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing and stated that he “[did not] have any argument at [that] juncture.” (App. 230.)

The District Court took the matter under advisement and two days later entered the order that is at issue on appeal. As there illustrated, the District Court considered the circumstances of Cruz's case and concluded that all four of the Sell criteria were satisfied. Its analysis of the first criterion, which is central to this appeal, rested on two legs.

First, the District Court concluded that a sufficiently important government interest was at stake because “[r]endering a defendant competent for sentencing enables not only the government, but also the court and the defendant himself, to ensure that the defendant receives a sentence that accurately reflects the nature of his offense and his individual circumstances.” (App. 7 (citing United States v. Wood, 459 F.Supp.2d 451, 457–60 (E.D.Va.2006)).) It further explained:

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit ha[s] promulgated a test to determine the seriousness of a crime, but other circuits have looked to the statutory maximum mandated for the offense or the applicable guidelines range. The Third Circuit in [United States v.] Grape[, 549 F.3d 591, 600 (3d Cir.2008),] determined that under either rubric, the defendant was accused of “serious” crimes because the crimes had statutory mandatory minimums of 10 and 15 years and the defendant had a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months ['] imprisonment.

In the case sub judice, the draft pre-sentence investigation report provisionally identifies a 10–year statutory maximum for each count and a guidelines range of 100 to 125 months['] imprisonment. Certainly, pursuant to the criteria set forth in Grape, Cruz was convicted of “serious” crimes and the government possesses a strong interest in rendering him competent for sentencing.

(App. 7–8 (citations omitted).) ²

Second, the District Court found that no special circumstances lessened the importance of the Government's interest. It noted that Sell identified two examples of such special circumstances: “(1) when the defendant has already been incarcerated for a significant period of time; or (2) whether there is a possibility of future civil commitment.” (App. 8.) But it concluded that neither of those circumstances were present here.

With respect to the length of Cruz's incarceration, the court concluded that he had not been incarcerated for a significant amount of time. It cited and discussed Grape, where this Court noted that the defendant had been incarcerated for approximately three and half years but “reasoned that in light of [his] potential sentence, he would still need to serve a majority of his sentence if convicted.” ( Id. (citing Grape, 549 F.3d at 602).) The Grape court concluded as a matter of law that defendant had not been incarcerated for a significant amount of time. By analogy, the District Court reached the same conclusion here. It reasoned that Cruz, who had been incarcerated for only two years, might still need to serve the majority of his sentence. When reaching that conclusion, the District Court relied principally upon the PSR, which “provisionally identifie[d] a 10–year statutory maximum for each count and a guidelines range of 100 to 125 months ['] imprisonment.” ( Id.)

With respect to the possibility of future civil confinement, the District Court examined the statutes that might authorize such confinement, 18 U.S.C. § 4246 and 50 P.S. § 7301, and noted each statute's prerequisites to civil confinement. Importantly, 18 U.S.C. § 4246 required “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another” while 50 P.S. § 7301 required a showing of “clear and present danger or harm to others or to himself.” In light of those prerequisites, the District...