Yarnall v. Phila. Sch. Dist.

203 F.Supp.3d 558

Colleen YARNALL, et al.

v.The PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-3130

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 19, 2016

Carole Lynn Hendrick, Collegville, PA, Patricia A. Heenan, Blue Bell, PA, Frederick M. Stanczak, Law Offices of Frederick M. Stanczak, Doylestown, PA, for Colleen Yarnall, et al.

Charles Ray, III, Peekskill, NY, pro se.

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, Judge.

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq ., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs Colleen Yarnall ("Yarnall"), Debra McKibben Marenbach ("Marenbach"), Nicole Boyd ("Boyd"), and Marta Ciccimaro ("Ciccimaro"), teachers in the Philadelphia public schools, obtained a jury verdict and an award of damages on June 15, 2015 against defendant The School District of Philadelphia ("SDP") for a hostile work environment under Title VII and against defendant Charles Ray, II ("Ray") for equal protection violations, invasion of privacy, and retaliation under § 1983. On April 18, 2016, the court denied the motion and supplemental motion of plaintiffs for injunctive relief.

Now before the court is the petition of plaintiffs for attorney's fees and costs against SDP.

I.

Plaintiffs, all of whom are Caucasian, were teachers at Mifflin Elementary School ("Mifflin"), a public school in the East Falls section of Philadelphia. At the start of the 2008-2009 school year, defendant Ray, who is African American, was hired as Mifflin's principal. Plaintiffs claimed that Ray began to create a hostile work environment, discriminating against them by subjecting them to public reprimands and criticism, schedule and classroom changes, reductions in access to supplies, and other inconveniences that were not experienced by other teachers. Plaintiffs alleged that Ray's conduct was encouraged by another Mifflin teacher named Shirl Ishmael ("Ishmael"). They also contended that Shirl Gilbert ("Gilbert"), who was an SDP administrator at the time, condoned Ray's actions.¹

Plaintiffs further asserted that Ray persuaded his friend Rodney Bradley ("Bradley") to spy on them. According to plaintiffs, Ray accessed personal information about them, such as their home addresses, and passed it along to Bradley. He told Bradley he hoped to frighten plaintiffs and wanted them "gone from the building." After surveilling plaintiffs for several months, Bradley ultimately disclosed his actions to SDP administrators and to plaintiffs. Following an investigation into the surveillance scheme, Ray resigned from Mifflin in June 2009.

In May 2011, each plaintiff filed a lawsuit in this court. Each amended her complaint in January 2012. Their cases were eventually consolidated in October 2012. In April 2013, The Honorable L. Felipe Restrepo, then a Judge of this Court,² granted in part and denied in part a motion of defendants to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. He dismissed: plaintiffs' Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims; the claims they had raised under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; all of their state-law tort claims, including derivative loss of consortium claims raised by their spouses; and their § 1983 claims against SDP, the Philadelphia Federation Teachers Union, and four individual school administrators. Judge Restrepo declined to dismiss plaintiffs' Title VII race discrimination claims, their claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), and their § 1983 claims against Ray. SDP thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, and Judge Restrepo subsequently dismissed plaintiffs' PHRA gender discrimination and retaliation claims.

On August 21, 2014, plaintiffs filed a "Third Consolidated Amended Complaint," which is their most recent pleading. In it they alleged: a race discrimination claim against SDP under Title VII, based on events that occurred during the 2008-2009 school year; an equal protection claim against Ray, Ishmael, and Gilbert under § 1983 ; an invasion of privacy and retaliation claim against Ray, also under § 1983 ; a discrimination claim against SDP, Ray, Ishmael, and Gilbert under the PHRA; and a claim against SDP styled "2012-2013 Title VII claims." They sought damages in excess of $150,000 as well as injunctive relief.

SDP, Ray, Ishmael, and Gilbert all moved for summary judgment.³ On September 30, 2014, Judge Restrepo entered judgment in favor of SDP on plaintiffs' Title VII claim insofar as it alleged discrimination but denied summary judgment insofar as the claim alleged a hostile work environment. Judge Restrepo granted judgment in favor of Gilbert and Ishmael on the § 1983 equal protection claim and in favor of all four defendants on the PHRA claim.⁴ Finally, he granted judgment in favor of SDP on the "2012-2013 Title VII claims."

In January 2015, the parties attended a settlement conference during which plaintiffs demanded $200,000. SDP refused to settle the matter for any amount over $20,000.

As a result of the court's summary judgment rulings, only three claims proceeded to trial: the claim under Title VII that SDP created a hostile work environment by permitting plaintiffs to be harassed by Ray; the claim under § 1983 that Ray denied plaintiffs of their right to equal protection by engaging in such harassment⁵ ; and the § 1983 invasion of privacy and retaliation claim against Ray based on his alleged surveillance scheme. All three of these claims were based on the events of the 2008-2009 school year.

On June 15, 2016, the jury returned its verdict. On the Title VII hostile work environment claim, the jury found in favor of plaintiffs Yarnall, Boyd, and Ciccimaro against SDP. However, in answer to a special interrogatory, the jury found that none of them had suffered any actual injury. Accordingly, it awarded nominal damages of $1 to each of them on that claim. The jury found in favor of SDP and against Marenbach on the Title VII claim because Marenbach had not exhausted her administrative remedies.

On the § 1983 equal protection claim, which was based on Ray's alleged creation of a hostile work environment, the jury found in favor of all four plaintiffs against Ray and awarded each plaintiff $1 in nominal damages and $2,000 in punitive damages. Finally, the plaintiffs prevailed against Ray on the § 1983 invasion of privacy and retaliation claims. The jurors determined that each plaintiff had suffered an actual injury due to Ray's violation of her right to privacy, with each plaintiff awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages. As to Ray's retaliatory conduct, however, the jurors found that no plaintiff suffered an actual injury. Accordingly, each plaintiff received $1 in nominal damages and $3,500 in punitive damages for that claim.

Plaintiffs thereafter moved for a permanent injunction against SDP. Among other things, they asked us to order SDP to adopt a new antiharassment policy. We denied their motion on April 18, 2016.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant petition seeking $236,550 in attorney's fees for the work of attorney Carole Hendrick ("Hendrick"), $24,381 in attorney's fees for the work of attorney Frederick Stanczak, and $27,317.24 in costs of litigation, as well as pre– and post-judgment interest.

II.

Significantly, the petition now before us appears to seek attorney's fees and costs from SDP alone and not from Ray. Plaintiffs' filing includes no motion articulating the relief they request. Plaintiffs have, however, submitted with their petition a form of order which reads as follows:

AND NOW, this day of, 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiffs [sic] petition for attorney [sic] fees and costs and any answers thereto the Petition is GRANTED. The Defendant School District of Philadelphia shall pay the following fees and costs forthwith:

1. The sum of $236,550.00 to Attorney Hendrick[;]

2. The sum of $24,381.00 to Attorney Stanczak[;]

3. The sum of $27,317.24 toward costs of litigation[; and]

4. Pre and Post judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§§] 1961(a) and (b).

(Emphasis added.) The form of order makes no mention of defendant Ray. Moreover, plaintiffs' memorandum of law in support of their petition focuses almost exclusively on the liability of SDP. For example, plaintiffs rely heavily on the decision of the Supreme Court in Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), which addresses the circumstances under which attorney's fees should be awarded to a plaintiff who receives only nominal damages from a defendant. They also focus on Title VII, pursuant to which they brought their claim against SDP, and on the hostile work environment which the jury found had been created by SDP. Plaintiffs' memorandum contains no claim that Ray's liability under § 1983 supports their request for attorney's fees.

Perhaps realizing that their petition focused on SDP's liability to the exclusion of Ray's, plaintiffs submitted a new form of order with their reply memorandum. That form of order states as follows:

AND NOW, this [redacted] day of [redacted], 2016, upon consideration of Plaintiffs [sic] petition for attorney [sic] fees and costs and any answers thereto the Petition is GRANTED. The Defendants shall pay the following fees and costs forthwith:

1. The sum of $236,550.00 to Attorney Hendrick[;]

2. The sum of $24,381.00 to Attorney Stanczak[;]

3. The sum of $27,317.24 toward costs of litigation[; and]4. Pre and Post judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§§] 1961(a) and (b).

(Emphasis added.) The reply brief asserts that "[p]laintiffs rely on § 1983 for fees against Ray" and offers a cursory statement of § 1983's damages provision. The bulk of the reply brief, however, reiterates plaintiffs' position that their request is supported by the authority which governs fee requests by parties who have received only nominal damages.

Of course, plaintiffs cannot raise new arguments for the first time in a reply memorandum, as they have attempted to do here. See United States v. Cruz , 757 F.3d...