United States v. Kidd

23 F.4th 781

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Corey KIDD, Defendant - Appellant

No. 20-2616

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 18, 2021

Filed: January 10, 2022

Counsel who represented the appellant was Garry J. Corrothers of Little Rock, AR.

Counsel who represented the appellee was Candace L. Taylor, AUSA, of Fort Smith, AR.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Federal inmate Corey Kidd appeals a district court order granting the government's Motion for Order to Authorize Payment from Inmate Trust Account, and directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to turn over $5,500 from Kidd's inmate trust account for payment toward his outstanding restitution obligation. The primary issue on appeal is whether the requirement that an inmate who "receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment ... apply the value of such resources to any restitution ... still owed," 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), applies to accumulated prison wages in the trust account of an inmate participating in the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Without discussing contrary decisions of two sister circuits, the district court accepted the government's argument -- based primarily on the broad purpose of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) -- that the "clear language" of § 3664(n) applies to any resources received from any source during incarceration. It is a general principle of statutory interpretation that "the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used." Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). Here, the statutory context is far more complex than the government asserts. We conclude § 3664(n) does not apply to accumulated prison wages. As the various sources of the $5,500 in Kidd's inmate trust account are unknown, we vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The district court sentenced Kidd to 155 months in prison after he pleaded guilty to armed robbery of a controlled substance, a crime of violence that required the sentencing court to order restitution to crime victims under the MVRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(a)(i). The court directed Kidd to pay $61,952.61 in restitution to the pharmacy he robbed and its insurer. The Judgment provided that a lump-sum payment was "due immediately," and if not paid immediately:

any unpaid financial penalty imposed shall be paid during the period of incarceration at a rate of not less than $25.00 quarterly, or 10% of the defendant's quarterly earnings, whichever is greater. After incarceration, any unpaid financial penalty shall become a special condition of supervised release and may be paid in monthly installments of not less than 10% of the defendant's net monthly household income or $100 per month, whichever is greater.

When he began incarceration, Kidd agreed to participate in the BOP's Financial Responsibility Program, designed to encourage inmates with a financial obligation such as restitution that cannot be paid at the time of commitment "to earn compensation through UNICOR or other institution work assignments" to satisfy that obligation. BOP Program Statement P5380.08, § 8 (Aug. 15, 2005); see 28 C.F.R. § 545.10 - 11. Consistent with the above-quoted Judgment, Kidd agreed to pay $25.00 quarterly from his inmate trust fund during incarceration. The record reflects that, as of June 2020, he had made all quarterly payments for seven years, reducing his unpaid restitution by $1,096.45, leaving a balance of $60,856.16 outstanding.

At some point in 2020, the government learned that Kidd had accumulated $5,989.37 in his inmate trust account.¹ The United States Attorney filed a motion for an order authorizing the Bureau of Prisons to pay $5,500 from that account to be applied to Kidd's restitution obligation, leaving $489.37 "prior to withdrawals and other transactions by the inmate." In support, the government relied on two provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3664, which sets forth procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of all orders of restitution under Title 18, including the MVRA. Section 3664(k) authorizes the sentencing court to "adjust the [restitution] payment schedule, or require immediate payment in full," based upon "any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution." Section 3664(n) requires a defendant who "receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration" to "apply the value of such resources to any restitution ... still owed."²

Kidd filed a pro se Response opposing the government's motion. As relevant here, the Response stated:

For the past eight years, I have [been] a willing participant along with the [BOP] in a binding contract [in which] I agreed to pay the twenty-five dollar quarterly restitution and the FBOP agreed to not subject me to any additional payments, sanctions or punishments.

.... I have never missed a payment nor have I [been] untruthful about my financial situation. I am an indigent inmate, who happens to work in the prison for eighteen dollars a month. Every so often I may receive outside funds from some one as a result of payment for hand washing clothes, cleaning cells or acting as a personal microwave cook. Outside of that, for the most part I have no financial support .... I have been forced to save money because upon my release from prison, I will have nothing. No home no clothes, no shoes, no car, no food nothing. ...

[A]t sentencing the judge stated that I am to pay 25 dollars quarterly ... and my contract with the FBOP is a reflection of that order .... It took me eight years to save almost six thousand dollars. ... These funds were placed into a special pre-release account, which I cannot access until I am released. The Government states that these funds have been placed in my account over several months by different outside sources. This is absolutely not true, I have saved this money over the past eight years ... and they are the only resources that I have to give myself a fighting chance upon being released from prison.

... I would like to have ... a hearing in which I can properly produce and present the means in which I received and saved money. How long it took to do so, and also copies of my payments which I made to the FBOP as a result of this restitution at hand.

... I am willing to renegotiate my contract with the FBOP and instead of paying $25 quarterly or 10%, I will pay 20% of any funds I have.

Kidd attached to the Response a copy of a BOP document entitled Inmate Financial Responsibility Display that is consistent with his description of his "contract" with the BOP to make quarterly restitution payments consistent with the incarceration payment schedule in the Judgment. The government's Reply did not challenge the facts stated in Kidd's Response. Rather, the government asserted that the $5,500 in Kidd's inmate trust fund "qualify as a material change in his economic circumstances under § 3664(k) [and] also qualifies as receipt of a substantial resource during incarceration within § 3664(n)."

Without holding the hearing Kidd requested, the district court granted the government's motion, relying solely on § 3664(n). The court concluded that under this statute, "any resources received from any source during the Defendant's term of incarceration must be applied to Defendant's outstanding restitution obligation." On appeal, Kidd urges us to adopt the Fifth Circuit's contrary interpretation of § 3664(n) :

We do not think the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes "substantial resources" such that it fits within § 3664(n) ’s ambit; rather we think this provision refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections.

United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019). In United States v. Poff, the Ninth Circuit agreed that § 3664(n) "refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections that become suddenly available" and therefore "accumulated prison wages ... do not qualify." 781 F. App'x 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). The government argues that this interpretation ignores the term "any source" in the text of § 3664(n).

We review the district court's interpretation of the statute de novo and its decision to authorize a payment under § 3664(n) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Adejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (interpreting § 3664 de novo); United States v. Raifsnider, 846 F. App'x 423, 423-24 (8th Cir. 2021) (reviewing § 3664(n) order for abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Rand, 924 F.3d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 2019) ). Applying these standards of review, we vacate the district court's Order and remand for further proceedings.

II.

Section 3664(n) provides that an inmate who "receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" must apply "the value of such resources" to his unpaid restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). In interpreting this statute, we begin, as always, with its text. "When the words of a statute are unambiguous ... judicial inquiry is complete." Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (cleaned up). Starting with this focus, the government's position -- "any source" means any source -- is strong. "Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (cleaned up). However, in deciding whether "any source" in § 3664(n) includes prison wages, "[t]he word ‘any’ considered alone cannot answer this question. ... [E]ven though the word ‘any’ demands a broad interpretation, we must look beyond that word itself." Small v. United States, ...