United States v. Pressley

990 F.3d 383

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.James Rodreiquas PRESSLEY, a/k/a Bubba, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-6222

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 9, 2020

Decided: March 11, 2021

ARGUED: Samuel F. Callahan, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Banumathi Rangarajan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Allon Kedem, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Evan M. Rikhye, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KEENAN and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded, with instructions by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson and Senior Judge Traxler joined.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

James Pressley was convicted by a jury of thirteen counts resulting from his participation in a cocaine distribution conspiracy and related financial crimes. In his present motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Pressley alleges that he repeatedly asked his trial counsel to file a motion to suppress certain incriminating statements he made to law enforcement officers before his arrest, and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to do so. According to Pressley, the officers subjected him to custodial interrogation without providing him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and the government relied heavily on his confession in its presentation to the jury. The district court denied Pressley's motion without an evidentiary hearing.

Upon our review, we conclude that the record is unclear regarding what facts counsel knew before trial, and whether his decision not to file a suppression motion was an objectively reasonable choice based on trial strategy. The record also contains disputed facts on the issue whether Pressley was subject to custodial interrogation, thereby triggering the protections of Miranda . We therefore remand this case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing, including testimony by trial counsel.

I.

In the summer of 2012, Pressley, Larry Taylor, and others were the subjects of a narcotics investigation conducted by a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms task force. After informants had completed multiple controlled purchases of drugs from Pressley, task force members Harnett County Lieutenant Joshua Christensen and Internal Revenue Service Special Agent Thomas Beers sought to induce Pressley to cooperate in their investigation of Taylor.

Christensen and Beers interrogated Pressley in Christensen's vehicle, prompting Pressley to make the incriminating statements at issue in this case. Describing the interrogation at trial, Christensen testified that he and Beers approached Pressley as Pressley was walking from his home toward his car. Christensen lowered the window of his vehicle and displayed his credentials. Christensen informed Pressley that he was not under arrest, but asked him to follow the officers in Pressley's own vehicle. Pressley agreed, and followed the officers to a church parking lot. According to Christensen, he chose the secluded location to ensure that the interaction would not be observed by others and compromise Pressley's potential cooperation.

Christensen testified that upon arrival at the church, Pressley got out of his vehicle. Christensen reintroduced himself, reiterated that Pressley was not under arrest, and stated that no warrants against him were outstanding and that the officers needed to talk to him. Agent Beers sat in the back seat of the officers’ vehicle, Christensen sat in the driver's seat, and Pressley sat in the front passenger's seat. Neither officer gave Pressley Miranda warnings during the one hour and forty-five-minute interview.

To encourage Pressley's cooperation, Christensen told Pressley that law enforcement officers could obtain search warrants for his home and that Pressley was facing serious federal charges. After the officers shared the evidence they had against Pressley and their hope that he would cooperate, Pressley made numerous inculpatory statements regarding his involvement in drug distribution activities, his co-conspirators, and the purchases he made with drug proceeds.

In his Section 2255 motion and accompanying affidavit, Pressley disputes the version of events that Christensen related at trial regarding this interview. Notably, Pressley claims that when Christensen first spoke to him, Christensen told Pressley not to use his cell phone, and stated that, if Pressley did not proceed to the church parking lot as instructed, he would be intercepted by an undercover officer. Pressley also avers that several unmarked police vehicles followed him to the church and surrounded his vehicle in the parking lot. According to Pressley, Christensen displayed his weapon during the interview, and Beers threatened to "turn ... inside out" the homes of Pressley's family members if he did not cooperate. Pressley maintains that, given these facts and circumstances, he did not feel free to terminate the interview and leave.

During the jury trial, Christensen relayed Pressley's confession in detail, and Pressley did not testify in his own defense. The government also relied extensively on Pressley's admissions as a centerpiece of its presentation to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all thirteen counts, including conspiracy to distribute and possess crack cocaine, distribution of crack cocaine, conspiracy to launder money, and other financial crimes. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, and, on direct appeal, we affirmed Pressley's convictions and sentence. United States v. Pressley , 654 F. App'x 591 (4th Cir. 2016).

In the present Section 2255 motion, Pressley contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress Pressley's incriminating statements, which Pressley contends were obtained in violation of Miranda . Pressley claims that he asked counsel on multiple occasions before trial to file such a motion, but counsel never complied with his request. The district court denied Pressley's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that: (1) Pressley admitted that he made the incriminating statements after the government offered potential benefits in exchange for Pressley's cooperation; (2) Pressley was told that he was not under arrest; and (3) Pressley voluntarily got into the car with the officers. Pressley appealed from the denial of his Section 2255 motion, and we granted him a certificate of appealability.

II.

We review de novo the district court's denial of a Section 2255 motion. United States v. Palacios , 982 F.3d 920, 923 (4th Cir. 2020). When the district court denies such a motion without an evidentiary hearing, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the movant. United States v. Poindexter , 492 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2007).

A.

We begin by outlining the legal principles governing our review of Pressley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In evaluating this claim, we apply the familiar standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland , a criminal defendant must show that his counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance, "meaning that the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" (the performance prong). Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep't of Corr. , 813 F.3d 517, 524 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accord broad deference to counsel's choices in recognition of the "wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions." Id. at 529 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant also must show that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, namely, that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent counsel's error (the prejudice prong). Id. at 524.

When a person claims ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to file a suppression motion, we apply a "refined" version of the Strickland analysis. Id. With respect to the performance prong, we ask whether the "unfiled motion would have had ‘some substance.’ " Id. at 524-25 (citing Tice v. Johnson , 647 F.3d 87, 104 (4th Cir. 2011) ). If the motion would have had some substance, then we ask whether reasonable strategic reasons warranted not filing the motion. See id . at 529 ; Tice , 647 F.3d at 104-05. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that: (1) "the [suppression] motion was meritorious and likely would have been granted, and (2) a reasonable probability that granting the motion would have affected the outcome of his trial." Grueninger , 813 F.3d at 525.

A defendant is entitled to suppression of his incriminating statements if law enforcement officers failed to provide Miranda warnings during a "custodial interrogation." See United States v. Giddins , 858 F.3d 870, 879 (4th Cir. 2017). There is no dispute in the present case that Pressley was interrogated. Accordingly, our analysis is limited to whether Pressley was "in custody" at the time of his interrogation.

A person "is in custody when, under the totality of the circumstances, [his] freedom from action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest," even if he is not formally placed under arrest. United States v. Colonna , 511 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted...