United States v. Price

496 F.Supp.3d 83

UNITED STATES of America

v.Helery PRICE, Defendant.

Criminal No. 07-0152-06 (ESH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 6, 2020

Amanda R. Williams, Anthony F. Scarpelli, Kacie McCoy Weston, John K. Han, Bernard J. Delia, Pamela Stever Satterfield, William John O'Malley, Jr., Yasmin Emrani, U.S. Attorney's Office/District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, Richard Alan Seligman, Law Offices of Richard Seligman, Washington, DC, Booth M. Ripke, Larry Allen Nathans, Nathans & Biddle, LLP, Baltimore, MD, William Lawrence Welch, III, Columbia, MD, for Defendant.

Helery R. Price, Lewisburg, PA, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLEN S. HUVELLE, United States District Judge

Before the Court is defendant Helery Price's Motion for Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). (See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 448.) He seeks a sentence reduction to time served based on "extraordinary and compelling reasons." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

In 2008, after a jury trial, Mr. Price was convicted of a single count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute one kilogram or more of phencyclidine ("PCP"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iv), 851. (Judgment, Aug. 11, 2008, ECF No. 277.) At the time he was sentenced, due to two prior drug convictions, he was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. (Id. ) As discussed infra , due to amendments in the relevant statutes, Mr. Price's statutory mandatory minimum if he were being sentenced today would be 15 years. If he were serving a 15-year sentence, the Bureau of Prisons calculates that, with good time credits, Mr. Price would have been released in March 2020.

Mr. Price is currently incarcerated at USP Lewisburg. On August 13, 2020, he sent a letter to the warden there, asking that he be considered for compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, his personal characteristics that increase his risk should he contract the virus (57 years old, African American, and male), the fact that he is serving a life sentence for a non-violent drug offense that would not apply today given the recent changes to criminal sentencing laws made by the First Step Act of 2018, and the unwarranted sentencing disparities between Mr. Price and his more culpable co-conspirators. (See Def.’s Mot. at 1 & attachment thereto.) Mr. Price's request was denied that same day. (Id. )

Mr. Price filed the pending motion for compassionate release on August 31, 2020, and a supplement thereto on September 6, 2020 (ECF No. 449). The government filed an opposition on September 8, 2020 (ECF No. 452), and Mr. Price filed a reply on September 11, 2020 (ECF No. 453), and a second supplement on September 27, 2020 (ECF No. 454).

ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As amended by the First Step Act of 2018, § 3582(c)(1) provides that:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ...

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that--

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ....

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....

18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).

Prior to the First Step Act, motions for compassionate release could only be brought by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) ("Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release"). Because the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statement was issued before the passage of the First Step Act, it only contemplates motions filed by the Bureau of Prisons, not by defendants.¹ In relevant part, it provides:

Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term of imprisonment ... if, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable, the court determines that—

(1) (A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; ...

(2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ; and

(3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In Application Note 1, the Commission identifies four types of circumstances that may qualify as extraordinary and compelling: (A) the defendant's medical condition; (B) the defendant's age, if combined with deteriorating physical or mental health and a minimum amount of time served; (C) certain family circumstances; and (D) "other reasons—as determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" independent of or in combination with the reasons listed in subsections (A) to (C). See U.S.S.G. § 1B.13 appl. n.1(A)–(D).

The government opposes defendant's motion, arguing that (1) he has failed to satisfy the statutory exhaustion requirement; (2) his reasons for seeking a sentence reduction are not "extraordinary and compelling"; and (3) even if he had presented extraordinary and compelling reasons, he should not be released based on a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and because his release would pose a danger to the community. Each argument will be addressed in turn.

I. EXHAUSTION

Section 3582(c) allows a defendant to bring a motion for compassionate release "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The parties dispute the meaning of this provision. Defendant argues that his motion is properly before the Court because more than 30 days have passed since August 12, 2020, when he submitted his request to the warden of USP Lewisburg. The government argues that because the warden denied defendant's request, as opposed to not responding to it, the 30-day waiting period does not apply and defendant cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement until all administrative appeals have been exhausted. (See Gov't Opp. at 12 ("Courts have interpreted the First Step Act to mean that an inmate must fully exhaust his administrative remedies unless his or her warden does not respond to the inmate's request within 30 days.").) The government's proposed interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which provides that a defendant can either exhaust administrative appeals or wait 30 days. See, e.g. , United States v. Franco , 973 F.3d 465, 466–69 (5th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2020). Indeed, such an interpretation would undermine the First Step Act's goal of expanding the use of compassionate release by removing the BOP as a gatekeeper to judicial consideration of sentence reduction motions. Accordingly, because more than 30 days have passed since defendant submitted his request to the warden of his facility, Mr. Price satisfies this first requirement for compassionate release.

II. EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS

Mr. Price argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to reduce his sentence because (1) changes in sentencing law mean that he is serving a mandatory life sentence while a similarly-situated defendant sentenced today would face only a 15-year mandatory minimum; (2) his life sentence far exceeds the sentences of more culpable co-conspirators; and (3) the injustice of his situation is exacerbated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which he is at greater risk of contracting while in prison and which, because he is an older, black, male, who has health issues, is more likely to cause him serious illness or death.

Before deciding whether these circumstances constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 3582(c), the Court must address a legal question: whether the fact that Section 3582(c) requires that any sentence reduction be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission" means that a court is limited to the specific reasons set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, none of which apply to Mr. Price, or whether it has the discretion to decide that a reason is extraordinary and compelling even if it is not a reason that falls within the Sentencing Commission's policy statement. Because this policy statement predates the First Step Act's substantial changes to the compassionate release process, which were designed to expand the use of compassionate release and remove the BOP as the exclusive gatekeeper of the process, a number of district courts, as well as one court of appeals, have concluded that the policy statement no longer binds district courts. See United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 234–35 (2d Cir. 2020) ("First Step Act empowered district courts evaluating motions for compassionate release to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise"); United States v. Quinn , 467 F.Supp.3d 824, 830 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ("Sentencing Commission's...