United States v. Rollins

540 F.Supp.3d 804

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Robert ROLLINS, Defendant.

99 CR 771-1

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 17, 2021

Susan M. Haling, Matthew Francis Madden, United States Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL, Pretrial Services, Probation Department, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

Nearly two decades ago, Robert Rollins was sentenced to 106½ years in prison for a series of four armed bank robberies in which nobody was physically injured. Doc. 103. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentences. 301 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002). Rollins moves for a sentence reduction to time served—approximately 22 years—under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Doc. 212. Last year, this court denied the motion without prejudice, Docs. 236-237 (reported at 2020 WL 3077593 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2020) ), but the Seventh Circuit vacated that ruling and remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Gunn , 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020). 2020 WL 7663884 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 2020). Rollins's motion is granted in large part, and his custodial sentence is reduced to 28 years plus one day.

Background

Rollins was apprehended after committing a bank robbery on March 2, 1999, in Independence, Missouri. 301 F.3d at 513 ; Doc. 259 at 13-14. In a proffer, which he later repudiated, Rollins admitted to having committed four other bank robberies in Chicago during the preceding months, from December 1998 through February 1999. 301 F.3d at 513. He turned 26 years old just before the fourth robbery. Doc. 259 at 2. The robberies followed a common pattern: Rollins entered a bank, approached the teller counter, and, after asking innocuous questions about getting change or opening an account, pointed a handgun at the teller and demanded cash. Id. at 3-4. Rollins had an accomplice to each robbery either inside the bank or serving as a getaway driver. Ibid. He stole a total of $12,058 from the Chicago banks. Id. at 5.

Rollins was prosecuted in two separate cases. In March 1999, he was indicted in the Western District of Missouri for the Missouri robbery. United States v. Rollins , No. 99-cr-06001 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 1999) ("Rollins I "), ECF No. 11. (Docket entries in the present case are cited as Doc. __, while docket entries in Rollins I are cited as Rollins I , ECF No. __.) In June 1999, Rollins pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and one count of using or carrying a firearm in the commission of the robbery, id. § 924(c)(1). Rollins I , ECF No. 23. The Rollins I court continued the sentencing while this case remained pending.

In October 1999, Rollins was charged by indictment in this case with four counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and four counts of using or carrying a firearm in the commission of each robbery, id. § 924(c)(1). Docs. 1, 38. A jury found Rollins guilty on all counts. Docs. 74-75. In October 2001, the court sentenced him to 106½ years in prison. Doc. 103 (Hibbler, J.).

At the time Rollins was sentenced, 106½ years was the minimum sentence that could have been imposed. Doc. 259 at 20. The sentence's first component consisted of concurrent 6½-year terms for the bank robberies, which was the bottom end of the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines range. Ibid. ; see United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 233, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ("The Guidelines as written ... are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all judges."). The sentence's second component consisted of four consecutive 25-year terms for the § 924(c) charges. That 100-year term was the statutory minimum because the then-applicable version of § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) imposed a 25-year minimum "[i]n the case of a second or subsequent [ § 924(c) ] conviction," which the Supreme Court had interpreted to mean a second "finding of guilt by a judge or jury." Deal v. United States , 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). Rollins had already pleaded guilty to a § 924(c) charge in Rollins I , so all four of his § 924(c) convictions in this case were "second or subsequent" as Deal understood the statute, even though he had committed all his armed robberies before he was prosecuted for any of them. Rollins's projected release date is February 8, 2092. Doc. 214 at 5.

After judgment was entered in this case, the Rollins I court sentenced Rollins to 33 months in prison for the robbery and the statutory minimum of 7 years for the § 924(c) conviction, with those sentences running consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentence in this case.

Rollins I , ECF No. 39. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Rollins , 73 F. App'x 189 (8th Cir. 2003). Including his pretrial detention, Rollins has been in federal custody for over 22 years, Doc. 259 at 1, so he has served the custodial portion of the Rollins I sentence, with only the judgment here requiring his continued imprisonment.

Were Rollins sentenced today for his crimes in this case, he would face a much lower statutory minimum sentence of 28 years in prison for the four § 924(c) counts. The First Step Act amended § 924(c) to trigger the 25-year minimum only for "a violation of this subsection that occurs after a prior conviction under this subsection has become final." § 403(a), 132 Stat. at 5221-22 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) ). Rollins's violations of § 924(c) all predated the judgments in both Rollins I and this case, so his minimum sentence today would be seven years for each count pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) —because he brandished a firearm—to be served consecutively under § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). He also would need to serve at least one day of consecutive time for the robbery counts. See Dean v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1177, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017) ("Nothing in [ § 924(c) ] prevents a district court from imposing a ... mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c) and a one-day sentence for the predicate ... crime, provided those terms run one after the other.").

Rollins's motion for a sentence reduction argues that this dramatic change in sentencing law and his exemplary record of rehabilitation in prison qualify as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that warrant a reduction of his sentence to time served. Doc. 214 at 14-20. As the Government acknowledges, Doc. 226 at 2, Rollins exhausted his administrative remedies by asking his warden to submit a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion on his behalf, Doc. 214 at 6. When addressing Rollins's motion last year, this court concluded that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, the Guidelines Policy Statement implementing § 3582(c)(1)(A), did not permit it to grant a sentence reduction for a reason other than medical condition, age, or family circumstances, except on the motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 2020 WL 3077593, at *2. The Seventh Circuit later held in Gunn , 980 F.3d at 1180, that the Policy Statement as presently composed does not bind district courts where, as here, a prisoner moves under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for a sentence reduction. On the parties’ joint motion, the Seventh Circuit vacated this court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of Gunn .

Discussion

I. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

To obtain relief, Rollins must show that his case presents "extraordinary and compelling reasons [that] warrant ... a reduction" in his prison sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The starting point for this analysis is Gunn , where the Seventh Circuit held that the Policy Statement articulated in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 "addresses motions and determinations of the Director, not motions by prisoners." 980 F.3d at 1180. Without a binding policy statement from the Sentencing Commission, "[t]he statute itself sets the standard: only ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ justify the release of a prisoner who is outside the scope of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)." Ibid. That said, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that the Policy Statement and its Application Notes "provide a working definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons,’ " and "a judge who strikes off on a different path risks an appellate holding that judicial discretion has been abused." Ibid. In short, the Seventh Circuit concluded, "[d]istrict judges must operate under the statutory criteria—‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’—subject to deferential appellate review." Id. at 1181.

The Policy Statement provides little guidance in this case. The grounds for a reduced sentence asserted by Rollins—a stupendously long prison term that almost certainly would not be imposed today, combined with his "admirable record of rehabilitation, and his achievements while incarcerated," Doc. 252 at 3—bear little resemblance to the specific "extraordinary and compelling" reasons listed in Application Notes 1(A)-(C), which concern a defendant's medical condition, age, and family circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 n.1(A)-(C). The only potentially applicable reason appears in Application Note 1(D), a catch-all that merely mimics the statutory phrase "extraordinary and compelling reason" and thus provides no guidance independent of the statute itself. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 n.1(D).

Application Note 2 does bear on Rollins's motion, but only by way of defeating an argument advanced by the Government. In opposing the motion, the Government cites legislative history that, by its lights, conveys that an "extraordinary and compelling reason" must be a post-judgment change in circumstance, such as a terminal illness that manifests after sentencing. Doc. 226 at 14 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 55-56, 121 (1983)). But Application Note 2 strikes a different path, making clear that a circumstance known to the sentencing court at the time of sentencing can later justify a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) :

For purposes of this policy statement, an

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