United States v. Williams

458 F.Supp.3d 939

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Cortney WILLIAMS, Defendant.

No. 2:17-cr-20002-5

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division.

Signed April 30, 2020

Filed May 1, 2020

Samuel Robert Stringfellow, US Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

SAMUEL H. MAYS, Jr., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Cortney Williams' pro se Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence (the "Motion"). (ECF Nos. 758, 759.) The government responded on April 20, 2020. (ECF No. 760.) For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

In March 2017, Williams was indicted for various crimes based on his involvement in a drug trafficking organization. (See generally ECF No. 28.) In October 2018, Williams pled guilty to two counts of a Superseding Indictment. (ECF Nos. 474-76.) In January 2019, the Court sentenced Williams to 46 months in prison on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. (ECF Nos. 562-564.) Williams' anticipated release date is August 31, 2020. See BOP Inmate Locator at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/In.

On April 10, 2020, Williams sent the Court a pro se motion for "Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 758.) Williams argues that the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an "extraordinary and compelling circumstance[ ]" warranting his early release from prison. (Id. at 1-2.) He argues that the institution where he is located "can not assure the safety of [his] health and life," that the facility "places a substantial risk due to the tight space in crowded conditions," and that "social distancing can not be accomplished." (Id. at 1.) He says that he, "like most individuals would not like to test [his] body, life or health against the virus ...." (Id. ) On April 15, 2020, Williams supplemented his Motion, informing the Court that his facility has had "42 confirmed [COVID-19] cases and increasing," and asked the Court to allow him "to proceed without exhaustion." (ECF No. 759 at 1.) On April 20, 2020, the government filed a response to Williams' Motion, arguing that the Court does not have the authority to consider it because Williams has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 760.)

II. Standard of Review

A sentencing court does not have inherent authority to modify an otherwise valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). The authority to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 748-49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2001) ). Eighteen U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a court to modify a term of imprisonment where "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [modification]." Motions under that section have been called "motions for compassionate release." United States v. McCann, No. 13-cr-52, 2020 WL 1901089, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2020). "The compassionate release provisions were ... intended to be a ‘safety valve’ to reduce a sentence in the ‘unusual case in which the defendant's circumstances are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be inequitable to continue the confinement of the prisoner.’ " United States v. Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d 421, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing S. Rep. 98-225, at 121 (1983)).

In the First Step Act of 2018 (the "First Step Act"), Pub L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a prisoner to file a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf. Before the First Step Act, a motion for compassionate release could be brought only by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP"). United States v. York, Nos. 3:11-cr-76, 3:12-cr-145, 2019 WL 3241166, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017) ). The First Step Act modified § 3582(c)(1)(A) with the intent of "increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release." Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (capitalization omitted); see also Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d at 427.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) now provides that:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that --

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ...

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....

Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission, "in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, [to] describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). In the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (the "U.S.S.G."), the Sentencing Commission has published a policy statement addressing the standards for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the "Policy Statement"). That Policy Statement reiterates that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and "after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable." Id. The Policy Statement also directs courts to determine that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community," before reducing a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id.

The Application Notes to the Policy Statement describe four categories of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that may justify compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) : (A) the medical condition of the defendant; (B) the age of the defendant; (C) family circumstances; and (D) other reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)-(D). Relevant here, the "other reasons" category allows compassionate release if, "[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists ... an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)." Id. The Application Notes to the Policy Statement do not give examples or provide more guidance for what may qualify in this "other" category.¹

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires a defendant to "first exhaust [his] administrative remedies [with the BOP] before seeking judicial relief." United States v. Koch, No. 01-cr-083, 2019 WL 3837727, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2019). A defendant may exhaust his administrative remedies in one of two ways: (1) by exhausting his "administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf," or (2) upon "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; see York, 2019 WL 3241166, at *5 ("Other district courts have recognized that the language of § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, requires the defendant to file an administrative request with the BOP ‘and then either exhaust administrative appeals or wait thirty days after submitting his request to the BOP.’ ") (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Heromin, No. 11-cr-550, 2019 WL 2411311, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2019) ). The defendant bears the burden of showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies and is entitled to compassionate release. See Ebbers, 432 F.Supp.3d at 426 (citing United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992) ).

III. Analysis

Williams moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (ECF No. 79.) He asks the Court for "immediate release or home confinement" at his sister's house. (Id. at 2.) The Court does not have authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to place a prisoner in home confinement. See Miller v. United States, No. 16-cr-20222, 453 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1064-65 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2020) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court construes Williams' Motion as a request for immediate release.

Before moving for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must ask the BOP to file a motion for compassionate release on his behalf, and then "fully exhaust[ ] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or wait until "30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility" have elapsed. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Williams asks the Court to allow him "to proceed without exhaustion." (ECF No. 759 at 1.) The government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion requirement is "jurisdictional" and that the Court "lacks authority to act on [Williams' Motion] at this time." (ECF No. 760 at 2-4.) Alternatively, the government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s administrative exhaustion requirement is a "mandatory claim-processing rule" that must be enforced if the government raises it. (Id. at 3-6.)

Exhaustion is at issue in two different contexts: when it is jurisdictionally prescribed or when it is mandated by a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. See United States v. Ogarro, No. 18-cr-373-9, 2020 WL 1876300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020). Jurisdictional prescriptions govern a court's adjudicatory authority (e.g., subject matter jurisdiction). See Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019). If jurisdictional prescriptions are not satisfied, a court does not...