Vacula v. Chapman

230 A.3d 431

Judith A. VACULA, Appellant

v.Robert F. CHAPMAN

No. 775 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 15, 2019

Filed: March 5, 2020

Robert S. Frycklund, Summit Hill, for appellant.

Douglas J. Taglieri, Pottsville, for appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Judith A. Vacula appeals from the order that sustained the preliminary objections of Robert F. Chapman and dismissed her complaint with prejudice. We reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

We glean the following underlying facts from Ms. Vacula's second amended complaint.¹ Ms. Vacula and Mr. Chapman began a romantic relationship in 2012. In January 2017, they reached an oral agreement to purchase a home in which to reside together. The parties agreed that they would jointly own the real estate, but that only Mr. Chapman would be named as the grantee on the deed. In reliance upon the agreement, Ms. Vacula gave Mr. Chapman $4,630 towards costs for a home inspection, a deposit, a down payment, and closing costs on the property. In April 2017, both Ms. Vacula and Mr. Chapman attended the closing on the transaction, and they began residing in the home with Ms. Vacula's minor children. In August 2017, the family grew with the addition of two kittens.

The parties also had an oral agreement as to the family's living expenses. Specifically, Ms. Vacula was to be responsible for paying the electric and internet utilities as well as purchasing all groceries. Mr. Chapman was to pay the mortgage and the cable bill. The remaining utility expenses were to be shared equally.

The arrangement proceeded as planned for approximately six months. During this time, in addition to expending funds pursuant to the parties' oral agreement, Ms. Vacula also contributed towards maintenance and repairs to the property, as well as improvements such as painting.

The parties' relationship began to deteriorate in September 2017. Arguments between them resulted in Mr. Chapman's leaving for days or weeks at a time. After several months of this, Mr. Chapman filed a landlord-tenant complaint against Ms. Vacula in the magisterial district court, which ultimately resulted in an award of possession to Mr. Chapman. During Mr. Chapman's absences and the litigation of the landlord-tenant action, Ms. Vacula alone bore all of the household expenses and maintenance costs, including utilities and mortgage payments that Mr. Chapman had agreed to pay.

Mr. Chapman executed his order for possession on February 7, 2018. As a result, Ms. Vacula had to find new housing for herself, her children, and the kittens, "at extraordinary personal expense." Second Amended Complaint, 2/19/19, at ¶ 22. Mr. Chapman also refused to allow Ms. Vacula to recover her personal property from the residence.

Ms. Vacula filed a pro se complaint of her own against Mr. Chapman in the magisterial district court for monetary damages, and received an award exceeding $12,000. Ms. Vacula appealed to the trial court. Following Mr. Chapman's praecipe for a rule to file a complaint, several complaints and rounds of preliminary objections were filed, culminating in the counselled second amended complaint at issue in this appeal. Therein, Ms. Vacula sought $24,000 in damages, plus interest, under theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

Mr. Chapman filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer as to both counts based upon the statute of frauds. Mr. Chapman also averred that Ms. Vacula's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and were stated with insufficient specificity. Ms. Vacula filed a memorandum of law in opposition.² By order of April 18, 2019, the trial court sustained the preliminary objections based upon the statute of frauds and dismissed Ms. Vacula's second amended complaint with prejudice. Ms. Vacula filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did not order Ms. Vacula to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, and none was filed. However, the trial court authored an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Ms. Vacula presents the following issues for this Court's consideration:

A. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion or otherwise ruled improperly in sustaining Mr. Chapman's preliminary objections to Ms. Vacula's second amended complaint.

1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion or otherwise ruled improperly in disregarding Mr. Chapman's failure to include a notice to defend or to endorse his preliminary objections with a notice to plead.

2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion or otherwise ruled improperly in dismissing both Ms. Vacula's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims in her second amended complaint on the basis of the statute of frauds.

3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion or otherwise ruled improperly in disregarding the authority of Hostetter v. Hoover , 378 Pa.Super. 1, 547 A.2d 1247 (1988).

B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law, abused its discretion or otherwise ruled improperly in dismissing Ms. Vacula's second amended complaint w[i]th prejudice, instead of permitting her to file a further amended pleading within twenty (20) days.

Ms. Vacula's brief at 10-11 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Ms. Vacula first argues that the trial court should not have sustained Mr. Chapman's preliminary objections because Mr. Chapman did not include therein a notice to defend or notice to plead. Ms. Vacula's brief at 24-26. This argument is unavailing.

Under our Rules of Civil Procedure, the requirement of a notice to defend attaches only to complaints. See Pa.R.C.P. 1018.1(a). Mr. Chapman filed no complaint in this action. Rather, Mr. Chapman stated preliminary objections pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028. That rule contains a note expressly addressing the requirement, or lack thereof, for endorsement with a notice to plead depending on the type of objection raised:

Note : Preliminary objections raising an issue under subdivision (a)(1), (5), (6), (7) or (8) cannot be determined from facts of record. In such a case, the preliminary objections must be endorsed with a notice to plead or no response will be required under Rule 1029(d).

However, preliminary objections raising an issue under subdivision (a)(2), (3) or (4) may be determined from facts of record so that further evidence is not required.

Pa.R.C.P. 1028.

Mr. Chapman's preliminary objections were pursuant to subdivisions (a)(2) (failure of pleading to conform to law), (a)(3) (insufficient specificity), and (a)(4) (demurrer). Accordingly, no endorsement with a notice to plead was necessary, no responsive pleading from Ms. Vacula was required, and the averments in Mr. Chapman's pleading were deemed to be denied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1029(d).

The trial court properly noted the above, but determined that Mr. Chapman had demonstrated that Ms. Vacula's complaint was legally insufficient based upon the statute of frauds. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/19, at 4. Therefore, we turn to Ms. Vacula's arguments that the Statute of Frauds does not render her complaint legally insufficient.³

We begin with the pertinent legal principles.

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Thus, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review mirrors that of the trial court. Accepting all material averments as true, we must determine whether the complaint adequately states a claim for relief under any theory of law.

Keller v. Bank of New York Mellon , 212 A.3d 52, 56 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

The Statute of Frauds "prevent[s] the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent claims by requiring that contracts pertaining to interests in real estate be supported by written evidence." Strausser v. PRAMCO, III , 944 A.2d 761, 765 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a contract for the sale or transfer of real estate generally will not be enforced to recognize or award an interest in the property in a buyer/grantee unless that contract is supported by a writing signed by the seller/grantor. See , e.g. , Hostetter v. Hoover , 378 Pa.Super. 1, 547 A.2d 1247, 1250 (1988).

However, "[t]he Statute of Frauds does not void those oral contracts relating to land which fail to comply with the Statute's formal requirements." Fannin v. Cratty , 331 Pa.Super. 326, 480 A.2d 1056, 1059 (1984). "Pennsylvania courts have emphasized that the Statute is not designed to prevent the performance or enforcement of oral contracts that in fact were made." Zuk v. Zuk , 55 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.Super. 2012) (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted).

Recovery of monetary damages for nonperformance of an agreement to create or transfer an interest in land is available, "the measure of such damages being the money that was paid on account of the purchase and the expenses incurred on the faith of the contract." Polka v. May , 383 Pa. 80, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (1955). Additionally, even specific performance may be ordered upon the appropriate showing of part performance of the oral contract. See Hostetter , supra at 1251 ("[S]pecific performance of an oral contract for the sale of real estate may be ordered where it appears that continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property was taken under the oral contract and improvements were made by the buyer which are not readily compensable in money.").

The trial court in the case sub judice held that Ms. Vacula's complaint stated no viable claim because "the statute of frauds has clearly made any oral agreement in support of breach of contract and unjust enrichment unenforceable." Trial Court Opinion, 5/14/19, at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted...