Walkden v. Pa., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing

103 A.3d 432

John Louis WALKDEN, Appellant

v.COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING.

No. 193 C.D. 2014

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 3, 2014.

Decided Nov. 6, 2014.

John Louis Walkden, pro se.

Terrance M. Edwards, Assistant Counsel, Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, and JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge.

Opinion

OPINION BY Senior Judge GARDNER COLINS.

John Louis Walkden (Licensee) appeals, pro se, from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (Trial Court) denying his appeal from a one-year suspension of his driver's license imposed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) for refusal of chemical testing in violation of Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law. We affirm.

On August 14, 2013, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Crystal Dugan was dispatched for a disturbance call from the owner of the Peach Bottom Inn in Peach Bottom Township, Pennsylvania reporting that a white Jeep had almost run him over in the parking lot of the Inn and the driver of the vehicle, who appeared to be intoxicated, cursed at him. (Jan. 22, 2014 Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 4, 15.) Trooper Dugan located a vehicle matching this description in the parking lot and spoke with the occupant of the vehicle, Licensee, who slurred his speech, had difficulty responding to questions and could not locate his license. (Id. at 4–6.) Licensee told Trooper Dugan that he was not sure where he was or how he had arrived there, but he responded in the affirmative when asked if he had driven to his present location. (Id. at 6.) Trooper Dugan detected the odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and noticed an open bottle of vodka in the passenger area of the vehicle. (Id. at 5, 7–8, 14.)

Trooper Dugan asked Licensee to step out of the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests, however Licensee needed assistance to exit the vehicle and once on his feet was unable to perform the tests. (Id. at 6–7.) Trooper Dugan then placed Licensee in custody and transported him to York Hospital for chemical testing. (Id. at 7–9.) Trooper Dugan read the DL–26 Implied Consent Warning Form twice to Licensee advising him that failure to consent to testing would result in suspension of his driving privileges and asked him to provide a blood sample for testing. (Id. at 9–10; Hearing Ex. C–1, DL–26 Form.) Licensee refused to submit to blood testing or sign the DL–26 Form and instead requested that his handcuffs be taken off. (H.T. at 10–11; Hearing Ex. C–1, DL–26 Form.) Trooper Dugan explained to Licensee that the handcuffs would be removed when the blood sample was taken, however she needed him to answer affirmatively that he would submit to a blood test before she took them off, but Licensee still refused the blood test. (H.T. at 11.)

By letter dated August 30, 2013, the Department notified Licensee that his license was being suspended for a period of one year based upon his refusal to submit to chemical testing. (Hearing Ex. C–1, Notification.) Licensee appealed the suspension and a hearing was held before the Trial Court on January 22, 2014. Following the hearing, the Trial Court issued an order dismissing Licensee's appeal and reinstating the suspension. In an opinion issued in support of the order, the Trial Court held that Licensee's admission that he was driving was sufficient evidence for Trooper Dugan to arrest Licensee for driving under the influence and there was no requirement that he be given warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because Licensee was not in custody at the time he made that statement. The Trial Court further held that Licensee's refusal to submit to chemical testing was not rendered invalid by Trooper Dugan's insistence that he remain in handcuffs until he agreed to the test because Licensee was not entitled to have his handcuffs removed while considering whether to agree to chemical testing and anything less than unconditional assent to the test is considered a refusal. Licensee appealed the Trial Court's order to this Court.¹

The four elements that the Department must prove to sustain a one-year driver's license suspension under the Implied Consent Law are that the licensee (i) was arrested for driving under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance; (ii) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (iii) refused to do so; and (iv) was warned that a refusal would result in the suspension of his driver's license. Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (1999) ; Marone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 990 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010).

On appeal to this Court, Licensee challenges whether the Department met its burden on the first of these elements in showing that Trooper Dugan had reasonable grounds in arresting Licensee for driving under the influence. Licensee contends that, because the car and headlights were off when Trooper Dugan approached Licensee's vehicle, there was not sufficient objective evidence that Licensee had been in actual physical control and operating a moving vehicle to substantiate an arrest for driving under the influence.

The question of whether an officer had “reasonable grounds” to arrest a licensee is a question of law fully reviewable by this Court. Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 ; McKenna v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 72 A.3d 294, 298 (Pa.Cmwlth.2013). “Reasonable grounds exist when a person in the position of the police officer, viewing the facts and circumstances as they appeared at the time, could have concluded that the motorist was operating the vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207. To determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to conclude that the licensee was operating a vehicle under the influence, we must consider the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as the location of the vehicle; whether the engine was running; staggering, swaying or uncooperative behavior by the licensee; and the odor of alcohol. Id.; Stancavage v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 986 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009). It is not necessary for an officer to actually witness a licensee operating a vehicle in order to have reasonable grounds to place him under arrest for driving under the influence. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Paige, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 600, 628 A.2d 917, 919 (1993) ; Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Cantanese, 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 128, 533 A.2d 512, 514 (1987).

We hold that the Trial Court did not err in concluding that Trooper Dugan had reasonable grounds to arrest Licensee. Trooper Dugan had ample reason to believe that Licensee was intoxicated: she testified that Licensee slurred when speaking, had difficulty responding to her questions, could not get out of the vehicle without her assistance and was unable to perform field sobriety tests. Additionally, Trooper Dugan detected the odor of alcohol and observed a bottle of vodka in the passenger area of the vehicle. Though Trooper Dugan did not personally observe Licensee operating his vehicle, she was dispatched to the Peach Bottom Inn based on a disturbance call from the owner of that establishment reporting that a driver of a white jeep—the same car Licensee was found in—had cursed at him, almost run him over and appeared intoxicated. Trooper Dugan also spoke to the owner of the Inn and another employee when she arrived at the scene and they informed her that Licensee had not patronized the Inn prior to the call. Furthermore, Licensee told Trooper Dugan that he had driven to his present location.

Licensee argues that the Department could not have established that he was in “actual physical control” of his vehicle because Trooper Dugan did not find Licensee in his vehicle with the engine running or with his keys in his hand. However, the cases Licensee cites for this argument relate to the burdens on the Commonwealth in proving a criminal driving under the influence violation. See Commonwealth v. Wolen, 546 Pa. 448, 685 A.2d 1384 (1996) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Byers, 437 Pa.Super. 502, 650 A.2d 468 (1994) ; Commonwealth v. Price, 416 Pa.Super. 23, 610 A.2d 488 (1992). A license suspension case is a civil matter and the reasonable grounds standard applicable here is less rigorous than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for a criminal conviction or even the probable cause standard required to substantiate an arrest in a criminal prosecution. See Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 ; Marone, 990 A.2d at 1190 ; Vinansky v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 665 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). Moreover, as our Supreme Court has made clear, whether an engine is running is only one of the various circumstances that should be considered in determining whether reasonable grounds exist for an arrest. See Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 (citing Wolen, 685 A.2d at 1385 ). All that is required is some objective evidence that the licensee had in the past, while intoxicated, operated or exercised control over the movement of the vehicle. Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 ; Marone, 990 A.2d at 1190.

Trooper Dugan observed several indicia that Licensee was inebriated, detected the odor of alcohol coming from Licensee's vehicle, observed an open container in the vehicle and had credible information that Licensee had only recently arrived at the premises and not consumed any alcohol at the Peach Bottom Inn. Even if there are other reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this...