Wallace v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI

2 F.4th 133

Joseph WALLACE, Appellant

v.Superintendent MAHANOY SCI; Attorney General Pennsylvania

No. 18-3006

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued March 9, 2021

Filed: June 22, 2021

Federal Public Defender, Western District of Pennsylvania, Lisa B. Freeland, Samuel G. Saylor [ARGUED], Office of Federal Public Defender, 1001 Liberty Avenue, 1500 Liberty Center, Pittsburgh, PA 15222, Counsel for Appellant

Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr. [ARGUED], Chester County Office of the District Attorney, Suite 4450, 201 West Market Street, P.O. Box 2746, West Chester, PA 19380, Counsel for Appellee

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Chief Judge.

More than twenty years ago, Joseph Wallace pleaded guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) to third-degree murder and related crimes. This appeal concerns his petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was due by January 7, 2002, but which he did not file until September 13, 2015. He asks us now to excuse his decade-plus delay in filing the petition.

For much of his life, if not all of it, Wallace has suffered from severe mental illness, including bipolar disorder with psychotic features, chronic depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and major affective disorder; his illness has manifested at times as hallucinations, religious delusions, manic activity, and suicidal tendencies. It is undisputed that an acute psychotic episode led him to commit the crime for which he remains incarcerated today. Wallace contends that his mental illness so hampered his ability to think clearly that he could not reasonably have been expected to file for federal habeas relief at any time prior to September 2015. But after a painstaking review of the record, we cannot agree. Instead, we conclude that Wallace has not demonstrated his entitlement to equitable tolling that would allow us to extend the filing deadline for the duration of the period of excessive delay the record reveals.

In addition, Wallace claims that his prescribed use of the prescription drug Ritalin¹ may have exacerbated his psychosis, rendering him involuntarily intoxicated or legally insane at the time of his crime such that he could not form the mens rea necessary for murder. But given the applicable law and the evidence of record, we are not persuaded that this claim permits Wallace to employ the narrow "actual innocence gateway," McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U.S. 383, 386, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013), to excuse him from the filing deadline for habeas petitions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

We will affirm the District Court's judgment dismissing Wallace's habeas petition as untimely.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

On February 28, 2000, Wallace was in the throes of a severe psychotic episode. Early that morning, after a sleepless night, he got into bed with his wife, Eileen. Wallace was clutching a knife. After waiting ten or fifteen minutes to build up his courage, Wallace used the knife to stab Eileen in the chest as she lay sleeping. She awoke, pleaded with him to stop, and tried to fight him off. They struggled for a few minutes while Wallace continued to stab and slash at her. Eileen soon died from her wounds.

Wallace then showered, changed his clothes, stowed the knife in a drawer, and locked the door to their house, leaving Eileen's body behind. Then he left for a convenience store. Later, Wallace took a train to Philadelphia where he planned to commit suicide. Police were waiting for him, however, after his mother disclosed his whereabouts. They apprehended him in Philadelphia's Thirtieth Street train station.

Meanwhile, Patricia Daniels, began to worry when her friend, Eileen, missed a scheduled appointment. Daniels contacted the police and asked for a "well-being check" at the Wallaces’ home. JA 1150.³ A responding officer discovered the doors were locked, and when no one answered, he entered forcefully by breaking a windowpane. Daniels accompanied the officer inside where they discovered Eileen's body upstairs.

The next day, while in police custody, Wallace admitted to stabbing his wife to death. He told police that he had acted on a belief that Eileen's death would put her out of her misery and set her spirit free. As he related his account, he appeared mild, calm, and subdued to the officers who interviewed him.

Several months later, Wallace explained to a doctor that he had killed Eileen because he had believed that he and she, together, "were Jesus," JA 253, and that "he was doing her a favor by killing her" because "she is in heaven" and "it was the right thing for her," JA 256. He then explained that he left the scene because he knew the police would be looking for him.

Around the time of the crime, Wallace had been taking prescription medications including Ambien, Paxil, and Ritalin. Later, he claimed to doctors that he did not remember precisely which medications he took on the day of Eileen's death.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Wallace's Pennsylvania Criminal Proceeding

Wallace was charged in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County with first-, second-, and third-degree murder, 18 Pa C.S. § 2502,⁴ aggravated assault, 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)(1), (4), possession of an instrument of crime, 18 Pa. C.S. § 907(a), and tampering with evidence, 18 Pa. C.S. § 4910(1).⁵ The case was assigned to Judge James P. MacElree, III. First Assistant Public Defender Graham Andes, Esq., represented Wallace. At that time, Andes was a twenty-seven-year veteran of the Chester County public defender's office and was that office's specialist in mental health defenses. Andes was assisted by co-counsel Maria Heller, Esq.

In March 2000, Andes directed two forensic psychologists, Dr. Gerald Cooke and Dr. Robert Sadoff, to examine Wallace and opine on his mental competence. Both doctors concluded that Wallace was competent to attend a preliminary hearing but that he would need to be re-evaluated as to his competence to stand trial.

In June 2000, Andes requested Drs. Sadoff and Cooke to re-evaluate Wallace by conducting psychological testing and reviewing his medical records. Andes sought comprehensive written opinions assessing both Wallace's competence to stand trial and his state of mind at the time of the crime. In response, Dr. Cooke reported that Wallace was, at the time of the evaluation, in partial remission due to his medication regime. Dr. Cooke adjudged him "marginally competent to stand trial," but suggested re-evaluation "a day or two prior to" trial to assess whether the stress of an approaching trial could cause him to decompensate. JA 999. As to state of mind at the time of the crime, Dr. Cooke opined that Wallace was not legally insane but satisfied Pennsylvania's GBMI⁶ definition:

Wallace was overtly and grossly psychotic at the time of the offense, and ... his actions followed from a psychotic delusion. If not for his psychosis, it is my opinion that this offense would not have occurred. It is also my opinion that because of his psychosis he could not conform his behavior to the requirements of law and therefore he would meet the criteria for Guilty but Mentally Ill . However, though he believed that he was acting based on a higher law, he did know that by Man's law what he did would be viewed as wrong, and that the police would come looking for him. Therefore, it is my opinion that he does not meet the stricter M'Naughten standard for Insanity .... [I]t is my opinion that Mr. Wallace acted without malice. Rather, based on his delusions, he felt he was freeing his wife from an evil world and sending her to heaven.

JA 1000 (emphases added).

Dr. Sadoff reached essentially the same conclusions as had Dr. Cooke. Sadoff opined in a June 2000 report that Wallace was "currently mentally competent to proceed." JA 983. In addition, Sadoff concluded that Wallace stabbed his wife "with a benevolent intent and without malice, i.e. , without the intent to harm her, but rather to help her get out of the misery of this world." JA 982. But Dr. Sadoff went on to opine that Wallace was not insane and instead met the definition for GBMI:

Mr. Wallace knew that he was stabbing his wife and knew that it was against the law. His behavior indicates that he wanted to avoid the police and knew that taking another's life was against the law. Thus , he does not fit the McNaughten rule for insanity in Pennsylvania . With respect to diminished capacity, Mr. Wallace had the ability to form the intent to kill his wife, which is what he intended to do, and carried out his intention, so there is no diminished capacity. However, Mr. Wallace, in my opinion, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, which is one of the definitions for mentally ill in the legal concept of "guilty but mentally ill."

JA 982–83 (emphases added).

On June 7, 2000, the trial court held a status hearing during which Andes indicated that the doctors had found Wallace competent to proceed, and Wallace himself agreed with their assessment.⁷ In an abundance of caution, the trial court conducted a second arraignment to ensure that there was no question of Wallace being competent for the arraignment process. While Wallace stood mute, Andes entered a plea of not guilty on his client's behalf as to all counts. Trial was tentatively set for late September 2000.

In the fall of 2000, Andes moved to recuse Judge MacElree as trial judge, arguing that the Judge had displayed an appearance of bias against mental health defenses based on statements made in Wallace's case. On September 26, 2000, oral argument on the recusal motion was held before Senior Judge John Backenstoe of Lehigh County. Andes argued that "there is no defense in this case but a mental health defense" but observed that, "based on the psychological/psychiatric reports that [he had] received from [the] experts, there [was] almost no chance of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity." JA 1057. Thus, he anticipated that the case before the jury...