Warren v. Tri Tech Labs., Inc.

993 F.Supp.2d 609

David WARREN, Plaintiff,

v.TRI TECH LABORATORIES, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 6:12–cv–00046.

United States District Court,

W.D. Virginia,

Lynchburg Division.

Jan. 23, 2014.

David Warren, McKinney, TX, pro se.

Agnis Chandra Chakravorty, Frank H. Hupfl, III, Woods Rogers PLC, Roanoke, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, District Judge.

The pro se Plaintiff, David Warren, filed this action claiming race-based discriminatory treatment in employment and wrongful dismissal in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Defendant, Tri Tech Laboratories, Inc. (“Tri Tech”), has filed a motion for summary judgment, which I will grant. The summary judgment record reveals that Plaintiff was terminated for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons that have nothing to do with his race.

I.

“[S]ummary judgment is warranted if, from the totality of the evidence, including pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, the court believes no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 385 (4th Cir.2013) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56¹; Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir.1995)). A genuine factual dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Defendant propounded written discovery to Plaintiff, and Defendant notified Plaintiff that it intended to take depositions of three of its former employees (including the decision maker who hired and fired Plaintiff). Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's discovery requests, and Plaintiff did not attend the depositions. Having failed to participate in discovery, Plaintiff nonetheless submitted 538 pages of documentspurportedly in response to Defendant's motion, and Plaintiff attended the hearing, where he presented his arguments. Plaintiff's response includes two “Statements of Disputed Material Fact,” two affidavits (Plaintiff's own 76–page affidavit, and one from his wife), and an abundance of exhibits. See docket nos. 42, 43, 44, and 45. However, the evidence Plaintiff has submitted is often not credible, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330–34, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and is largely inadmissible, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).² The vast majority of Plaintiff's submissions rely on speculation, hearsay, or opinion to dispute the evidence submitted by Defendant. To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists (or does not exist), a party may not rest upon his own mere allegations or denials. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rather, the

party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir.1994); Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.1993).

Here, Plaintiff relies on his own statements and his own characterization of the various documents he has submitted to argue that he was treated differently than Defendant's white employees. However, other than his own assertions, Plaintiff cannot presently point to any evidence that supports his claim, and Plaintiff's “own naked opinion” that he was a victim of discrimination is not enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Goldberg v. B. Green and Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988). Plaintiff's speculative assertions regarding Defendant's “state of mind” or “motivation” do not suffice. Id. Plaintiff must “proffer[ ] sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof of his claim at trial.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir.1993).

A district court has an “affirmative obligation ... to prevent ‘factually unsupported claims [or] defenses' from proceeding to trial.” Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Given the record Defendant has developed and submitted in support of the motion, Defendant has satisfied its burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and Plaintiff has failed to rebut that showing. See Whiteman, 729 F.3d at 385 n. 7 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

II.

On September 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed “this action in order to enforce his rights to be free from discrimination based upon his race as provided by Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” The complaint states, in part (paragraph numbering and exhibit citations omitted; quoted verbatim except for bracketed insertions): ³

Plaintiff is an African American male citizen of the Unites States who resides in McKinney, Texas.

Defendant Tri Tech Laboratories, Inc. is a foreign corporation licensed and doing business in the State of Virginia. Tri Tech Laboratories is a contract or third party manufacturer of beauty and cosmetic products.

Plaintiff filed a timely Charge of Discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [the “EEOC”] and received his Notice of Right to Sue on June 18, 2012.

* * *

Plaintiff began employment with Defendant as the Director of Quality on February 4, 2012 at its Lynchburg, Virginia facility.

Defendant's method of selecting which employees are afforded an opportunity to participate in Defendant's well-established and robust, written progressive discipline program is a primary source of discrimination which has resulted in an unfair and wrongful termination of employment opportunities for the Plaintiff. In its response to the [EEOC] regarding Plaintiff's charge, Defendant referenced its language in its written handbook, citing it reserves the right, in its sole discretion, whether and what disciplinary action will be taken in a given situation. Defendant then makes an erred statement that Plaintiff was responsible for a mislabeled Over the Counter drug product as credence to its actions.

Defendant stated in its response to the [EEOC] that it terminated Plaintiff's employment due to mislabeled products and complaint from customer. Although the Plaintiff denies and such allegation of fact surrounding mislabeled products or complaints lodged that were a result of Plaintiff's actions, Caucasian employees have conducted far worse offenses which could and possibly should have resulted in loss of business from its customers prior to Plaintiff's employment. Those Caucasian employees have not been terminated, reprimanded, or even subjected to any disciplinary actions by Defendant. On February 8, 2010, approximately four (4) days after Plaintiff's employment began, a formal notice of a recall of products produced by the Defendant in 2011 for microbial contamination of Burkholderia Cepacia prior to Plaintiff's employment was published by the Food and Drug Administration [the “FDA”] for Kao Brands, makers of Jergens and John Freda product dated December 29, 2009. The products were traced back to Defendants' facility solely and released under the auspices of the quality management system of Mark Hallett, Sr. Director of Quality (Caucasian), Cathleen Owen, Director of Quality (Caucasian), and Blake Hemmel, Manager of Quality (Caucasian). Manufacturing operations at the facility was halted for approximately one week. Neither of these Caucasian employees, directly responsible for preventing unadulterated products from entering the marketplace that can harm to the public under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic act, were terminated for their actions.

Prior to Plaintiff's tenure with Defendant and during the approximate time periods of November 2009 and December 2009, Caucasian Employees, Mark Hallett, Cathleen Owen, and Blake Hemmel, released products manufactured for Beauty Avenues, the makers of Bath and Body Works product, that did not meet the legal fill weight under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Beauty Avenues raised the issue as a customer complaint during Plaintiff's employment where their stores and patrons complained. These products were subject to recall under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and could have resulted in loss of business.

Prior to Plaintiff's tenure and while all Caucasian employees were responsible, Defendant has release OTC products that were mislabeled with the wrong expiration date as shown by Defendant's previous year scorecard provided by Beauty Avenues.

Prior to Plaintiff's tenure, Defendant shipped products to Canada that were mislabeled and were not approved through customs in the country. Caucasian Employees, Mark Hallett and Cathleen Owen were responsible for the released products that were held in customs due to improper labeling of hand sanitizers manufactured for Beauty Avenues, the makers of Bath and Body Works. Plaintiff corrected the issue where the products could be released from customs and properly enter the Canadian marketplace.

During Plaintiff's employment, Mark Hallett, Caucasian, instructed a change be made to the manufacturing process for liquid moist soaps. This change caused the products to be adulterated under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, where the products were not homogeneous and a copolymer and acrylic was undispersed in the products. The defect was noted by the rancidity and foul, sulfur odor caused...