Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss

450 P.3d 601

WASHINGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, UFCW Local 365, a labor organization, and Professional & Technical Employees Local 17, a labor organization, Respondents,

v.WASHINGTON STATE CENTER FOR CHILDHOOD DEAFNESS & HEARING LOSS, Respondent,Evergreen Freedom Foundation d/b/a/ Freedom Foundation, Petitioner.

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 76, a labor organization, and United Association, Local 32, a labor organization, Respondents,

v.State of Washington Department of Labor & Industries, Respondent,Evergreen Freedom Foundation d/b/a Freedom Foundation, Petitioner.

Teamsters Local Union No. 117, a labor organization, Respondent,

v.State of Washington; Christopher Liu, in his capacity as Director, Department of Enterprise Services ; and Dick Morgan, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondents,Evergreen Freedom Foundation d/b/a Freedom Foundation, Petitioner.

Service Employees International Union Healthcare 1199NW, a labor organization, Respondent,

v.State of Washington; Department of Social and Health Services, an agency of the State of Washington; and Department of Health, an agency of the State of Washington, Respondents,Evergreen Freedom Foundation d/b/a Freedom Foundation, Petitioner.

NO. 95262-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued June 12, 2018

Filed October 24, 2019

Greg Overstreet, Security Services N.W., 250 Center Park Way, Sequim, WA 98382-3463, Jennifer Matheson, James Abernathy, Sydney Paige Phillips, Freedom Foundation, P.O. Box 552, Olympia, WA 98507, Eric Rolf Stahlfeld, Attorney at Law, 145 S.W. 155th Street, Suite 101, Burien, WA 98166-2591, Hannah Sarah Sells Marcley, Attorney at Law, 111 21st Avenue S.W., Olympia, WA 98501-2809, for Petitioners.

Kristen Laurel Kussmann, Jacob Fox Metzger, Paul Drachler, Douglas Drachler McKee & Gilbrough LLP, 1904 3rd Avenue, Suite 1030, Seattle, WA 98101-1170, Edward Earl Younglove, III, Younglove & Coker, PLLC, P.O. Box 7846, 1800 Cooper Point Road S.W., #16 Olympia, WA 98507-7846, Kathleen Phair Barnard, Laura Elizabeth Ewan, Dmitri L. Iglitzin, Schwerin Campbell Bamard Iglitzin & Lavitt, 18 W. Mercer Street, Suite 400, Seattle, WA 98119-3971, Kristina Marie Detwiler, Robblee Detwiler PLLP, 2101 4th Avenue, Suite 1000, Seattle, WA 98121-2346, for Respondents.

Morgan B. Damerow, Washington State Attorney, General's Office, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA 98504-0100, Ohad Michael Lowy, Attorney General's Office, 7141 Cleanwater Drive S.W., Tumwater, WA 98501-6503, for Other Party.

STEPHENS, J.

¶1 This case requires us to decide whether state employees have a protected privacy interest against disclosure of public records containing their birth dates associated with their names. We conclude that the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, does not exempt these records from disclosure. Nor does Washington Constitution article I, section 7 preclude disclosure, given that names and birth dates are widely available in the public domain and that their disclosure here does not violate privacy rights. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the superior court decision denying a permanent injunction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2016, the Freedom Foundation (Foundation) sent PRA requests to several state agencies seeking disclosure of records for union-represented employees, including their full names, associated birth dates, and agency work e-mail addresses. Upon reviewing the Foundation's PRA requests, the agencies determined that all of the requested records were disclosable and indicated that, absent a court order, they intended to release the requested records.

¶3 Several unions¹ filed motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent disclosure of the requested records. The Thurston County Superior Court granted a temporary injunction as to most of the requested records but ultimately denied the Unions' motion to permanently enjoin release of state employee names, birth dates, and e-mail addresses. Order Denying Pls.' Mot. for Permanent Inj., No. 16-2-01547-34 (Thurston County Super. Ct. Wash., July 29, 2016) at 3; Verbatim Report of Proceedings (July 29, 2016) (VRP) at 20-21, 25. It concluded that no PRA exemption applied and that the Unions had not demonstrated grounds to permanently enjoin disclosure. VRP at 25.

¶4 On appeal, a Court of Appeals commissioner granted a stay preventing release of the state employees' full names associated with their birth dates. Comm'r's Ruling, Wash. Fed. State Emps. v. State, No. 49248-2-II (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016). A panel of the Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the superior court and held that Washington Constitution article I, section 7 creates a privacy interest against public disclosure of state employees' full names associated with their birth dates. Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, 1 Wash. App. 2d 225, 229, 404 P.3d 111 (2017) (WPEA ). In light of its holding, the court declined to consider the Unions' arguments premised on various statutory provisions. Id. at 229 & n.2, 404 P.3d 111.

¶5 We granted the Foundation's petition for review. 190 Wash.2d 1002, 413 P.3d 15 (2018). Before this court, the Unions assert all claimed grounds for nondisclosure, both statutory and constitutional, of the state employees' names and corresponding birth dates. The employee work e-mail addresses have been disclosed and are no longer at issue. See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2182 (Comm'r's Ruling, Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, No. 48972-4-II (Wash. Ct. App. June 6, 2016)).

ANALYSIS

¶6 The PRA "begins with a mandate of full disclosure of public records;² that mandate is then limited only by the precise, specific, and limited exemptions which the Act provides." Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash.2d 243, 258, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (plurality opinion) (PAWS). The PRA requires that "[e]ach agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records, unless the record falls within the specific exemptions of subsection (8) of this section, this chapter, or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." RCW 42.56.070(1). " ‘The "other statutes" exemption incorporates into the [PRA] other statutes which exempt or prohibit disclosure of specific information or records.’ " Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 190 Wash.2d 769, 778, 418 P.3d 102 (2018) (quoting PAWS, 125 Wash.2d at 261-62, 884 P.2d 592 (citing former RCW 42.17.260(1) (1992), recodified as RCW 42.56.070(1) )). Where other statutes mesh with the PRA, they operate to supplement it. See Planned Parenthood of Great Nw. v. Bloedow, 187 Wash. App. 606, 619, 350 P.3d 660 (2015) ("The ‘other statute’ exemption avoids any inconsistency and allows other state statutes and federal regulations to supplement the PRA's exemptions" (citing Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Office of Att'y Gen., 170 Wash.2d 418, 440, 241 P.3d 1245 (2010) )). However, in the event of a conflict between the PRA and other statutes, "the provisions of [the PRA] shall govern." RCW 42.56.030 ; PAWS, 125 Wash.2d at 261-62, 884 P.2d 592. The PRA must be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote the public policy of keeping Washington residents informed and in control of their public institutions. RCW 42.56.030. "The language of the [PRA] does not authorize us to imply exemptions but only allows specific exemptions to stand." Brouillet v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 114 Wash.2d 788, 800, 791 P.2d 526 (1990).

¶7 Courts are often called on to determine whether records that are exempt under the PRA or an "other statute" should be enjoined from disclosure. See Lyft, 190 Wash.2d at 790, 418 P.3d 102. The PRA injunction statute contemplates that disclosure may not be enjoined unless a party to which the record pertains establishes that disclosure is clearly not in the public interest and in fact poses substantial and irreparable harm. RCW 42.56.540. The lower courts in this case expressed uncertainty as to which injunction standard applies: CR 65 or the PRA standard. They appear to have applied both, in an abundance of caution. See WPEA, 1 Wash. App. 2d at 231-32 ; 1 VRP at 6. Our recent decision in Lyft clarifies that the PRA standard, not the general injunction standard, applies. See Lyft, 190 Wash.2d at 796, 418 P.3d 102.

¶8 A party seeking to prevent disclosure of agency records under the PRA bears the burden of proof. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash.2d 734, 744, 958 P.2d 260 (1998). Whether requested records are exempt from disclosure presents a legal question that is reviewed de novo. PAWS, 125 Wash.2d at 252, 884 P.2d 592 ; RCW 42.56.550(3). A trial court's ultimate decision on whether to grant an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kucera v. Dep't of Transp., 140 Wash.2d 200, 209, 995 P.2d 63 (2000). Findings of fact based on the testimonial record are reviewed for substantial evidence. Zink v. City of Mesa, 140 Wash. App. 328, 336-37, 166 P.3d 738 (2007).

¶9 The Unions' principal argument against disclosure is privacy—they assert both specific PRA exemptions and article I, section 7 privacy rights. They make an additional constitutional argument based on article I, section 5 associational rights. Though the Court of Appeals addressed only article I, section 7, we believe it is appropriate to begin our review with the statute's provisions, as we have previously concluded in the PRA context that reviewing courts " ‘should not pass on constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary to the determination of the case.’ " Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wash.2d 199, 208 n.10, 189 P.3d 139 (2008) (Bellevue John Does II) (quoting State v. Hall, 95 Wash.2d 536, 539, 627 P.2d 101 (1981) ).

I. The PRA Provides No Exemption from Disclosure of State Employees' Birth Dates...