Washington v. State

450 Md. 319

148 A.3d 341

Trendon WASHINGTON

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 5, Sept. Term, 2016

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

November 1, 2016

Argued by Stephen B. Mercer (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland of Baltimore, MD) on brief for Appellant.

Argued by Robert Taylor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland of Baltimore, MD) on brief for Appellee.

Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.

Adkins, J.Appellant Trendon Washington is serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. He filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), § 8–201 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”).¹ The postconviction court dismissed his petition because he was not convicted of a crime of violence and is therefore not eligible for postconviction relief under the statute. We affirm the postconviction court's dismissal of Washington's petition, and hold that a person convicted of conspiracy to commit murder is not eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing under CP § 8–201(b). We further hold that Maryland's postconviction DNA testing statute does not violate due process or equal protection rights accorded by the U.S. Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Washington was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and handgun offenses in connection with the death of Ricardo Paige. On March 20, 2007, Ricardo Paige was found dead at 502 East 43rd Street in Baltimore, Maryland. He had been shot six times. The police recovered two .45 caliber shell casings from the scene along with a bloody broom and dust pan that appeared to have been used to sweep up spent shell casings. The broom and the dust pan tested positive for blood, but the items were not tested for DNA. On January 21, 2009, a jury convicted Washington of conspiracy to commit murder but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining charges. Washington was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On August 6, 2015, Washington filed a petition, pro se , in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City requesting postconviction DNA testing of the broom and dust pan. The Circuit Court dismissed the petition without a hearing on December 14, 2015 because it concluded that Washington did not have standing to file a petition under CP § 8–201(b).² The court reasoned that in order to qualify for relief under this statute, a person must be convicted of a crime of violence under Maryland Code (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 14–101 of the Criminal Law Article(“CR”). Because Washington had been convicted only of conspiracy to commit murder, which is not defined as a crime of violence in CR § 14–101, he lacked standing to pursue the remedies under the statute.

Washington noted a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to CP § 8–201(k)(6). Arrington v. State , 411 Md. 524, 544, 983 A.2d 1071 (2009). He presented the following questions for our review:

1. Whether a person convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and sentenced to incarceration for life is eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing of scientific identification evidence pursuant to § 8–201 of the Criminal Procedure Article ?

2. Whether a person convicted of conspiracy to murder and sentenced to incarceration for life has a residual, core liberty interest protected by the [Due Process Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 that in limited circumstances gives rise to a procedural right to access forensic evidence the State previously produced at trial?

3. Whether § 8–201 of the Criminal Procedure Article, which permits only those convicted of murder to petition for postconviction DNA testing, violates the [Equal Protection Clause] of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 as applied to a person sentenced to life for conspiracy to murder?

(Emphasis in original.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this appeal we are tasked with interpreting Maryland's postconviction DNA testing statute to determine if individuals convicted of conspiracy to commit murder are eligible to file a petition for testing. This is a question of law, which we review without deference to the postconviction court. Arrington , 411 Md. at 551, 983 A.2d 1071 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Maryland's postconviction DNA testing statute, CP § 8–201, grants individuals convicted of certain crimes the right to file a petition requesting postconviction DNA testing. CP § 8–201(b). In 2015, the General Assembly amended the statute to enlarge the class of individuals eligible to file a petition to all those convicted of crimes of violence defined in CR § 14–101.³ Previously, only individuals convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, rape in the first and second degree, and first- and second-degree sex offense were eligible to file such a petition. Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), CP § 8–201(b).

At issue is whether individuals convicted of conspiracy to commit murder are eligible to file a petition for postconviction DNA testing under the recently-expanded list of petition-eligible crimes. Washington argues that, as an individual convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, he is eligible to file a petition based upon a reading of CP § 8–201(b) in the context of the larger statutory scheme and purpose. Washington also asserts that denying him access to DNA evidence for testing violates his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it “constitutes a deprivation of his residual, core liberty interest.” Finally, Washington contends that denying him access to DNA evidence violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because the State has no rational basis for distinguishing him, an individual sentenced to life imprisonment, from individuals convicted of first-degree murder or attempted first-degree murder who received the same sentence.

To the contrary, the State urges us to affirm the dismissal of Washington's petition for lack of standing. Postconviction petitions for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence, it says, are authorized by CP § 8–201(b), and are limited to those convicted of a crime of violence as defined in CR § 14–101. The State points out that conspiracy to commit murder is simply not listed as a crime of violence in CR § 14–101. Therefore, Washington, who was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, lacks standing to file a petition. As to due process, the State avers that the procedures Maryland has in place for such testing go above and beyond the constitutional procedural requirements. Finally, the State asserts that denying access to postconviction DNA testing is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution or Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because Washington is not similarly situated to individuals convicted of consummated crimes of violence and, even if he is, the State has a rational basis for creating this distinction.

Eligibility to File a Petition Under CP § 8–201

The current text of CP § 8–201(b) provides:

(b) Notwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief, a person who is convicted of a crime of violence under § 14–101 of the Criminal Law Article may file a petition:

(1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence that the State possesses that is related to the judgment of conviction; or

(2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law enforcement data base or log for the purpose of identifying the source of physical evidence used for DNA testing.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 14–101 of the Criminal Law Article, which CP § 8–201(b) incorporates to define those eligible to file DNA testing petitions, lists crimes of violence subject to mandatory minimum sentencing. Relevant for our purposes, CR §§ 14–101(a)(7) and (17) define murder and attempted murder as crimes of violence.⁴

We employ Maryland's long-settled rules of statutory construction to guide our interpretation of CP § 8–201. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Blake v. State , 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006). First, we examine the plain language of the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Id. When examining the plain language, “[w]e neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations' that limit or extend its application.” Willis v. Montgomery Cty. , 415 Md. 523, 537, 3 A.3d 448 (2010) (citation omitted). We “examine the language ‘within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). To confirm our plain language reading, we may also consider a statute's legislative history to determine legislative intent. Moore v. State , 388 Md. 623, 635 n.4, 882 A.2d 256 (2005) (collecting cases). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said. Willis , 415 Md. at 536, 3 A.3d 448. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain the Legislature's intent from the legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose to resolve the ambiguity. Blake , 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d 1020.

As the State argues, CP § 8–201(b) permits only “a person who is convicted of a crime of violence under § 14–101 of the Criminal Law Article ” to file a petition. Examination of the language of CR § 14–101 confirms this reading of CP § 8–201(b). Conspiracy has never been included on the CR § 14–101 list. This omission does not appear to be an oversight, moreover, considering that CR § 14–101 does expressly...