Weaver v. James Bonding Co., Inc.

Page 1219

442 F.Supp.2d 1219

Louis G. WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. JAMES BONDING COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-0449-WS-B.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

August 1, 2006.

Edward G. Hawkins, Hawkins Law Firm, L.L.C. Mobile, AL, Jeffrey W. Bennitt, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Thomas Brian Walsh, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.

ORDER

STEELE, District Judge.

At the final pretrial conference held on July 17, 2006, the undersigned sua sponte raised the question of whether plaintiff's federal claims against the lone remaining defendant are cognizable as a matter of law. The Court ordered supplemental briefing on that narrow issue, and has now received and reviewed the parties' memoranda of law on that threshold question. As such, the viability of the federal cause of action, and the jurisdictional status of the state law claims, are now squarely presented for ruling.

I. Background.

A. Procedural Posture.

Plaintiff Louis G. Weaver brought this action in this District Court on his own behalf and as administrator of the estate of James Ellis Weaver ("Weaver"). The Complaint filed on August 2, 2005 purported to assert claims against defendant James Bonding Company ("James Bonding") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as state law claims for assault and battery and wrongful death. (Complaint, ¶ 29.)¹ Plaintiff maintained that agents of James Bonding "did excessively beat and maim" Weaver on the evening of August 4, 2003 during the course of arresting him. (Id., ¶ 5.) According to plaintiff, Weaver "was beaten senseless" by James Bonding and was "continually beaten after he was senseless." (Id.) After spending five days in jail, Weaver was transferred to the USA Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with septic endocarditis and a staph infection in his bloodstream. Weaver received antiobiotic therapy for six days, underwent open-heart surgery for mitral valve replacement on August 15, and died the next day of complications from that surgery. Plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Dimitris K. Kyriazis, who was one of Weaver's attending physicians, opined that Weaver was septic, meaning that his entire body was infected, and that this condition predated his arrival at Mobile Metro Jail on August 4, 2003. Despite Dr. Kyriazis's stated opinion, plaintiff has alleged in the parties' proposed Pretrial Order (the "Pretrial Order") that the beating of Weaver by James Bonding "was a legal contributing cause [to] his death." (Doc. 117, at 1.)

James Bonding failed to move for summary judgment on the § 1983 or the state law claims, most probably because it sought to represent its own interests in this action by proceeding pro se. When this Court learned of James Bonding's pro se status, an Order (doc. 107) was entered on June 13, 2006 explaining that business entities cannot represent themselves in federal court. In response, counsel of record appeared for James Bonding on June 22, 2006. (See doc. 206.) By that time, however, it was far too late in the day for James Bonding to file a Rule 56 motion. After all federal claims against defendants Mobile County and Jack Tillman were dismissed on summary judgment, the Court became concerned that plaintiff's § 1983 theory might not be cognizable against James Bonding because the latter may not have been acting under color of state law. If that were true, then the only remaining causes of action would be state law claims involving non-diverse parties, which would call into question the propriety of federal subject matter jurisdiction. For that reason, the Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the narrow issue of the viability of plaintiffs § 1983 claim.

B. Relevant Facts.

The parties' supplemental submissions concerning James Bonding's involvement in this matter rely on facts to which the parties agreed in their Pretrial Order; accordingly, the legal validity of the § 1983 claim will be evaluated by reference to those facts. James Bonding is a bonding company that is duly licensed by the State of Alabama. On or about May 24, 2003, James Bonding bonded Weaver out of jail on charges of felony obstruction of justice and possession of a controlled substance. When Weaver failed to appear for a May 27 court date on those charges, the Mobile County Circuit Court issued a writ for his arrest. At James Bonding's request, that court issued a certified copy of the bond and conferred upon James Bonding the authority under Alabama law to arrest Weaver and to return him to jail.² The parties agree that James Bonding searched for Weaver for more than two months until August 4, 2003, when he was finally located at the Cimarron Club with the help of a tipster. It is undisputed that James Bonding arrested Weaver on August 4 pursuant to the bondsman's process and transported him to Mobile Metro Jail, where he was booked and taken into custody.

There are no agreed facts concerning the method and manner in which that arrest was carried out. For purposes of this Order, however, the undersigned will accept plaintiffs description of that event, as set forth in the Complaint and the Pretrial Order. In particular, the Court assumes (without finding) that James Bonding representatives "jumped into [Weaver's] vehicle while he was trying to evade arrest, crashed the vehicle into a wall and then beat him." (Pretrial Order, at 1.)³ The Court also accepts plaintiffs characterization that agents of James Bonding used their "fists and a mag light and or other instruments" to beat Weaver "senseless" when they arrested him. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) There is no evidence or allegation that law enforcement officers participated in or in any way assisted or joined James Bonding in effecting Weaver's arrest. At most, James Bonding's narrative⁴ in the Report of Parties' Planning Meeting reflects that after Weaver had been arrested, handcuffed, and secured in the bail bondsman's vehicle, James Bonding contacted the police, who arrived at the scene a short time later to arrest Weaver's girlfriend, who was also present. (See doc. 53, at 6.)⁵ James Bonding then transported Weaver to Mobile Metro Jail and placed him in the custody of jailers there.

II. Analysis.

A. James Bonding Cannot Be Liable under Section 1983.

1. Section 1983 Liability Requires State Action.

Plaintiff's sole federal claim alleges that James Bonding utilized excessive force to arrest Weaver, violating his Fourth Amendment rights and giving rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 cause of action, a plaintiff must show that a wrongful act "(1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir.1992). The law is clear that "the under-color-of-statelaw element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). For a defendant's actions to be under color of state law, such conduct must be "fairly attributable to the State," which in turn requires that "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130 (citation omitted).⁶ "Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a `State actor' for section 1983 purposes." Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1130). Indeed, a private entity such as James Bonding can qualify as a "state actor" under § 1983 only if one of the following three tests is satisfied: (a) a "state compulsion test," wherein the state has coerced or significantly encouraged the violative conduct; (b) a "public function test," wherein private parties perform a public function that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; and (c) a "nexus/joint action test," wherein the state has insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party, such that the state and private party are essentially joint participants in an enterprise. Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1347; see also Green v. Abony Bail Bond, 316 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1259-60 (M.D.Fla.2004). The "state actor" determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. See Focus, 344 F.3d at 1277.

2. Tests for State Action Are Not Satisfied Here.

Plaintiff's supplemental brief (doc. 118) addresses none of the three tests for satisfying the "state actor" requirement. Nonetheless, application of these alternative frameworks to Weaver's circumstances makes it clear that James Bonding was not a state actor.

As for the state compulsion test, there is absolutely no evidence that the State of Alabama has coerced or encouraged bail bondsmen to use excessive force in carrying out arrests, or even that Alabama has coerced or encouraged bail bondsmen to carry out arrests in any manner. That omission is sufficient to reject state compulsion as a ground for satisfying the "state action" requirement here. See McCoy v. Johnson, 176 F.R.D. 676, 680 (N.D.Ga.1997) (rejecting state compulsion theory out of hand where plaintiff made no allegations of any state compulsion on defendant). At most, the record confirms that an Alabama statute authorizes bail bondsmen to arrest fugitives under certain circumstances, and that James Bonding availed itself of those provisions in obtaining permission from an Alabama court to arrest Weaver for bail jumping. Mere regulation of a private actor does not and cannot amount to state compulsion of that private actor. See Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1348 ("[T]he mere fact that a State regulates a private party is not sufficient to make that party a State actor."); White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir.1979) (mere existence of state s...