Williams v. Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People

135 N.E.3d 1260

2019 Ohio 1897

Noel WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee,

v.NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE et al., Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

No. 18AP-476

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on May 16, 2019

On brief: Varner Law Office, and Carrie M. Varner, for plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee.

On brief: The Gittes Law Group, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, Columbus, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Argued: Frederick M. Gittes.

On brief: James E. Workman, Jr., Zanesville, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant Sybil Edwards-McNabb.

DECISION

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, Noel Williams, appeals from a decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), on Williams' claims of breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The NAACP and defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, Sybil Edwards-McNabb, also filed a cross-appeal from a separate decision and entry of the trial court denying their motion for sanctions. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In September 2013, Williams served as president of the Columbus branch of the NAACP. However, on September 13, 2013, the NAACP removed Williams from her position and suspended her membership with the NAACP. Pursuant to the NAACP's bylaws, Williams requested and received a hearing on her suspension of membership and removal from the position of president. Following a February 4, 2014 teleconference, the NAACP issued a February 15, 2014 document upholding its decision and officially suspending Williams' membership for three years. Williams then requested an appeal to the NAACP's board of directors in March 2014, and the appeal hearing panel in May 2014 affirmed the decision to suspend Williams' membership and remove her from the position of president of the Columbus branch.

{¶ 3} Subsequently, on September 12, 2014, Williams filed a complaint in the trial court alleging the NAACP's actions against her were not in accordance with the NAACP's constitution and bylaws. Specifically, Williams asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Williams additionally asserted a claim of defamation individually against Edwards-McNabb, president of the Ohio Conference of NAACP.

{¶ 4} On February 5, 2018, the NAACP and Edwards-McNabb filed separate motions for summary judgment asserting the undisputed facts demonstrated that the NAACP did not commit any actionable breach of contract, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Instead, the NAACP asserted that, despite Williams' allegations, it complied with its constitution and bylaws in pursuing disciplinary action against Williams. Williams opposed both motions for summary judgment.

{¶ 5} The parties' Civ.R. 56 materials demonstrated that Williams had been president of the Columbus branch of the NAACP in the early 2000s, serving in that capacity until September 2013. Pursuant to the NAACP's governing constitution, Williams' membership in the NAACP and her position of president bound her to "abide by the rules and policies of the [NAACP] and the decisions of the Board of Directors." (Constitution of the NAACP, Article IV, Section 1.) In addition to its constitution, the NAACP, a voluntary organization, also has a set of bylaws governing the organization and its members. The NAACP took disciplinary action against Williams after learning that she initiated litigation between the Columbus branch of the NAACP and a third-party contractor without first obtaining proper authorization from the NAACP, in contravention of the NAACP's bylaws.

{¶ 6} Prior to the trial court's ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment, the NAACP and Edwards-McNabb filed a joint motion for sanctions on February 23, 2018 alleging Williams had engaged in a pattern of fraudulent, bad faith, and abusive conduct throughout the litigation. Williams never filed a response to appellees' motion for sanctions.

{¶ 7} On May 15, 2018, the trial court issued two separate decisions and entries granting the motions for summary judgment of the NAACP and Edwards-McNabb. Specifically, the trial court concluded that, as to the NAACP, there were no genuine issues of material fact on Williams' claims of breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to Edwards-McNabb, the trial court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact on Williams' claim of defamation. The trial court thus entered judgment in favor of appellees on all of Williams' claims. Also on May 15, 2o18, the trial court issued a separate decision and entry denying appellees' motion for sanctions on the grounds that because the court had "issued a final decision in [appellees'] favor[,] * * * the Court finds no reason to consider sanctions." (May 15, 2018 Decision & Entry.)

{¶ 8} Williams' timely appeals from the trial court's decision and entry granting summary judgment in favor of the NAACP. She does not appeal from the decision and entry granting summary judgment in favor of Edwards-McNabb. Additionally, the NAACP and Edwards-McNabb filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion for sanctions.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 9} Williams assigns the following errors for our review:

[1.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee NAACP's motion for summary judgment.

[2.] The trial court committed reversible error when it granted appellee NAACP's motion for summary judgment by holding that appellee did not breach any of its implied and actual contractual obligations to appellant.

[3.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee NAACP's motion for summary judgment by holding that there was no issue of material facts as to appellant's claim of breach of contract.

[4.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee NCAAP's motion for summary judgment by holding that there was no issue of material facts as to appellant's claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

[5.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee NAACP's motion for summary judgment by holding that there was no issue of material facts as to appellant's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[6.] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee NAACP's motion for summary judgment by holding that there was no issue of material facts as to appellant's claim for promissory estoppel.

{¶ 10} The NAACP and Edwards-McNabb assign the following error for our review:

The trial court erred in deciding not to hold a hearing, or consider the defendants' unopposed motion for sanctions, on the sole basis that the case ended when it granted summary judgment.

III. Williams' First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Assignments of Error – Summary Judgment

{¶ 11} Williams' first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are interrelated, and we address them jointly. Taken together, Williams asserts in these six assignments of error that the trial court erred in granting the NAACP's motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 12} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under a de novo standard. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker , 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41, 654 N.E.2d 1327 (9th Dist. 1995) ; Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc. , 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588, 641 N.E.2d 265 (8th Dist.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Civ.R. 56(C) ; State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997).

{¶ 13} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a material fact. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). However, the moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under this rule with a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case; the moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Id. ; Vahila v. Hall , 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997). Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party does not respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 ; Vahila at 430, 674 N.E.2d 1164 ; Civ.R. 56(E).

{¶ 14} Here, the trial court granted summary judgment to the NAACP on Williams' claims of breach of contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Williams now argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on each of these claims...