Williams v. State

313 Ga. 325

869 S.E.2d 389

WILLIAMS

v.The STATE.

S22A0210

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 15, 2022

Ashleigh Bartkus Merchant, John B. Merchant III, The Merchant Law Firm, P.C., 701 Whitlock Avenue Suite J43, Marietta, Georgia 30064, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Eric Christopher Peters, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, C. Lance Cross, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorneys, Sherry Boston, District Attorney, DeKalb County District Attorney's Office, 556 North McDonough Street, Decatur, Georgia 30030, for Appellee.

Boggs, Presiding Justice.

After a 2017 jury trial, Tahja Tayshawn Williams was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the death of Keaira Palmer and the wounding of Stefon Cook in a drive-by shooting.¹ He appeals, asserting four enumerations of error: (1) the evidence was insufficient in three respects: it merely showed Williams’ presence, it supported his claim of justification, and it failed to corroborate accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude jail calls to which Williams was a party; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when a co-defendant refused to answer certain questions; and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could find Williams guilty of felony murder and not the underlying aggravated assault. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Williams’ convictions, the jury was authorized to reject Williams’ claim of justification, and the accomplice testimony was corroborated. There was no error in denying Williams’ motion to exclude evidence of a jail telephone call as hearsay because it was an admission of a party opponent. Williams’ motion for mistrial on the ground that a witness refused to answer questions was properly denied because Williams had the opportunity for a full and complete cross-examination of the witness. Finally, Williams’ contention that the trial court improperly instructed the jury is moot. We therefore affirm.

Construed to support the jury's verdict, the evidence showed that late in the evening of August 2, 2016, Williams, a "Double OG" or leader in the Six Deuce Brims gang (a subset of the Bloods), picked up fellow gang members Rynesha Lucas and co-indictees Ivanna Patrick and Roderick Jackson. After obtaining some money, they drove to an apartment complex to meet more gang members: co-indictees Sharod Jackson, Michael Anthony Miller, Roderick Harris, and Tareco Jenkins. In the meeting that followed, Williams told the others that he wanted to retaliate against the G-Shines, a rival gang, because G-Shine members had committed various crimes against Six Deuce members, including robbing Williams of several firearms. Gang members testified that Williams decided the group would obtain firearms and then "ride on" (that is, "pull up on your enemy and shoot") the G-Shine members at their customary gathering place, a convenience store on Glenwood Road in DeKalb County.

The Six Deuce members acquired a number of firearms from an unidentified individual in the apartment complex and took two vehicles – a stolen green Lexus driven by Sharod Jackson with Patrick, Harris, and Miller as passengers, and a black car driven by Williams with Lucas, Roderick Jackson, and Jenkins as passengers. Shortly after midnight, the two cars, with Williams leading, drove past the convenience store, where the G-Shine members were gathered outside. Williams then turned his car around and led the group back past the front of the store, and occupants of both cars began shooting at the crowd in the parking lot. The first shots were fired from Williams’ car, and some in the crowd began returning fire. Police officers later found two groups of spent shell casings on the ground: one in the road and one in the parking lot, from at least seven different firearms in a variety of calibers. Several people in the parking lot were hit: Palmer was killed by a bullet that severed her spinal cord, Cook was shot in the neck but survived, and Ahmed Lee was struck in the leg.² Surveillance video of the incident was played for the jury.

During the incident, the Lexus was disabled, either from gunfire or from hitting the curb, and the occupants jumped out and ran away. Williams drove away and, after receiving telephone calls from the occupants of the Lexus, drove to several locations to pick them up. Later in the day, Williams was a passenger in a car that was pulled over by the police in a traffic stop. Williams told the driver to drive away, but she refused, and Williams fled on foot, leaving behind a suitcase and duffel bag.

The State indicted all the participants in the drive-by shooting except Lucas, who was 15 years old at the time of the crimes. The indictment was nolle prossed as to Jenkins, and the remaining defendants pled guilty; all seven of the participants testified at trial.

1. Williams contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions, because he was merely present at the scene and the State did not prove that he was a party to the crimes. He also asserts that the State failed to disprove justification by self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, Williams contends that the only evidence connecting him with the crimes was uncorroborated accomplice testimony.

Williams’ contention that he did not participate in the drive-by shooting was contradicted by multiple witnesses, primarily the seven other participants in the shooting. The testimony of those witnesses did not always agree, and several witnesses made contradictory statements at trial and were confronted with their earlier statements to police. But evidence was presented that Williams not only planned the shooting but participated in it by driving the lead vehicle, communicating and picking up gang members after the shooting, and later fled from a traffic stop. "Although the eyewitness accounts of the shooting did vary to some extent, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)

Bighams v. State , 296 Ga. 267, 268-269 (1) (b), 765 S.E.2d 917 (2014).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the jury was authorized to conclude that Williams was a party to the crimes under OCGA § 16-2-20. See Hood v. State , 309 Ga. 493, 498 (1), 847 S.E.2d 172 (2020) ("Conviction as a party to a crime requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal intent with the principal perpetrator of the crime, which may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before, during, and after the offense." (Citations and punctuation omitted.)). The trial court gave the pattern jury instruction on parties to a crime,³ and the jury was authorized to believe the witnesses who testified that Williams was a party to the crimes. See Blackwell v. State , 302 Ga. 820, 821-822 (1), 809 S.E.2d 727 (2018) (holding that when appellant participated in a gunfight in a crowded parking lot, a rational trier of fact could find he was a party to malice murder even though he did not fire the fatal shot).

This evidence, construed in favor of the jury's verdicts, also was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams and his companions did not act in self-defense, but rather initiated the conflict. "Issues of witness credibility and justification are for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to reject a defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. State , 309 Ga. 755, 758 (1), 848 S.E.2d 97 (2020).

Likewise, there is no merit to Williams’ claim that the testimony of his alleged accomplices was not corroborated as required by OCGA § 24-14-8, because "multiple alleged accomplices may corroborate one another's testimony." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Huff v. State , 300 Ga. 807, 809 (1), 796 S.E.2d 688 (2017). All seven of the participants in the drive-by shooting testified, and they sufficiently corroborated one another's testimony. Moreover, in its order on Williams’ motion for new trial, the trial court noted that the State presented other corroborating evidence, including Williams’ flight from the police. See Fisher v. State , 309 Ga. 814, 819-820 (2) (a), 848 S.E.2d 434 (2020) (holding that defendant's flight from police, with other evidence, corroborated accomplice testimony). Whether accomplice testimony has been sufficiently corroborated is a question for the jury, and even slight corroborating evidence of a defendant's participation in a crime is sufficient. See Raines v. State , 304 Ga. 582, 588 (2) (a), 820 S.E.2d 679 (2018).

The evidence as recited above was constitutionally sufficient to support Williams’ convictions. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Williams contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion in limine to exclude multiple telephone calls to and from the DeKalb County Jail. Ultimately, at trial the State introduced only one telephone call, which was interpreted for the jury by an expert in gang identification. In that call, made before commission of the crimes at issue here, the caller, a jail inmate, reported to Williams that a member of another gang was attempting to harm the caller in jail. He asked Williams to intervene on his behalf with the leader of the other gang. Before the call ended, Williams instructed the inmate to get the other gang member on the phone and then set up a three-way conversation with the gang leader. The gang expert testified that the number associated with that leader appeared in Williams’...