Willner v. Frey

421 F.Supp.2d 913

Marguerite Evans WILLNER, Michael A. Willner, Plaintiffs, v. John T. FREY, Defendant.

No. 1:05CV1315.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

March 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, VA, for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Willner, Mason Neck, VA, Pro se.

Jack Lewis Gould, Fairfax, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are landowners who lost a portion of their property in a state adverse possession litigation and now seek to recover that property by claiming in this case that Virginia's law of adverse possession, as applied to them in the earlier state case, violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' effort to recover that property in this suit fails for a variety of reasons.

I.

This dispute began over a piece of land located in Mason Neck, Virginia on the banks of the Potomac River. In 1989, the plaintiffs, Michael and Marguerite Willner, purchased an eleven acre tract of land in Fairfax County on which they built their home. Three years later Sheldon Leggett purchased an adjacent parcel of land. On August 13, 2002, Leggett and his wife filed suit against the Willners in the Circuit Court for Fairfax County (hereinafter referred to as Fairfax I) claiming that the Leggetts and their predecessors in title had continuously, visibly, and adversely possessed a portion of the Willners' land for a period of more than 15 years, and therefore were entitled to the land under the law of adverse possession, as codified at Virginia Code §§ 8.01-131 and 8.01-236.¹ Fairfax I proceeded under the well-settled Virginia legal principle that "[t]o establish title to real property by adverse possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous possession, under a claim of right, for the statutory period of 15 years." Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 368, 601 S.E.2d 616, 620 (2004) (quoting Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 61-62, 400 S.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1991)). At no time during Fairfax I did the Willners raise, plead, or argue that Virginia's law of adverse possession was unconstitutional for any reason. On March 26, 2004, after a seven day bench trial, the Fairfax County Circuit Court judge found that the Leggetts had satisfied their burden of proving the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, and accordingly ordered title to the disputed land transferred to the Leggetts. Leggett v. Willner, Law No. 206590 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Va.2004). Thereafter, the defendant, John T. Frey, acting in his official capacity as the Clerk of the Fairfax County Circuit Court, recorded the Final Order in the land records of Fairfax County.

On June 24, 2004, the Willners appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which denied the Willners' petition for appeal. Leggett v. Willner, Law No. 206590 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Va.2004), pet. for appeal denied, Willner v. Leggett, R. 041476 (Va.2004). On November 17, 2004, the Willners' petition for rehearing was likewise denied. Leggett v. Willner, Law No. 206590, (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Va.2004), pet. for rehearing denied, Willner v. Leggett, R. 041476 (Va.2004).

After they had exhausted their appeal in Fairfax I, the underlying adverse possession case, the Willners filed a second civil suit in the Fairfax County Circuit Court (hereinafter referred to as Fairfax II), this time against the Commonwealth of Virginia, challenging Virginia's law of adverse possession on state constitutional grounds. The Willners' motion for judgment in Fairfax II, filed on July 5, 2005, contained three counts:

1. Count One alleged that the Commonwealth of Virginia, through the operation of Va.Code § 8.01-236, had taken the Willners' property for public use without just compensation in violation of Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution, and that the Willners were thereby entitled to just compensation.

2. Count Two alleged in the alternative that the property had been taken for private use in violation of Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution.

3. Count Three of the Willners' motion for judgment alleged that the law of adverse possession, as applied to the Willners, deprived them of property without due process of law in violation of Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution.²

Nor did the Willners overlook any corresponding potential federal constitutional claims; to the contrary, they explicitly declined to assert any such claims in Fairfax II, claiming they were entitled to reserve the right to bring such claims in federal court. Specifically, the motion for judgment in Fairfax II, under the heading "Reservation of Jurisdiction," stated as follows:

The Willners have rights guaranteed to them including, but not limited to, those protections guaranteed to them under the just compensation and due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, rights which have been violated by Defendant as a result of actions set forth herein. The Willners reserve the right to all claims over which subject matter presently lies, or which may later become ripe, in the courts of the United States.

In response to this motion for judgment, the Commonwealth filed a demurrer,³ arguing that the Commonwealth's resolution of a property dispute between two private parties pursuant to Va.Code § 8.01-236 violates neither the Virginia Constitution nor the U.S. Constitution, and that the statute had provided ample due process to the Willners. During oral argument on the demurrer, the Fairfax County Circuit Court orally sustained the Commonwealth's demurrer, but specifically refused the Commonwealth's request to rule on the federal claims the Willners sought to reserve for a later day in federal court.⁴ On September 15, 2005, the Fairfax County Circuit Court issued a formal Order sustaining the Commonwealth's demurrer and dismissing Fairfax II with prejudice.

On September 27, 2005, the Willners filed a motion to suspend the Final Order in Fairfax II or, in the alternative, to vacate the Final Order and grant leave to amend the motion for judgment. More specifically, citing the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2497, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005) (holding that federal takings claims reserved in state court proceedings are subject to the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and not reviewed in federal court de novo), the Willners sought to suspend the September 15, 2005 Order in order to allow them to pursue their federal claims in federal court. In the alternative, the Willners sought an amendment to their motion for judgment that would allow them to add to Fairfax II their claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. On November 4, 2005, the Fairfax County Circuit Court denied the Willners' motion to suspend or vacate the Final Order. See Marguerite Evans Willner v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Law No. 05-4075 (November 4, 2005). It also denied the proposed amendments to the motion for judgment because it viewed the proposed amendments as futile. Id. On November 18, 2005, the Willners appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia. This appeal is pending.⁵

Two days before filing the notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Willners filed the instant federal complaint naming as defendant John T. Frey, the clerk of the Fairfax County Circuit Court, acting in his official capacity. This complaint contains three counts:

1. Count One seeks a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201⁶ that the disputed property was taken by Frey, acting in his official capacity, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and an injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2202⁷ directing Frey to remove the Final Order in Fairfax I from the land records of Fairfax County.

2. Count Two of the complaint seeks a declaration that Va.Code § 8.01-236, as-applied to the Willners, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the same injunctive relief.

3. Count Three seeks a declaration that Va.Code § 8.01-236 violated the Willners' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because:

while the Willners forfeited the title to the disputed property for failure to eject the Leggetts and their predecessors in title from their claim of ownership to the disputed property within 15 years of the accrual of the Willners' right to do so, the Leggetts and their predecessors in title were not equally in jeopardy of losing title to the disputed property for failing to eject the Willners from their claim of ownership within 15 years of the cause of action accruing in the Leggetts and their predecessors in title.

Complaint ¶ 54. As in the other two counts, the Willners also seek an injunction in this count pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, directing Frey to remove the Final Order from the land records of Fairfax County.

Frey's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) has been fully briefed and argued and is now ripe for disposition.

II.

Frey raises several potentially dispositive non-merits defenses to the Willners' federal complaint. First, he argues that principles of res judicata bar the Willners from rearguing in federal court issues already resolved in the state courts. In the alternative, he argues that the Willners' complaint is, in essence, an attempt to seek appellate review of a state court decision in a federal district court in contravention of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005...