Worsdale v. City of Killeen

578 S.W.3d 57

Joy WORSDALE, Individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Scott Worsdale, et al., Petitioners,

v.The CITY OF KILLEEN, Texas, Respondent

No. 18-0329

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued February 21, 2019

Opinion Delivered: June 14, 2019

Jeffrey C. Mateer, John C. Sullivan, Joshua T. Wilson, Kyle D. Hawkins, W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Austin TX, for Amicus Curiae.

Jody D. Leake, Scott R. Crivelli, The Carlson Law Firm, P.C, Killeen TX, Tyler B. Talbert, Benjamin C. Yelverton, Scanes & Routh, LLP, Waco TX, Petitioners.

Patrick C. Bernal, Megan Robbins Santee, Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal & Zech, P.C., San Antonio, for Respondents.

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice Brown, and Justice Busby joined.

The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity but, as part of the Act's waiver bargain, requires prompt notice of a claim.¹ Prompt notice allows governmental units to expeditiously undertake remedial measures that may be required to protect the public. Prompt notice also advances fundamental immunity underpinnings by allowing governmental units an opportunity to defend against tort claims and allocate resources to resolve potentially meritorious claims. So, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit,² section 101.101 of the Act requires formal "notice of a claim" that provides a reasonable description of the claim within six months of the occurrence, unless the governmental unit has "actual notice that death has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or that the claimant's property has been damaged."³

This wrongful-death case focuses on the actual-notice exception, which we long-ago construed in Cathey v. Booth⁴ and Texas Department of Criminal Justice v. Simons⁵ as requiring a governmental unit's "subjective awareness" of its "alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or property damage," meaning "fault as ultimately alleged by the claimant."⁶ We hold that the undisputed evidence here conclusively establishes the governmental unit had actual notice it may be responsible for the deaths of two motorists whose vehicle struck an unbarricaded dirt mound completely blocking an unlit country road.

Within days after the accident, the municipal defendant knew that (1) a crash investigation identified the particular road hazard and the absence of any warning indicators as contributing to the accident; (2) maintenance of the road was alleged to be the municipality's responsibility; and (3) the municipality had annexed and never officially abandoned the property. Accordingly, not long after the crash, the municipality swiftly complied with the accident investigator's instructions to remove the dirt mound and install permanent barricades and signage. Because we conclude the municipality had actual notice as required by section 101.101(c) of the Tort Claims Act, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction and remand the case to the trial court. In doing so, we decline the invitation to overrule our actual-notice precedent.

I. Background

Scott Worsdale and Heike King were injured when the motorcycle Worsdale was driving collided with a large dirt mound spanning the width of Reese Creek Road, an unlit asphalt road in the City of Killeen, Bell County, Texas (the City). Within days after the crash, the Killeen Police Department dispatched an officer to conduct an accident investigation. The investigator photographed the accident site, including the dirt pile, and constructed a scale diagram of the scene using 3D laser-mapping technology. In the "Texas Peace Officer's Crash Report," the investigator identified road conditions and alcohol consumption as "contributing factors," observing:

This area is dark and not lighted, at the time of the crash the area was dark. Reese Creek road is currently blocked by a dirt pile from the ditch on the North side of the roadway to the ditch on the south side of the roadway, closing the roadway to vehicular traffic for construction. At the time of the crash there were no signs, barricades, or cones present to indicate that the roadway was closed to Westbound traffic on Reese Creek East of the area of the crash.

As part of the crash investigation, the officer spoke with several officials from various city departments, including the deputy city attorney and the city inspector. The main topic of conversation was responsibility for road maintenance and warning signs. City officials acknowledged that the two-lane road had been obstructed for at least two years but denied responsibility for the blockage. The City explained that barricades and warning signs had not been erected before the accident due to an ongoing dispute between Bell County and the City over jurisdiction. Each claimed the other was responsible for maintaining the road.

Although the city inspector said the City had owned but then abandoned the property, the city attorney informed the crash investigator that an ordinance would be required to abandon the road and none could be located. Two days after the accident, the City removed the dirt pile from the road at the police department's request and installed permanent road-closure signs and barricades. Though Worsdale and King survived the initial impact, King died a month later, and Worsdale ultimately succumbed to his injuries after lingering for more than a year. The police department never formally determined who was at fault and instead closed the case when Worsdale—"the suspect in the case"—died.

The decedents' relatives⁷ sued the City under the Tort Claims Act, alleging the dirt mound was a "special defect" on the City's premises.⁸ The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on the relatives' failure to provide prompt notice as required under section 101.101 of the Act. The relatives conceded formal notice under section 101.101(a) was lacking, but maintained the City had actual notice under section 101.101(c). After considering the undisputed evidence, the trial court denied the plea.

On interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial-court order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.⁹ Relying principally on our opinion in the City of Dallas v. Carbajal ,¹⁰ the court concluded that a traffic-accident report resulting from a routine safety investigation is insufficient as a matter of law to provide actual notice to a governmental unit.¹¹ The court found the facts in this case "strikingly similar" to those in Carbajal , because the crash investigation report did not "expressly or impliedly attribute fault for the accident to the City ...."¹² Because the evidence was undisputed, the court decided the issue as a matter of law and held that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the City had "subjective awareness ... of its fault, as ultimately alleged by [the relatives], in producing or contributing to Worsdale's and King's injuries."¹³

We granted the relatives' petition for review, which asserts the court of appeals misapplied our actual-notice precedent, including Cathey and Simons , and argues in the alternative we should overturn our precedent because it conflicts with section 101.101(c)'s plain language.

The relatives' primary argument is that the court of appeals misconstrued our precedent as requiring a governmental unit to subjectively conclude it is actually liable for a loss. They contend that when assessed under the correct standard—subjective awareness of alleged fault contributing to the claimant's injury—the evidence here either establishes or, at a minimum, raises a fact issue that the City had actual notice. According to the relatives, the City knew about its alleged fault in contributing to the accident based on (1) the finger pointing between the City and the County regarding responsibility for maintaining the road, (2) the City's wide-ranging investigation that involved its legal counsel and city inspector, (3) the City's subsequent remedial measures, and (4) the City's denial of liability based on its mistaken belief about its ownership of the road. If this evidence does not at least raise a fact issue about actual notice, the relatives contend it is only because our actual-notice precedent erroneously interlineates requirements that are not supported by section 101.101(c)'s plain text, and we should therefore overrule Cathey and its progeny as wrongly decided.

Likening this case to Carbajal and our recent opinion in City of San Antonio v. Tenorio ,¹⁴ the City says subjective knowledge of its fault is lacking as a matter of law. The City, supported by the State of Texas as amicus curiae, also objects to abrogating our precedent because it correctly construes the Tort Claims Act's notice provisions. Citing the doctrine of legislative acceptance, the State also contends the Legislature has acquiesced to the Court's interpretation by not changing the actual-notice statute despite the fact that Cathey has been applied in hundreds of cases over the past twenty-four years, the Tort Claims Act has been amended in other respects, and at least one other statute was enacted to alter a core holding in Simons.

II. Discussion

A. The Tort Claims Act Requires Prompt Notice

Under the common law, municipalities like the City of Killeen are immune from suit and liability for damages arising from the performance of governmental functions absent a clear and unambiguous legislative waiver of immunity.¹⁵ The Texas Tort Claims Act waives immunity for certain tort claims, including premises defects, "to the extent of liability" under the Act.¹⁶ Here, neither the City's immunity nor the statutory waiver of immunity is at issue. Rather, this appeal focuses on satisfaction of the Act's notice requirement—a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.¹⁷

Section 101.101 of the Act requires that either formal or actual...