Acker v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt., Inc.

93 F.Supp.3d 1060

Megan ACKER, Plaintiff

v.ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 14–cv–2504 SRN/BRT.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed Feb. 27, 2015.

Joshua R. Williams, Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.

Barbara Jean D'Aquila and Margaret Rudolph, Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 6] and Defendant's Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 14]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies both Motions.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Megan Acker asserts one cause of action against Defendant Environmental Resources Management, Inc. for reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Statutes § 363A.01 et seq. (Notice of Removal, Ex. A [Doc. No. 1–1] (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 42–46).) According to her Complaint, Plaintiff began working for Defendant on about August 25, 2008 and, throughout her employment, was subjected by her supervisor, Brian Whiting, to harassment and differential treatment based on sex. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 8–9.) Plaintiff alleges that she complained to her project manager about the sexual harassment and differential treatment on about September 24, 2009 and, shortly thereafter, discussed her complaint with employees in Defendants' human resources department. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.) Plaintiff asserts that, after the human resources department initiated an investigation of her complaint, Mr. Whiting accused Plaintiff for the first time of having work performance issues. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14.) Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges, Mr. Whiting engaged in a pattern of retaliation and, in February 2010, placed Plaintiff on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) even though she had exceeded her performance expectations for the preceding four months. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 18–19.) Although Plaintiff complained to the human resources manager that she believed Mr. Whiting had imposed the PIP in retaliation for her complaint of sex discrimination, the human resources manager failed to investigate. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) Mr. Whiting extended the PIP in March 2010, and Defendant ultimately terminated Plaintiff's employment in April 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 29.)

On about February 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination based on the events described above with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (“MDHR”). (Id. ¶ 30.) According to Plaintiff, the MDHR found probable cause that Defendant had retaliated against her in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). (Id. ¶ 32.) She alleges that any delay in the MDHR's probable cause determination was caused in part by the 2011 Minnesota state government shutdown and by Defendant, and that any such delay did not cause Defendant to suffer prejudice. (Id. ¶¶ 33–35.) In a May 22, 2014 letter, the MDHR granted Plaintiff the right to pursue a private action. (Id. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff thereafter initiated this lawsuit in Minnesota state court on June 9, 2014. (See Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1], Ex. A.) On June 30, Defendant removed the matter to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See id. )

Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 6] and a supporting memorandum [Doc. No. 9] on July 25, 2014, seeking to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff filed an opposition memorandum [Doc. No. 10], along with a declaration [Doc. No. 11] and several exhibits, and Defendant filed a reply memorandum [Doc. No. 13]. Defendant also filed a Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 14] and supporting memorandum [Doc. No. 16], to which Plaintiff responded [Doc. No. 19]. These matters were heard on November 24. Plaintiff then submitted a supplemental affidavit [Doc. No. 25] and exhibits, and Defendant replied [Doc. No. 26].

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(c) motions are governed by the same standards that apply to motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). The Court must assume the facts in the Complaint to be true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986). However, the Court need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir.1999), or legal conclusions Plaintiff draws from the facts pled. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). In addition, the Court ordinarily does not consider matters outside the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). The Court may, however, consider exhibits attached to the Complaint and documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings, Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n. 4 (8th Cir.2003), and may also consider public records. Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” will not pass muster. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In sum, this standard “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In its Motion, Defendant argues that dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is warranted under the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695 (Minn.1996), and under the doctrine of laches. (Def.'s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 6] at 1.) The Court, however, finds that neither theory mandates dismissal in this case.

1. Beaulieu

Defendant's first argument is that Plaintiff's claim fails under the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the MHRA in Beaulieu. (See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Its Mot. for J. on the Pleadings [Doc. No. 9] (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 1–2.) Under the MHRA, a person has the option of bringing a claim alleging an unfair discriminatory practice in a civil action or in a charge filed with a local commission or the commissioner, within one year after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory practice. Minn.Stat. § 363A.28, Subd. 3. If the person chooses to file a charge with the commissioner, the commissioner must “promptly” investigate the allegations. Id. § 363A.28, Subd. 6(a). For the type of charge at issue in this case, “the commissioner shall make a determination within 12 months after the charge was filed as to whether or not there is probable cause to credit the allegation of unfair discriminatory practices.” Id. § 363A.28, Subd. 6(b).

According to Defendant, the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of this statutory language mandates dismissal of the present action because the MDHR and Plaintiff failed to act within the statutory time limits for pursuing a claim. (See Def.'s Mem. at 9–11, 14–18.) In Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., several individuals filed charges with the MDHR, alleging that the defendants had engaged in sex discrimination and reprisal in violation of the MHRA. 552 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn.1996). The MDHR issued its finding of probable cause more than thirty-one months after the charges were filed and, later, filed a complaint against the defendants. Id. at 699. Although the administrative law judge rejected the defendants' argument for dismissal based on the MDHR's untimely finding of probable cause, id., the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, id. at 697. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals:

We ... hold that in all cases where the MDHR fails to make a determination of probable cause within 12 months after the filing of a charge, a respondent may seek appropriate relief from the administrative law judge. The relief granted by the administrative law judge should be in proportion to the prejudice suffered by the respondent and may include dismissal of the complaint. Normally, we leave the determination of prejudice and the relief to be granted to the administrative law judge; however, we conclude, as a matter of law, that probable cause determinations made 31 or more months after a charge is filed are per se prejudicial to the respondent and require dismissal of the complaint.

Id. at 702–03. The court also stated in a footnote that “the charging party has the ability, and to some extent the responsibility, to do what it can to minimize the impact of the MDHR's inaction.” Id. at 702 n. 7 (citing Minn.Stat. §§ 363.071, 363.14¹ ; Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir.1993) ).

The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument. First, Beaulieu set a bright-line rule of per se prejudice requiring dismissal of a complaint only when the underlying probable cause determination is made 31 months or more after a charge is filed. Powers–Potter v. Nash Finch Co., No. 14–CV–0339 (PJS/SER), 2014 WL 2003063, at *1 (D.Minn. May 14, 2014) (analyzing Beaulieu and finding that, although it ordinarily is for the administrative law judge to determine whether a respondent is prejudiced by the MDHR's delay and the appropriate relief, “the Minnesota Supreme Court established a bright-line rule for delays of 31 months or more”). As for instances in which a probable cause determination is made more than 12 months, but less than 31 months, after a charge is filed, Beaulieu provides...