Baldyga v. U.S., CIV.A.02-40244-NMG.

Page 264

337 F.Supp.2d 264

Gerald BALDYGA, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

No. CIV.A.02-40244-NMG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 8, 2004.

Gerald Baldyga, Elkton, OH, Pro se.

John M. Hodgens, Jr, U.S. Attorneys Office, Worcester, MA, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

Pending before the court is the petition of Gerald Baldyga ("Baldyga") to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

I. Background

On March 25, 1999, after a four-day trial before this Court a jury convicted the petitioner of four counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of tampering with a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). On July 15, 1999, the Court sentenced Baldyga to 97 months imprisonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Baldyga's conviction on December 7, 2000 and denied a motion for rehearing en banc on January 12, 2001. United States v. Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674 (1st Cir.2000). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari in this matter on October 1, 2001.

On June 21, 2001, Baldyga filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus and motion for injunction without forfeiture, which the Court dismissed and denied respectively. On December 17, 2002, Baldyga filed the instant motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The government filed its opposition to that motion on January 7, 2003.

In the intervening months, Baldyga filed numerous additional motions in this matter including, on February 2, 2003, a response to the government's opposition, on May 12, 2003, a motion to correct sentence, on June 24, 2003, a motion for leave to attach issues to the habeas petition, on September 16, 2003, a motion seeking the court to order the United States Attorney to respond to Baldyga's papers and on October 7, 2003 a "notice of default and dishonor." Because these motions are essentially supplements to the original § 2255 petition, the Court will treat them collectively with the original petition for habeas corpus, as "the § 2255 petition." Baldyga also filed, on October 27, 2003, a motion to recuse the presiding judge of this session of the United States District Court.

In addition to his § 2255 petition Baldyga has filed a number of motions in his finally-adjudicated criminal case. Between March 10, 2003 and October 27, 2003, Baldyga filed a motion for miscellaneous relief from his sentence, a motion to amend or correct his sentence, a motion to compel the government to answer his claims, a motion to request an order of the court, a second motion to compel the government to respond and another motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge. In addition, on December 10, 2003, Baldyga filed a "motion re: Judicial Misconduct" in which he accused the Chief Judge of the District of Massachusetts of judicial misconduct.

II. Argument

A. Baldyga's Petition for Habeas Corpus and Supplemental Motions

A federal prisoner may base a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on four possible grounds:

1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;

2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence;

3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; and

4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Supreme Court has narrowly defined the availability of § 2255 relief where the petitioner does not allege constitutional or jurisdictional errors. Such claims can be made under § 2255 only if:

the claimed error is a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure.

Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir.1994)(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962)).

Although Baldyga's § 2255 petition is difficult to disentangle, he basically argues that his conviction and sentence should be set aside on four grounds: 1) that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police searched his home with an invalid warrant, 2) that he was wrongfully arrested by federal employees while in state custody without a warrant and illegally taken to a federal prison, 3) that his trial was conducted under a massive conspiracy between the police, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the prosecution, his defense attorney and the Court and 4) that he had ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

1. The Alleged Invalid Search Warrant

Baldyga claims that his conviction should be overturned because the police did not have valid warrants to search his home. The Court addressed the Fourth Amendment issues in this case prior to trial, holding, after a March 18, 1999 suppression hearing, that the police had probable cause to search Baldyga's home and outbuildings and that both warrants issued were valid. In his § 2255 petition, Baldyga argues that the warrants used to search his property were illegal. His precise argument is difficult to decipher, but he essentially alleges that the affidavit in support of the application for a warrant used in connection with his March 1, 1998 arrest was falsified and that his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment were therefore violated.

A Fourth Amendment claim is improperly raised in a § 2255 petition. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), that a state prisoner who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment issues at trial was precluded from relitigating those same issues on collateral attack. See also, Arroyo v. United States, 195 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.1999). While neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has yet addressed the issue, courts in the District of Massachusetts have often held that the same rule applies to petitioners convicted of federal crimes. See, Kiley v. United States, 260 F.Supp.2d 248, 275 (D.Mass.2003); Owens v. United States, 236 F.Supp.2d 122, 133 (D.Mass.2002).

Baldyga litigated his Fourth Amendment issues at both the March 18, 1999 suppression hearing and during the appeal of his conviction to the First Circuit. Accordingly, he is precluded from arguing Fourth Amendment claims in his § 2255 petition and as to those issues, his petition for habeas corpus will be dismissed.

2. The Alleged Illegal Arrest

Baldyga argues that his March 2, 1998 arrest was illegal because the warrant that lead to his arrest was issued by the state court and he was eventually charged with a federal crime. He maintains that his removal from the "subject matter jurisdiction" of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Town of Dudley court system to the federal court system and the Wyatt facility in Central Falls, Rhode Island was illegal and constituted kidnapping (because he was transported across state lines). In order for such a claim to be litigated in a habeas corpus petition, it must fall under one of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cited above. Here Baldyga argues that he was "denied due process and liberty" in violation of his Constitutional rights.

Baldyga's claim is neither supported by the record nor by any evidence. It is relatively common for a prisoner to be transferred from state to federal custody after the nature of his offense becomes clear. The evidence in the instant case shows that Baldyga was afforded due process of law in the federal system. On March 2, 1998, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), Michael Pevarnik, appeared before federal Magistrate Judge Charles B. Swartwood and swore out a criminal complaint with respect to Baldyga's drug-related activity. On that same day Magistrate Judge Swartwood issued a warrant for Baldyga's arrest. After the warrant was issued, Baldyga was taken into federal custody on March 3, 1998, and made his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Swartwood on that date. Because Baldyga received due process of law in this matter, his constitutional rights were not violated and accordingly, the § 2255 petition as to this issue will be dismissed.

3. The Alleged Conspiracy

Baldyga's next claim is that, essentially, his conviction resulted from a massive conspiracy between the prosecutor, the DEA Agent, his own defense attorney and this Court. It is not possible to glean from Baldyga's voluminous papers specific facts offered to support this claim. Two arguments are clear: 1) that the replacement of his original, court-appointed attorney, Peter Ettenberg by Attorney Martin Boudreau was because Mr. Ettenberg "questioned legalities" and 2) that this Court demonstrated bias towards Baldyga throughout the trial.

Baldyga claims that his original court-appointed attorney, Peter Ettenberg, was replaced by Attorney Boudreau because the latter was a former prosecutor, a friend of the Chief of Police of the Town of Webster and because Ettenberg was challenging the legality of Baldyga's arrest. According to the petitioner, "the fix was in." A review of the record, however, disproves his assertion. At the time of Baldyga's initial appearance he was represented by a court-appointed attorney (Ettenberg). However, Mr. Ettenberg was on trial and unavailable to render legal assistance until March 17, 1998. Because Baldyga's detention hearing was scheduled for March 6, 1998, Magistrate Judge Swartwood appointed Attorney Boudreau as counsel instead. The substitution arose from a scheduling conflict not a conspiracy against the petitioner.

Regarding petitioner's assertion of the Court's bias, this Court will let the record, including Baldyga's voluminous pleadings and the transcripts of the hearings and trial, speak...