Berges v. Cnty. Court of Douglas Cnty.

409 P.3d 592

Ronald BERGES, Beth Ballen, Stephanie Van Voorst, Jody Curtin, Nathan Mohr, Lynn Robinson, and Mark Bauman, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.COUNTY COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY and Honorable Monica J. Gomez, Defendants-Appellees.

Court of Appeals No. 15CA1589

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VI.

Announced October 6, 2016

Lindquist & Vennum LLP, John A. Chanin, Patrick G. Compton, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Eytan Nielsen LLC, Iris Eytan, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Berges

Recht Kornfeld, P.C., Richard Kornfeld, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Beth Ballen

Denis Lane, Jr., Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Van Voorst

Greenberg Traurig, LLP, John Voorhees, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Nathan Mohr

Shufflebarger Lambrone & Clark LLC, Jeremy Shufflebarger, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn Robinson

Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP, Gary Lozow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Bauman

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, David C. Blake, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO

¶ 1 This appeal requires us to examine the interplay between two sections of article 3 of title 19 (the Children's Code). Section 19-3-206, C.R.S. 2016, vests county attorneys with exclusive authority to represent the "petitioner" in all "proceedings" brought under article 3, which is entitled "Dependency and Neglect." Section 19-3-304, C.R.S. 2016, requires certain people (e.g., doctors and school officials) to report suspected child abuse or neglect; these people are often called "mandatory reporters." A mandatory reporter who willfully violates this duty to report commits a misdemeanor.

¶ 2 The question is: Does section 19-3-206 strip district attorneys of their authority to prosecute mandatory reporters for the misdemeanor offense described in section 19-3-304 ? We conclude that the answer is "no" because section 19-3-304 does not set forth a proceeding under article 3; it simply defines an offense. And criminal prosecutions of that offense do not constitute article 3 proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment denying relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to plaintiffs Ronald Berges, Beth Ballen, Stephanie Van Voorst, Jody Curtin, Nathan Mohr, Lynn Robinson, and Mark Bauman.

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶ 3 Plaintiffs are medical doctors, clinical social workers, and health care professionals facing criminal charges in Douglas County Court for violating section 19-3-304. The charges were filed by a detective in the Douglas County Sheriff's Office. See Crim. P. 4.1(c)(3).

¶ 4 When the district attorney assumed the prosecution of the criminal cases, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the district attorney lacked authority to prosecute the charges in light of section 19-3-206. The county court denied the motions, concluding that "a proceeding brought under Article 3 of the Children's Code is limited to proceedings brought in Dependency and Neglect actions, not cases involving mandatory reporters."

¶ 5 Plaintiffs then filed a complaint pursuant to Rule 106(a)(4) in the district court, seeking review of the county court's order along with a stay and dismissal of the criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs asserted that the county court's determination was an abuse of discretion resulting from an incorrect interpretation of the law. The district court denied all relief, upholding the county court's determination and reiterating that "the mandate of C.R.S. § 19-3-206 does not apply to criminal prosecutions of failures-to-report." This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 6 In a Rule 106(a)(4) proceeding,¹ the district court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the lower governmental or judicial body exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) ; Walker v. Arries , 908 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Colo. App. 1995). Because we are in the same position as the district court, we review the district court's decision de novo and assess whether the county court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. See Roalstad v. City of Lafayette , 2015 COA 146, ¶ 13, 363 P.3d 790. Misinterpretation of the law may constitute an abuse of discretion. Griff v. City of Grand Junction , 262 P.3d 906, 909 (Colo. App. 2010). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Roalstad , ¶ 10 ; see People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 621.

III. Analysis

¶ 7 Plaintiffs contend that section 19-3-206 vests county attorneys with exclusive authority to prosecute mandatory reporters for criminal violations of section 19-3-304 because such prosecutions are proceedings brought under article 3. Plaintiffs thus present a question of statutory interpretation.

¶ 8 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE–1J v. A.R.L. , 2014 CO 33, ¶ 10, 325 P.3d 1014. To determine the plain meaning of a statute, "[t]he language at issue must be read in the context of the statute as a whole and the context of the entire statutory scheme." Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff , 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). Our interpretation should give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of a statute. Id. ; see also Lewis v. Taylor , 2016 CO 48, ¶ 20, 375 P.3d 1205 ("In evaluating whether a statute is ambiguous, we do not read its words or phrases in isolation, but instead read them in context and in a manner that gives effect to the statute as a whole."). In particular, "[t]he sections of the Children's Code must be read together to effectuate the legislative intent and to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts."

People In Interest of E.M. , 2016 COA 38M, ¶ 19, –––P.3d –––– (cert. granted Aug. 1, 2016).

¶ 9 Section 19-3-206 provides: "In all proceedings brought under this article, the petitioner shall be represented by a county attorney, special county attorney, or city attorney of a city and county." Section 19-3-304 describes a mandatory reporter and requires a mandatory reporter who has reasonable cause to know or suspect that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect to report such fact to the county department, local law enforcement agency, or the child abuse hotline. This section closes by stating that any person who willfully violates the duty to report "[c]ommits a class 3 misdemeanor and shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501, C.R.S.," and "[s]hall be liable for damages proximately caused thereby." § 19-3-304(4)(a)-(b).

¶ 10 Examining the words and phrases of section 19-3-206"one-by-one," plaintiffs maintain that the statute precludes a district attorney from prosecuting a mandatory reporter. A contrary interpretation, plaintiffs argue, would fail to give each word its commonly accepted meaning (namely "all," "proceedings," "shall," and "petitioner") and would render some of the words meaningless (namely "all"). We disagree because we cannot read statutory language in isolation from its context. See Lewis , ¶ 20.

¶ 11 We begin by recognizing that a district attorney is ordinarily vested with authority to prosecute all violations of law that occur in his or her judicial district. Harris v. Jefferson Cty. Court , 808 P.2d 364, 365 (Colo. App. 1991) ; see § 16-5-205, C.R.S. 2016; § 20-1-102, C.R.S. 2016; People v. Taylor , 732 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Colo. 1987) ("These constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the office of the district attorney clearly demonstrate that the district attorney is vested with authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within the geographical boundaries of the judicial district served by the district attorney."). "However, when the General Assembly authorizes a different body to prosecute a particular type of action, then the district attorney is without authority to act." Harris , 808 P.2d at 365.

¶ 12 So, did the General Assembly remove a district attorney's authority to prosecute mandatory reporters for violating section 19-3-304 when it required a county attorney to represent the petitioner in "all proceedings" brought under article 3? § 19-3-206. For four reasons, we conclude that the answer is "no."

¶ 13 First, the statutory scheme as a whole makes clear that the "proceedings" to which section 19-3-206 refers are not criminal prosecutions but the civil proceedings described in detail throughout article 3. The term "proceeding" is not defined in article 3 or the Children's Code generally, but plaintiffs recognize that the ordinary meaning of the term is "[t]he business conducted by a court or other official body." Black's Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014). In section 19-3-206, however, the ordinary meaning of proceeding is limited to those court actions brought by a "petitioner." "Petitioner" is not defined by the relevant statutes either, but its ordinary meaning is "[a] party who presents a petition to a court or other official body, esp. when seeking relief on appeal." Black's Law Dictionary at 1329. Thus, to understand what constitutes a proceeding and a petitioner under article 3, we must explore what constitutes a petition under article 3. Article 3 describes two types of petitions: a petition in dependency and neglect (see § 19-3-502, C.R.S. 2016 ) and a petition to reinstate the parent-child legal relationship (see § 19-3-612, C.R.S. 2016 ).

¶ 14 Petitions in dependency and neglect arise from reports of known or suspected child abuse. § 19-3-501(2)(a), C.R.S. 2016. The resulting court proceedings focus on protecting a child's best interests while avoiding unnecessary out-of-family placement and respecting parental rights (for example, through provision of appropriate services and treatment plans). §§ 19-3-501, - 505, - 507, C.R.S. 2016; People in Interest of J.G. , 2016...