Commonwealth v. Johnson

247 A.3d 981

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Dewitt JOHNSON, Appellant

No. 23 EAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: December 2, 2020

Decided: March 25, 2021

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Victor Edward Rauch, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Appellant.

Daniel Peter Casullo III, Esq., Lawrence Jonathan Goode, Esq., Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR

This appeal concerns the application of the statutory compulsory joinder rules, which generally require a prosecutor to pursue, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district, subject to enumerated exceptions. The exception in issue pertains when a court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant or the offense.

In June of 2015, as a result of a traffic stop, Appellant was arrested and charged with driving with a suspended license, possession with intent to deliver heroin ("PWID"), and knowing and intentional possession of heroin ("K&I"). Before the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, he was found guilty, in absentia , of the summary traffic offense. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1121(c)(3) (delineating the Traffic Division's jurisdiction for the relevant time period).

The Municipal Court's jurisdiction is capped at criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years. See id. § 1123(a)(2). Accordingly, and since that court lacked jurisdiction over PWID, see 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(1) (prescribing a maximum penalty of fifteen years' imprisonment for this crime), the Commonwealth pursued the drug offenses in the common pleas court, which, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, has "unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law." PA. CONST., art. V, § 5 (b). Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the prosecution was required to try all of the offenses simultaneously, per the compulsory joinder requirements of Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. As noted, Section 110 generally requires the government to bring all known charges against a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode occurring within the same judicial district in a single proceeding. See id. § 110(1). The county court, however, denied the motion.

On interlocutory appeal, the Commonwealth acknowledged the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto , 652 Pa. 101, 207 A.3d 812 (2019), holding that Section 110 generally prohibits the government from proceeding with a prosecution subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, after a summary offense arising from the same criminal episode had been adjudicated in the Traffic Division of that court. See id. at 104, 207 A.3d at 813. Based on Perfetto , the Commonwealth conceded that it was foreclosed from pursuing the K&I charge, because that crime, like the traffic offense, fell within the Municipal Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argued that PWID remained viable, since the Municipal Court had lacked jurisdiction over that offense. In this regard, the Commonwealth invoked Section 112(1) of the Crimes Code, which serves as an exception to Section 110's general prohibition by providing, in relevant part:

A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of [inter alia , Section 110 ] under any of the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). It was the Commonwealth's position that "the offense," in Section 112(1), doesn't mean the offense that was the subject of the prior prosecution, but rather, concerns the crime or crimes for which the government is seeking subsequent convictions.

The Superior Court credited this argument and affirmed with respect to PWID. See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 221 A.3d 217, 220-21 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Appellant lodged an application for reargument, contending that "the offense," in Section 112(1), means the crime that was the subject of the previous prosecution. Thus, according to Appellant, the exception applies only to situations where the prior conviction or acquittal was rendered by a court without jurisdiction or authority to render a judgment in the first instance. He stressed that this was not the circumstance in his case, because the Traffic Division unquestionably had jurisdiction to convict him of the summary traffic offense. The Superior Court denied Appellant's application.

As concerns the serial prosecutions of single-criminal-episode summary offenses (triable at the magisterial district court level) and greater crimes (over which magisterial district courts lack jurisdiction), the history of Section 110 provides some illumination. In 1973, this Court mandated compulsory joinder under its supervisory powers. See Commonwealth v. Campana , 455 Pa. 622, 626, 314 A.2d 854, 856 (1974) (per curiam ).¹ By that time, the General Assembly had already enacted Section 110 of the Crimes Code, legislation which the Court deemed to be "entirely in harmony" with its supervisory mandate. Id. at 626, 314 A.2d at 856.² Significantly, as well, both this Court in Campana , and the General Assembly, in its statutory scheme of compulsory joinder, derived governing principles from the Model Penal Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 110, Editor's Notes (citing the 1967 Joint State Government Commission Comment to the effect that, "[t]his section is derived from Section 1.09 of the Model Penal Code"); Campana , 452 Pa. at 248-250 & nn.31, 32 & 37, 304 A.2d at 438-40 & nn.31, 32 & 37.³

In the Campana line of decisions, a plurality of Justices made it clear that their intent was generally to require summary and greater offenses arising out of single criminal episodes to be consolidated in the common pleas courts. See Campana , 452 Pa. at 253-54, 304 A.2d at 441-42.⁴ This approach would seem to be consonant with the plain language of the Model Penal Code and Section 110, which barred subsequent prosecutions that were "within the jurisdiction of a single court" -- facially signifying any single court where jurisdiction might lie, including the courts of common pleas -- and not only the particular court in which an initial prosecution may have been conducted.

Nevertheless, in a series of subsequent decisions, and in a departure from the policy judgment of the Campana plurality, this Court construed the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso to permit serial prosecutions for summary and greater offenses, respectively, at the magisterial district and common pleas tiers. See Commonwealth v. Taylor , 513 Pa. 547, 552-53, 522 A.2d 37, 39-40 (1987) ; Commonwealth v. Breitegan , 500 Pa. 384, 385-86, 456 A.2d 1340, 1341 (1983) ; Commonwealth v. Beatty , 500 Pa. 284, 290-91, 455 A.2d 1194, 1198 (1983). In explaining this decision, the Court did not focus on substance of the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" language or its history or derivation, but rather, relied on the following policy pronouncement:

We are aware that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(b) appears to recognize concurrent jurisdiction in such cases of the Court of Common Pleas. Nevertheless, we will not construe the phrase "and was within the jurisdiction of a single court" in such a manner as to ignore the traditional division of labor in our court system. The traditional role of the Court of Common Pleas in the disposition of summary motor vehicle offenses is the role of the reviewing tribunal as opposed to the court of original jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 932.

* * *

Our interpretation of Section 110(1)(ii) as excluding traffic violations under the Motor Vehicle Code is further bolstered by a consideration of the purposes sought to be achieved by the legislative enactment as well as our promulgation of the compulsory joinder rule. The disposition of a summary offense in a traffic matter prior to the trial of a misdemeanor or felony does not present the type of governmental harassment of a defendant that would offend double jeopardy concerns. Additionally, judicial economy is not served by requiring our Courts of Common Pleas to dispose of these matters which are regularly entrusted to the district justices for disposition.

Id. at 290-91 & n.3, 455 A.2d at 1198 & n.3.⁵

Under this line of authority, the present prosecution for PWID would be permissible. However, in 2002, the Legislature modified Section 110(1)(ii) to remove the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso upon which these decisions were premised. See Act of June 28, 2002, P.L. 481, No. 81, § 1. It seems that the displacement of the Beatty line of decisions may have been an unintended consequence, since the General Assembly's clear intention was to override the effect of Commonwealth v. McPhail , 547 Pa. 519, 692 A.2d 139 (1997) (plurality), which had led to the "within the jurisdiction of a single court" proviso of Section 110(1)(ii) being met even where multi-jurisdictional criminal episodes were involved. See id. at 530, 692 A.2d at 144-45. Disapproving this state of affairs, the General Assembly amended Section 110(1)(ii) to reflect its current language by replacing the phrase "was within the jurisdiction of a single court" with "occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution." See Act of June 28, 2002, P.L. 481, No. 81, § 1.

Again, the intended effect of the 2002 amendment was to limit mandatory joinder only to those offenses occurring in a single judicial district. See Commonwealth v. Fithian , 599 Pa. 180, 199, 961 A.2d 66, 77 (2008). But another impact -- which may not have been intended -- was to displace the Beatty line of decisions, which had approved of the serial litigation of summary offenses at the magisterial district court level and greater offenses in the county courts. See Perfetto , 652 Pa. at 121–23, 207 A.3d at...