Commonwealth v. Sipps

225 A.3d 1110

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Matthew Jeffrey SIPPS, Appellant

No. 1872 EDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted November 18, 2019

Filed December 31, 2019

Richard J. Blasetti, Media, for appellant.

Katayoun M. Copeland, District Attorney, and Andrew S. Kovach, Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:

Matthew Jeffrey Sipps (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of concealment of the whereabouts of a child, corruption of minors, and patronizing a victim of sexual servitude.¹ After careful review, we affirm.

On appeal, Appellant presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient to support [Appellant's] conviction of Count 3, Patronizing a victim of sexual servitude [ 18 Pa.C.S. § 3013 ], where the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] engaged in a sex act or performance with another individual knowing that the act or performance is the result of the person being a victim of human trafficking?

2. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient to support [Appellant's] conviction of Count 1, Concealment of whereabouts of a child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2909(a), where the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] removed a child from her known place of residence with the intent to conceal the child's whereabouts from her parent or guardian, caused the child to be removed from her known place of residence, prevented the child from returning or being returned to her known place of residence, or failed to return a child to her known place of residence when the child's parent or guardian had a reasonable expectation that [Appellant] would return the child?

Appellant's Brief at 6.²

Preliminarily, we address the trial court's contention that Appellant's sufficiency issues "should be deemed waived" because Appellant "has not cogently identified the mandated elements of the crimes." Trial Court Opinion, 12/26/18, at 7. Referencing both case law and Appellant's "wholesale lack of specificity," the court stated that it "must guess" at Appellant's "generalized sufficiency claims." Id. at 8. However, despite its consternation with Appellant's Rule 1925(b) concise statement, the trial court authored a comprehensive, articulate and impressive opinion, which we reference infra .

In response to the trial court's assertion of waiver, Appellant also notes that the trial court "addressed the merits of the question[s] at length." Appellant's Brief at 17. For its part, the Commonwealth does not address waiver, but argues against the merits of Appellant's sufficiency claims. See generally , Commonwealth Brief at 4-17.

This Court has held that we may find waiver where a concise statement is too vague. See Commonwealth v. Hansley , 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011). "When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review." Commonwealth v. Dowling , 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). "A Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement." Id. at 686-87. We have stated:

If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal. [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on appeal].

Commonwealth v. Williams , 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Here, although the trial court has advocated waiver, we find that the two sufficiency issues Appellant raises on appeal were not so vaguely stated in the Rule 1925(b) statement so as to compel waiver. For example, in his first issue, Appellant's assertion reflects his first question on appeal:

The evidence at trial was insufficient to support [Appellant's] conviction of Count 3, Patronizing a victim of sexual servitude [ 18 Pa.C.S. § 3013 ], where the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] engaged in a sex act or performance with another individual knowing that the act or performance is the result of the person being a victim of human trafficking?

Appellant's Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/20/18, at 1.

While Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement may be flawed, the trial court — after discussing waiver — has provided a thoughtful analysis rejecting the sufficiency claims on the merits. On this record, we, like the trial court, proceed to review the merits of Appellant's sufficiency claims.

It is well-settled that:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed , 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Appellant first claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of patronizing a victim of sexual servitude. The relevant statute reads:

(a) Offense defined.-- A person commits a felony of the second degree if the person engages in any sex act or performance with another individual knowing that the act or performance is the result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3013. By law, human trafficking occurs when a person:

(1) recruits, entices, solicits, harbors, transports, provides, obtains or maintains an individual if the person knows or recklessly disregards that the individual will be subject to involuntary servitude; or

(2) knowingly benefits financially or receives anything of value from any act that facilitates any activity described in paragraph (1).

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3011.

Appellant argues that "the jury used surmise and conjecture to convict because testimony from the witness stand did not support" his patronizing a victim of human trafficking conviction. Appellant's Brief at 12. Appellant concedes that he had sex with the complainant, satisfying the first element of the offense, but as to the second element, claims the evidence did not support a finding that he knew the complainant was being trafficked. Appellant states that the Commonwealth evidence "proved only at best [that Appellant] engaged in sex with a young runaway." Id. at 14. Appellant continues:

Nowhere in the record does evidence appear Appellant was aware that complainant was from Rhode Island, that she met Ray Justis through a website or that Justis transported her to New Jersey. Testimony does not bear this out.

Appellant's Brief at 15. This argument is specious.

As noted, the trial court addressed the merits of this claim. Although at this writing there are no published decisions specifically discussing the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to a conviction of patronizing a victim of sexual servitude, the trial court nonetheless offered a detailed record-based analysis with citation to related legal authority. Specific to Appellant's contention that he lacked knowledge that the "young runaway," i.e. , the complainant, V.M., was the victim of human trafficking, the court explained:

At trial, V.M. testified she had sexual intercourse with [Appellant] on three (3) occasions stemming from her being a "worker" for Ray Justis and these interactions were subsequent and in response to Ray posting an advertisement for her on Backpage.com, and in each such instance [Appellant] paid Ray five hundred ($500.00) dollars per liaison. [Appellant], after taking V.M. to his home, continued to have with [V.M.] repeated sexual intercourse. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 93-96, 99, 100, 114. See also Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 – Backpage.com Advertisement for V.M. There was clearly legally sufficient evidence for the jury to have determined that [Appellant] engaged in sexual acts with V.M. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 99, 100, 114. See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3013(a).

The sole remaining issue is thus whether the evidence at trial was as a matter of law sufficient to demonstrate that [Appellant] knew his repeatedly having intercourse with V.M. was "the result of [V.M.] being a victim of human trafficking." See § 3013. See also 18 Pa.C.S. 302(a)(2)(i)(ii).

The trial record on being viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, certainly contains more than sufficient evidence to support the jury's rational inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence, as well as the direct evidence, and common sense that when having repeated sexual liaisons with V.M., [Appellant] knew such was the result of V.M. being a victim of human trafficking. SeeCommonwealth v. Crawford , 24 A.3d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 2011) ; Commonwealth v. Wallace , 817 A.2d 485, 490 (Pa. Super. 2002) ; and Commonwealth v. Lewis , 911 A.2d at 564, quotingCommonwealth v. Alford , 880 A.2d at 671 quoting Commonwealth v. Gruff , 822

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