Croci v. Town of Haverstraw

175 F.Supp.3d 373

Cheryl Croci, Plaintiff,

v.Town of Haverstraw, George Wargo, and Howard Phillips, Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-5138 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 31, 2016

Ambrose Wotor Wotorson, Jr., Esq., Law Offices of Ambrose Wotorson, P.C., New York, NY, Counsel for Plaintiff.

Kenneth Ethan Pitcoff, Esq., Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, NY, Counsel for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cheryl Croci (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against defendants Town of Haverstraw (the “Town”), George Wargo (“Wargo”), and Howard Phillips (“Phillips”) (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment rights and for violations of procedural and substantive due process. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim, § 1983 claims, and state law claims on various grounds. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this Opinion. Plaintiff began working for the Town in 1997, and, according to Plaintiff, at all relevant times, her performance has been satisfactory. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (Dkt. No. 14).) In March 2000, Plaintiff began working for the Town's Highway Department as a personal assistant. (Id. ¶ 10(a).) Since that time, Plaintiff was re-appointed to that position every two years. (Id. ¶ 10(b).) On or about March 2, 2010, Plaintiff began to formally complain about sex discrimination and an allegedly hostile work environment based upon her gender. (Id. ¶ 10(c).) According to Plaintiff, these complaints were continuing in nature, and Defendants' agents investigated her complaints on two separate occasions. (Id. ) At the end of the first investigation, the agents concluded that her complaints were unsubstantiated. (Id. )

Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that Phillips, the Town Supervisor, was “not pleased” with Plaintiff's complaints, and, in response to her complaints, falsely alleged that Plaintiff had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior. (Id. ¶ 10(d).) According to Plaintiff, Phillips made this allegation “without any credible basis for doing so,” and further “issued a pretextual and retaliatory warning to Plaintiff,” while “utterly fail[ing] to punish Plaintiff's harasser(s) in any regard or to ensure that such harassment did not occur in the future.” (Id. )

Nevertheless, Plaintiff's complaints persisted, and Defendants undertook a second investigation, which concluded that her gender-based hostile work environment claims were substantiated. (Id. ¶ 10(e).) As a result, Plaintiff alleges, her harasser was eventually removed from the garage where Plaintiff worked and was suspended for 15 days in August or September 2013, after Plaintiff had already filed a sexual harassment lawsuit, and was instructed to avoid further contact with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 10(f).) Despite this outcome, Plaintiff alleges that Phillips—who remained in his position and was not subject to any punishment—“was not pleased with ... Plaintiff's complaining about a gender-based hostile work environment, nor about [the] outcome of the second investigation.” (Id. ) In addition to her internal complaints, in or about 2011, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Rockland County State Supreme Court, alleging sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and a hostile work environment based on gender. (Id. ¶ 10(g).) Plaintiff alleges that that complaint was served on Phillips, who was aware of the suit and participated in its defense, and served on the Town. (Id. )

Later, in or around March or April 2012, Plaintiff attended a luncheon for the Superintendents of the Highways Association. (Id. ¶ 10(h).) During the luncheon, an engineer/consultant brought up and discussed Plaintiff's pending sexual harassment charges with Wargo, then one of the foremen for the County of Rockland Highway Department, in Plaintiff's presence. (Id. ¶¶ 10(h)–10(i).) After Wargo asked her, Plaintiff said that she did have sexual harassment charges pending against the Town. (Id. ¶ 10(i).)

The next year, in May 2013, Phillips met with John Piperato, who at the time was “attempting to run” for Superintendent of the Haverstraw Highway Department. (Id. ¶ 10(j).) During the meeting, Phillips allegedly suggested that he would back Piperato's bid only if Piperato fired Plaintiff once elected, because of Plaintiff's sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims. (Id. ) Piperato declined the invitation, and Phillips subsequently backed Wargo in his pursuit of the Superintendent's position. (Id. ¶¶ 10(k)–10(l).) According to Plaintiff, Wargo was “not pleased with Plaintiff's protected activities and ... did not want her to work under his charge, precisely because of her prior protected activities, which he was aware of.” (Id. ¶ 10(l).) Nevertheless, prior to the election, Wargo assured Plaintiff on several occasions that he intended to keep her on as a personal assistant if he were elected and that her position was secure since she had been in it for “so long.” (See id. ¶ 10(o).)

In or about July 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging ongoing sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and a hostile work environment based upon her gender. (Id. 10(m).) The Town was served with a copy of the complaint, and Phillips, who, Plaintiff alleges, became aware of and participated in the defense to that complaint, was “not pleased with Plaintiff's EEOC filling.” (Id. )

In November 2013, Wargo was elected as a Democrat to the position of Superintendent of Highways. (Id. ¶ 10(n).) The next month, despite Wargo's earlier assurances to the contrary and without any explanation, Plaintiff was informed that Phillips and Wargo decided that she should no longer be the personal assistant to the Superintendent of Highways. (Id. ¶ 10(p).) Plaintiff was not given any notice or right to be heard before her termination. (Id. ¶ 10(t).) Moreover, Plaintiff was the only support staffer in the Highway Department who was not retained, despite the fact that she, like Wargo and Phillips, was a registered Democrat, and even though other Town employees have kept their positions after past elections, including three secretaries in the Town Clerk's office. (Id. ¶¶ 10(q)–10(s).)¹ Plaintiff alleges that Wargo—who is a Town employee and ultimately answerable to Phillips—participated in the decision to terminate Plaintiff on account of her “prior protected activities in formally pursuing sexual harassment claims against the Town.” (Id. ¶ 10(s).)

B. Procedural Background

On July 9, 2014, Plaintiff brought the instant Action against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 1.) Because no proof of service had been filed within 120 days of when Plaintiff filed the original Complaint, on January 7, 2015, the Court ordered that Plaintiff properly serve the summons and complaint and file proof of such action, or, alternatively, demonstrate good cause to the Court concerning Plaintiff's failure to effect such service. (Dkt. No. 3.) After successful service by that date, (Dkt. Nos. 4–6), Defendants requested on March 10, 2015 a pre-motion conference in advance of their anticipated Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, (Dkt. No. 10.) By letter dated March 19, 2015, Plaintiff requested leave to file an Amended Complaint, (Dkt. No. 11–12), and did so on April 6, 2015, (Dkt. No. 14). Having reviewed Plaintiff's then-still-proposed Amended Complaint, Defendants submitted a letter to the Court indicating that they wished to renew their request for a pre-motion conference in advance of an anticipated Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 15.) Plaintiff responded, (Dkt. Nos. 16–17), and, after a pre-motion conference held on May 7, 2015, (Dkt. (minute entry for May 7, 2015)), Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss and accompanying papers on June 26, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 19–21). Plaintiff filed her Opposition by August 1, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 24–26), and Defendants submitted their Reply on August 21, 2015, (Dkt. No. 27).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and, although a plaintiff need only allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [her] claim[ ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed,” id. ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for...