Doe v. N. Homes, Inc.

11 F.4th 633

Jane DOE, (a pseudonym), Plaintiff - Appellant

v.NORTH HOMES, INC., individually, doing business as North Homes Children and Family Services and I.T.A.S.K.I.N. Juvenile Center; Devin Michael Wood, in his individual capacity; Connie Ross, in her individual and official capacities; John Does 1–5, in their individual capacities; John Does 6–10, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants – Appellees

No. 20-1974

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 18, 2021

Filed: August 24, 2021

Paul Convery Dworak, Jeffrey S. Storms, Newmark & Storms, Jeffrey M. Montpetit, Sieben & Carey, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Monica Detert, Stephen Paul Laitinen, Mark A. Solheim, Larson & King, Saint Paul, MN, for Defendants-Appellees North Homes, Inc., individually, doing business as North Homes Children and Family Services and I.T.A.S.K.I.N. Juvenile Center, Connie Ross.

Devin Michael Wood, Duluth, MN, Pro Se.

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

North Homes, Inc. confined fifteen-year-old Jane Doe in its residential correctional unit where an employee sexually assaulted her for three days. No one intervened. In this case, we decide whether Doe plausibly alleged that North Homes—a private entity—qualifies as a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because she did, we reverse, in part.

I. Background

At this stage, we take Doe's factual allegations as true and draw inferences in her favor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; see also Does 1-2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. , 999 F.3d 571, 574-575 (8th Cir. 2021). We use this necessarily one-sided narrative to answer the limited question before us. Does 1-2 , 999 F.3d at 574-575. We do not use it to reach the merits of Doe's claims. See id.

North Homes owns and operates correctional and rehabilitative facilities for juveniles in Northern Minnesota. To operate I.T.A.S.K.I.N. Juvenile Center (the "Juvenile Center"), North Homes "worked in concert" with Itasca County and other counties "to provide care for minor children who were detained, incarcerated, committed, or the like, for criminal, mental health, or other protective purposes."

An interagency agreement between Minnesota's Department of Corrections and its Department of Human Services authorized and licensed the Juvenile Center to run two residential units: (1) the DOC unit; and (2) the DHS unit. The agencies jointly operated those units under their interagency agreement's terms. Through "statutory and regulatory authority[,] and/or court orders," North Homes could move residents between the two units at its discretion.

Connie Ross (North Homes's director and administrator) managed both units. In turn, those units supervised residents "24/7." The units "entirely restricted" residents’ "libert[ies]." And residents could not leave "on their own volition[.]"

In early 2014, Doe, a young woman diagnosed with bipolar and substance-use disorders, arrived at the Juvenile Center. Kanabec County (Doe's legal custodian), and her foster parent, enrolled Doe at the Juvenile Center for mental health and behavioral help. At first, the Juvenile Center placed her in the DHS unit.

Several months later, however, staff "involuntarily detained" her in the DOC unit "for behavioral issues." Supervisors and staff knew about, and received training on, Doe's serious medical needs. And by statute, they were all obligated to report child abuse (including sexual abuse) to police. See Minn. Stat. § 260E.06.

Soon after her detainment, Devin Michael Wood—a twenty-three-year-old corrections officer for the DOC unit—"groomed and made sexual advances towards" Doe. Then, for three days, Wood "engaged in sex acts, including intercourse, with [Doe]." Those acts intensified Doe's serious medical needs.

For three days, no employees stepped in to help Doe despite constant monitoring. None complied with the child-abuse-reporting requirement, either. This conduct aligned with how employees (including Ross) "regularly turned a blind eye towards inappropriate and sexual relationships between residents and staff[.]" It also reflected how employees "encouraged a ‘code of silence’ " to protect their "predatory" colleagues.

On the fourth day, police arrested Wood for criminal sexual conduct. Blaming Doe for Wood's arrest, staff members verbally harassed her. The harassment triggered even more emotional and psychological harm. Despite knowing about the verbal harassment, Ross and others did not stop it.

With the arrest fallout still ongoing, Doe told Ross about "another staff member ... engaging in a sexual relationship with a minor resident." Ross responded by directing employees to detain, punish, and silence Doe—in the DOC unit.

Months later, Wood pled guilty to three counts of third-degree sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 609.344(m).

Doe sued North Homes, Ross, and Wood, as well as other employees, alleging three § 1983 counts: (1) Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the employees; (2) a Monell claim against North Homes and Ross for creating an environment "where children ... were regularly subjected to sexual abuse"; and (3) a First Amendment claim against Ross.

While characterizing North Homes as a "nominally private entity," Doe alleged that "[it] acted under color of state law because [it] fulfilled the public function of juvenile incarceration, detainment, and commitment, and acted in concert with state actors in denying [Doe] her federal civil rights." By virtue of their employment at North Homes, Doe's complaint treated all defendant employees as state actors, too. Ultimately, the district court saw "at most, the passive involvement of the state in the circumstances leading to her alleged constitutional deprivations." Concluding that there was a lack of state-actor allegations, the district court held that Doe's § 1983 claims failed.¹

II. Discussion

We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. See Magee v. Trs. of Hamline Univ ., 747 F.3d 532, 534 (8th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we use judicial "experience and common sense" to decide if Doe's "complaint crosse[d] over the plausibility threshold." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ); Magee , 747 F.3d at 535. So, we ask if Doe's allegations let us "draw the reasonable inference that [North Homes] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id .

Only a state actor can face § 1983 liability. See Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores , 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001). But "in a few limited circumstances," a private entity "can qualify as a state actor," including "when the private entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function," and "when the government acts jointly with the private entity." Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp ., ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019) (internal citations omitted).

Still, the state-actor question presents a "necessarily fact-bound inquiry[.]" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). First, we ask if the claimed deprivation "resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority." Id . And second, we ask if "under the facts of this case," we may "appropriately characterize[ ]" North Homes as a state actor. Id. "Our ultimate conclusion must turn on the particular facts of the case, since only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Wickersham v. City of Columbia , 481 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth ., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) (cleaned up)).

Here, we must decide if Doe plausibly alleged that North Homes performed a public function when it detained her.

The power to decide to incarcerate a person rests with the state.² See, e.g. , Chapman v. United States , 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (explaining that "the Government may not punish" a person "unless and until it proves his guilt ... at a criminal trial" with "the relevant constitutional guarantees[,]" and then post-conviction, "the court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by statute" if the punishment does not violate the Constitution); see also Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp ., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("Clearly, confinement of wrongdoers—though sometimes delegated to private entities—is a fundamentally governmental function.").

And so, only the state can decide to delegate that power. Cf. West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 56–57, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (private doctor "fully vested with state authority" performed public function of treating prisoners, which flowed directly from the state's decision to incarcerate those prisoners); see also Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys’ Haven, Inc. , 976 F.3d 750, 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2020) (deciding that providing housing and treatment for at-risk youth did not amount to a public function while distinguishing that facility from one that "incarcerat[es] children placed under its care " (emphasis added)).

Even so, we can see how that conclusion may seem at odds with Richardson v. McKnight ’s statement: "correctional functions have never been exclusively public." 521 U.S. 399, 405, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). But Richardson expressly limited its scope to § 1983 immunity, not § 1983 liability. Id . at 413, 117 S.Ct. 2100 ; accord Holly v. Scott , 434 F.3d 287, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2006) (Motz, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that Richardson "deals only with a private person's immunity from liability"). And, in upholding a qualified-immunity denial, Richardson expressly left the state-actor question for the district court to decide. 521 U.S. at 413–14, 117 S.Ct. 2100. While one circuit saw Richardson as dispositive on...