Ex parte Edwards

608 S.W.3d 325

EX PARTE Maurice EDWARDS, Appellant

NO. 01-19-00100-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued August 4, 2020

Rehearing Denied October 27, 2020

Charles Hinton, Houston, for Appellant.

Kim Ogg, District Attorney, Harris County, Tiffany C. Larsen, Houston, for State.

Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Landau, and Countiss.

OPINION ON REHEARING

Julie Countiss, Justice

Appellee, the State of Texas, has filed a motion for en banc reconsideration of our August 27, 2019 opinion and judgment.¹ Treating the motion for en banc reconsideration as a request for a panel rehearing,² we deny the motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion and judgment of August 27, 2019, and issue this opinion and new judgment in their stead.³ We dismiss the State's motion for en banc reconsideration as moot.⁴

Appellant, Maurice Edwards, challenges the trial court's order denying his pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his requested habeas relief because the ten-year statute of limitations barred his prosecution for the alleged felony offense of aggravated sexual assault.⁵

We reverse and remand.

Background

On November 16, 2017, a Harris County Grand Jury issued a true bill of indictment, alleging that on or about May 2, 2003, appellant committed the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault.⁶ Appellant filed a verified pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he had been "confined and restrained of liberty by the [s]heriff of Harris County, Texas in the Harris County Jail" and his confinement and restraint were illegal because the applicable statute of limitations barred his prosecution for the alleged felony offense of aggravated sexual assault in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I section 10 of the Texas Constitution, and Article 12.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.⁷ Appellant sought "dismissal of the charge [against him as] being outside the statute of limitations."⁸

The trial court held a hearing on appellant's application. Appellant offered, and the trial court admitted into evidence without objection, a copy of the complaint, the indictment, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 12.01, and a Houston Police Department ("HPD") offense report. The parties "stipulate[d] to the facts that [were] in the offense report" for the purposes of the hearing.

In the report, HPD Officer B.K. Foley stated that, on May 2, 2003, he was "dispatched to a sexual assault [that had] just occurred," and upon his arrival, "the complainant was at the scene" and the perpetrator was not present. He spoke with the complainant, who said that the alleged perpetrator's name was "Maurice" and she "d[id] not know his last name or phone number off hand," had met him when she worked at the Moments Cabaret strip club, and had "gone out with [him] a few times." On the day of the sexual assault, she "called [Maurice] to come and pick her up from a friend[']s house" and he was "going to eventually give her a ride to [a convenience store] where her boyfriend was supposed to be waiting." However, Maurice drove past the store and into an apartment complex, where the complainant "tried to get out of the vehicle" as Maurice began "grabbing her and hitting her." When the complainant tried to get away, Maurice started to choke her. Maurice then "took her clothes [off] and had sex with her."

Emergency assistance personnel transported the complainant to a hospital "to have a rape kit done." Officer Foley "ran the license plate [number] of [Maurice's] vehicle," which two witnesses at the scene had given to him. The information he received from "r[unning] the license plate [number]" indicated that "there was a city warrant on the vehicle for a Maurice Edwards[, date of birth] 11-13-77," along with a Texas driver's license number. Foley then "ran the criminal history on [Maurice Edwards] and the info[rmation] matched" the information that the complainant had provided. In his report, Foley identified "one possible suspect" as "Edwards, Maurice Ellis." Foley also noted that the complainant was "very hysterical and hard to interview," "often did not answer questions and appeared to not be telling the whole truth about her relationship with [Maurice] and how they met both originally and [on the day of the sexual assault]," and "often tried to change the subject and appeared to be withholding information."

On May 6, 2003, HPD Officer L.D. Garretson, who had been assigned to the investigation, supplemented the offense report, stating that there had not been a supplement to the offense report made "regarding the recovery/tagging of the complainant's sexual assault kit into the HPD property room." Garretson listed "Maurice Ellis Edwards" as the "suspect" who sexually assaulted the complainant. On May 15, 2003, HPD Officer M.T. Walding supplemented the offense report, stating that he had stopped a car that matched the description of Maurice's car, the driver was "identified as Tommie C. [ ]Lewis," and "[t]he passenger claimed he was Jason Lewis." When Walding asked Tommie "when he last saw Maurice," Tommie answered, "about a year ago." Walding called the complainant, who stated that "this was obvious[ly] a lie," and she advised Walding that neither of the men fit the description of Maurice.

On May 16, 2003, Officer Garretson reviewed "[the] complainant's sexual assault examination forensic report forms for [submission] to the HPD crime lab for DNA analysis and comparison purposes." In his supplement to the offense report, he noted that the complainant had not attempted to contact him and had not responded to the "Sex Crimes Unit Contact Letter" that he had sent to her on May 6, 2003. According to Garretson, "[u]ntil ... contact" from the complainant was received, the status of the investigation was "case cleared due to lack of prosecution by [the] complainant." Garretson against listed "Maurice Ellis Edwards" as the "suspect."

A November 7, 2013 supplement to the offense report by Officer Limscop reflects that laboratory testing "in association with a request for outsourced – DNA analysis" was completed. And a February 5, 2014 supplement to the offense report by Office Limscop shows that a laboratory analysis "in association with a request for CODIS^{[9 ]} analysis" was completed.

On April 13, 2014, HPD Officer J.H. Lewis supplemented the offense report, stating that on March 13, 2014, he had received the case "for further investigation regarding a CODIS match confirmation." On August 22, 2017, HPD Officer N. Vo updated the offense report, stating that he had interviewed the complainant, who "positively identified [Maurice] through [a] photo[graphic] array even though the [sexual assault] happened 13 years ago." He further stated that the Harris County District Attorney's Office had "advised [him] that charges for aggravated sexual assault were accepted" and a search warrant for buccal swabs from Maurice, who was "currently in jail for another charge," would be obtained.

On September 20, 2017, Officer Vo obtained two buccal swabs from appellant and submitted them for DNA analysis and comparison "to the male DNA that was found in the complainant's sexual assault kit." In Vo's November 1, 2017 supplement to the offense report, he noted that the laboratory results from the buccal swabs were still pending. "However, the case ha[d] been thoroughly investigated" and "charges [had been] filed."

No other evidence was offered or admitted at the hearing, and no witnesses testified. In response to appellant's habeas application, the State argued that, under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 12.01(1)(C)(i), no statute of limitations applied to the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault allegedly committed by appellant because biological matter was collected during the investigation, the matter was subjected to forensic DNA testing, and the testing results showed that the biological matter "d[id] not match the victim or any other person whose identity [was] readily ascertained."¹⁰ According to the State, all "three prongs ... set out under [Article] 12.01(1)(C)(i) ha[d] been met," there were "no issues with the statute of limitations with [appellant's] case," and appellant's requested habeas relief "should be denied."

While presenting its argument at the hearing, the State also focused on "the proper definition of ‘readily ascertained’ " and whether appellant was "absolutely ascertainable" but was not "readily ascertained," as Article 12.01(1)(C)(i) required for no statute of limitations to apply.¹¹ The State asserted that it "did not have the link to [appellant] based on his DNA until 2014," and "[w]ithout a DNA profile being obtained from the testing of the [sexual assault] kit, a suspect, under the law, has not been readily ascertained." In other words, appellant was not "readily ascertained to a point where the State believed that it had gathered enough evidence sufficient to prove [its] case beyond a reasonable doubt until the CODIS hit and the subsequent identification of [appellant] out of [the photographic array] by the complainant, which did not occur until 2017."

In contrast, appellant, at the hearing, reiterated that his "core position" was that "the ten-year statute of limitations d[id] apply"¹² to his case, he was "not ... indicted until 2017," although the alleged sexual assault took place in 2003, the prosecution of appellant for the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault was "time-barred," and he was entitled to habeas relief. As to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 12.01(1)(C)(i), appellant directed the trial court to two cases that addressed whether Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 12.01(1)(C)(i)'s exception eliminates the general ten-year statute of limitations applicable to the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault. Appellant also responded to the State's...