Felix v. City of N.Y.

408 F.Supp.3d 304

Dorrelien FELIX et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants.

16-CV-5845 (AJN)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 30, 2019

Jonathan C. Moore, Luna Droubi, Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Joshua Joseph Lax, Brian Christopher Francolla, Matthew Joseph Modafferi, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

This litigation concerns the attempted arrest and fatal shooting of David Felix. The two New York Police Department ("NYPD") detectives involved, Defendants Harold Carter and Vincente Matias, now move for partial summary judgment on some claims brought against them under Section 1983, the New York State Constitution, and New York tort law. Specifically, they move for summary judgment on claims related to their conduct preceding the shooting.

For the reasons stated below, Defendants Carter and Matias's partial motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the parties' statements and counter-statements made pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.

On April 25, 2015, Defendants Harold Carter and Vincente Matias, two NYPD detectives, arrived at the Bridge, a residence with programming, treatment, and supervision for individuals suffering from mental illness. Defendant's Counter Statement Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("Def. Counter 56.1") ¶¶ 8, 11, Dkt. No. 120. They were there to arrest David Felix, a suspect in a robbery and assault, although they did not have an arrest warrant. Id. ¶¶ 7, 10. When they buzzed the front door, they were greeted by Danielle Steeley, an employee of the Bridge. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Defendants Carter and Matias showed her a document with a picture of Felix. Id. ¶ 23 Steeley has testified that she believed this document to be an arrest warrant for Felix. Id. ¶ 25. She then explained the mission of the Bridge and informed the detectives that Felix was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Id. ¶ 26. Steeley buzzed Felix's apartment but he did not respond. Id. ¶ 40.

The three of them then went up to Felix's apartment on the sixth floor. Id. ¶ 42. On the way, Steeley called her supervisor, Maritza Bryson, and Defendant Carter told Bryson that he and Matias were there to arrest Felix. Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant's' Rule 56.1 Statement ("Plaintiffs Counter 56.1") ¶ 89. Steeley then knocked on Felix's door, but no one responded. Id. ¶¶ 93-94. Steeley then opened the door. Id. ¶ 98. At some point, they heard what sounded like a person kicking a screen door. Id. ¶ 113. Defendant Matias entered the apartment and discovered that Felix had knocked off a window screen and was fleeing down the fire escape. Id. ¶¶ 116-17. Defendant Matias relayed this to Carter, who had also entered the apartment. Id. ¶¶ 118-19. Defendant Carter ran down the stairs, followed by Matias. Id. ¶¶ 119-20.

Defendant Carter confronted Felix in order to arrest him. Id. ¶¶ 126-27. Felix attempted to escape and was grabbed by Carter. Id. ¶¶ 128-29. Defendants Carter and Matias became engaged in a physical struggle with Felix as they tried to apprehend him. Id. ¶ 131-57. As discussed below, the conduct of Carter, Matias, and Felix during this struggle is disputed. Matias eventually disengaged due to injuries that he sustained. Id. ¶¶ 160, 162. Defendant Carter then shot Felix once, fatally wounding him. Id. ¶ 175. The circumstances surrounding the shooting are heavily disputed. They are not relevant for the disposition of this motion, though, because Defendants only move for summary judgment on claims for conduct preceding the shooting.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may not be granted unless all of the submissions taken together "show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is genuinely in dispute if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Roe v. City of Waterbury , 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). "[I]n making that determination, the court is to draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, viewing the factual assertions in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, and depositions in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Rodriguez v. City of New York , 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995). However, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

In seeking summary judgment, the initial "burden is upon the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue respecting any material fact exists." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. , 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). Where the non-moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant "demonstrates ‘the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact" to survive summary judgment. Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs, Felix's parents and the administrator of his estate, bring claims under Section 1983 against both Carter and Matias, as well as the City. They also bring Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims against the City, New York State Constitutional claims against Carter and Matias, assault and battery claims against Carter and Matias, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Carter and Matias, as well as wrongful death and pain and suffering claims against Carter and Matias. Finally, Plaintiffs also bring a "respondeat superior " claim against the City. This motion only concerns: 1) the Section 1983 claims against Carter and Matias on conduct preceding the shooting; 2) the New York State Constitutional claims for conduct preceding the shooting; and 3) the assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claims against Carter and Matias for conduct preceding the shooting.

A. Section 1983 Claims

Carter and Matias move for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claims related to their conduct before the shooting. This breaks down into two claims. The first is that Carter and Matias unlawfully entered Felix's apartment. The second is that Carter and Matias used excessive force when they were physically struggling with Felix before the shooting.

Carter and Matias contend that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that their conduct for both claims comported with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. At minimum, they argue there is no genuine dispute of material fact that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The purpose of qualified immunity is to "give government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments." Stanton v. Sims , 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S.Ct. 3, 187 L.Ed.2d 341 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). "In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. The first asks whether the facts, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer's conduct violated a [federal] right[.]’ ... The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation." Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 655-56, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ).

For a right to be clearly established, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate" such that "every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’ " al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ) (alteration in original). Such precedent must come from "controlling authority" or a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’ " al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741-42, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne , 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) ). Qualified immunity thus immunizes "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

1. Unlawful Entry

Plaintiffs claim that Carter and Matias unlawfully entered Felix's apartment without a warrant in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants contend that it is undisputed that Steeley gave them consent to enter the apartment. Carter and Matias further argue that given uncertainty in the law regarding the authority of staff at a facility like the Bridge to consent to a search, they are at least entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, they maintain that Felix's kicking of the screen and escape from the apartment created an exigent circumstance, justifying the entry. If that was all that Plaintiffs allege, these arguments might succeed. But they seek to establish...