Huntington v. McDaniel-Huntington (In re Estate)

339 Mich.App. 8

981 N.W.2d 72

IN RE ESTATE OF Eldridge Dean HUNTINGTON.

Eldridge D. Huntington, Jr., Successor Personal Representative of the Estate of Eldridge Dean Huntington, Appellee,

and

Steven Huntington, Other Party,

v.LaTonia McDaniel-Huntington, Personal Representative of the Estate of Eldridge Dean Huntington, Appellant.

No. 354006

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 7, 2021, at Detroit.

Decided September 16, 2021, 9:05 a.m.

Laidler Law Office PLLC, Pontiac (by Kevin Laidler ) for Eldridge Huntington, Jr.

Melissa Z. El, PC (by Melissa Z. El-Johnson) for LaTonia McDaniel-Huntington.

Before: Tukel, P.J., and Sawyer and Cameron, JJ.

Tukel, P.J.

In this supervised administration of the estate of nonresident decedent Eldridge Huntington, Sr. (Eldridge Sr.),¹ appellant, LaTonia McDaniel-Huntington, appeals as of right the probate court's order denying her petition to require Eldridge Huntington, Jr. (Eldridge Jr.) to "provide statutory authority that allows him to pursue assets outside the jurisdiction of [the probate court]," and deeming admitted the contents of Eldridge Jr.’s request for admissions. We affirm the probate court's decision that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the portion of Eldridge Sr.’s estate in Michigan, but we reverse its decision that it did not have authority to distribute that portion of Eldridge Sr.’s estate. Additionally, we affirm the probate court's ruling that McDaniel-Huntington admitted the contents of Eldridge Jr.’s request for admissions because McDaniel-Huntington failed to address it at the probate court level and thus waived the issue. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

Eldridge Sr. died in California where he was domiciled, without a will, survived by his wife—McDaniel-Huntington—and two sons, including Eldridge Jr. The sons are not McDaniel-Huntington's children. McDaniel-Huntington was appointed personal representative of the estate in Michigan, but the parties soon began to contest the existence and proper disposition of various assets located in Michigan and California. The main, and perhaps only, asset located in Michigan was a condominium, though Eldridge Jr. argued that Eldridge Sr. had a Michigan-based consulting business that might have value. An initial hearing was held, at which it became clear that no California probate estate had been opened and that McDaniel-Huntington was hoping to distribute the condominium to herself under her intestate share, MCL 700.2102. The probate court ordered that the administration be supervised and that all Michigan assets be frozen. McDaniel-Huntington later filed a petition for complete estate settlement, requesting that the condominium be distributed to her. Eldridge Jr. objected, arguing that McDaniel-Huntington was withholding information and playing a "shell game." Eldridge Jr. also filed a request for admissions. McDaniel-Huntington replied to the request for admissions by stating that she did not have to answer the request for admissions because there had been no discovery order.

At an evidentiary hearing, it became clear that McDaniel-Huntington had not investigated certain potential assets in California, including a deed found in a safe-deposit box and a car that was repossessed by the financer when McDaniel-Huntington failed to make payments. The probate court told McDaniel-Huntington she should have listed all estate assets in her Michigan inventory, even if they were located in California. The probate court, concerned about McDaniel-Huntington's failure to investigate the estate, appointed Eldridge Jr. as successor personal representative and stated that he could use this role to investigate the estate assets. Soon thereafter, McDaniel-Huntington filed a petition, requesting Eldridge Jr. be required to "provide statutory authority that allows him to pursue assets outside the jurisdiction of this Court" and arguing that the Michigan condominium should be distributed to McDaniel-Huntington under her intestate share, MCL 700.2102. In essence, McDaniel-Huntington argued that Eldridge Jr. was not entitled to use the Michigan probate proceeding to inquire into California assets.

At a final hearing on McDaniel-Huntington's petition, the probate court stated that McDaniel-Huntington had no right to "Michigan elections or allowances" and further stated that "[t]his administration is ancillary (ph). The distributions need to be made via a California Probate estate opened and administered in California. That's pursuant to MCL 700.4201. I'm not—we can't ... partition this." The probate court further stated that, in terms of spousal elections, MCL 700.2202 states that "the surviving widow of a decedent who was domiciled in this state, and who dies intestate may file with the court an election in writing. She was not domiciled in this state.... [S]he's not entitled to real property pursuant to Michigan elections and allowances." McDaniel-Huntington argued that she was requesting an intestate share, not a spousal election.

After a recess to review the law, the following discussion occurred on the record:

[The Court ]: Okay, here's the bottom line, you are misinterpreting EPIC.^[2] You are going under Part 1, which is basically exclusive rights to Michigan residents. What's really applicable is Part 3 of EPIC and that is [MCL] 700.4205, Ancillary and Other Local Administrations. Basically, the decedent was domiciled in California.

[Counsel for McDaniel-Huntington ]: Yes.

[The Court ]: Therefore, California laws apply. The only thing you can do in Michigan as full faith and credit is marshal the assets, liquidate them, and send it over to California. California has community property rights. For example, I own property in Tennessee, if I died today my estate's not gonna be distributed or intestate or otherwise through Tennessee laws, it's gonna be Michigan laws. So the only jurisdiction we have here is full faith and credit to marshal the assets and send them to California. Your motion is denied and you've come back here three times. I'm not doing this again. The answer is no, she does not get her intestate share through Michigan.

If she wants her intestate share follow California laws, they're totally different than Michigan.

The probate court later issued a written order denying McDaniel-Huntington's petition for the reasons stated on the record, further holding that "it is undisputed by the parties that the decedent was domiciled and a resident of the State of California at the time of his death, and the Michigan decedent estate administration is ancillary to California decedent estate administration[.]" (Emphasis added.)

The probate court also ordered that McDaniel-Huntington be deemed to have admitted the contents of Eldridge Jr.’s request for admissions. After a petition for rehearing or reconsideration, the probate court issued a further opinion and order denying the petition. The probate court "acknowledge[d] that LaTonia McDaniel-Huntington may have rights to claim an intestate share of her husband's assets" but noted that the California assets were unknown and that Eldridge Jr. stated he would open an estate in California, which would make the Michigan estate ancillary under MCL 700.3919. This appeal followed.³

II. THE PROBATE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER ELDRIDGE SR.'S ESTATE

McDaniel-Huntington argues that the probate court wrongly held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. We disagree with her framing of the issue. Indeed, the probate court never concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. Rather, it concluded that it did not have the authority to administer the portion of Eldridge Sr.’s estate located in Michigan. The probate court erred by doing so, and we remand to the probate court for it to properly administer the portion of Eldridge Sr.’s estate located in Michigan.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Statutory interpretation and a determination whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists are questions of law reviewed de novo on appeal." In re Haque , 237 Mich.App. 295, 299, 602 N.W.2d 622 (1999).

Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. We read the statutory language in context and as a whole, considering the plain and ordinary meaning of every word. When the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute as written and judicial construction is not permitted. [ O'Leary v. O'Leary , 321 Mich.App. 647, 652, 909 N.W.2d 518 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

We also review de novo the probate court's interpretation of a court rule, which is "subject to the same rules of construction as statutes." In re Leete Estate , 290 Mich.App. 647, 655, 803 N.W.2d 889 (2010). Consequently, individual court rules are to be read in context to create a "harmonious whole." Hill v. L.F. Transp., Inc. , 277 Mich.App. 500, 507, 746 N.W.2d 118 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court reviews "the probate court's findings of fact for clear error. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Redd Guardianship , 321 Mich.App. 398, 403, 909 N.W.2d 289 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The probate court's decisions are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See id. ; In re Duane v. Baldwin Trust , 274 Mich.App. 387, 396-397, 733 N.W.2d 419 (2007) (listing several probate court decisions subject to abuse-of-discretion review), criticized on other grounds 480 Mich. 915, 739 N.W.2d 868 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision resulted in an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes." Hayford v. Hayford , 279 Mich.App. 324, 325, 760 N.W.2d 503 (2008). "An error of law necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion." Denton v. Dep't Of Treasury , 317 Mich.App. 303, 314, 894 N.W.2d 694 (2016).

B. CLARIFICATION OF...