Kelly v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.

37 F.Supp.2d 233

Mary Jane KELLY, Plaintiff, v. METRO-NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD and "Jane Doe", name fictitious, true name unknown to plaintiff, Defendants.

No. 96 Civ. 6446(PKL).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

January 6, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Philip J. Dinhofer, New York City, for Plaintiff.

Jose R. Rios, Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, New York City, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

LEISURE, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action based on an alleged assault upon her on a Metro-North Commuter Railroad ("Metro-North") train while traveling to her job at the Metro-North office in Grand Central Terminal in New York City. Plaintiff avers claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et seq., and pursuant to state statutory and common law. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant Metro-North moves for summary judgment as to all counts.

For the reasons stated in this Opinion, defendant Metro-North's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Standard for Summary Judgment

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the Court determines no genuine issue of material fact exists to be tried and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228, 117 S.Ct. 1819, 137 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1997); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). "In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden will be satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir.1995) (citation omitted); see also Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1231 (2d Cir.1996).

The Court's function in adjudicating summary judgment motions is not to try issues of fact, but instead to determine whether there are such issues. See Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 15-16 (2d Cir.1995). In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Holt, 95 F.3d at 129.

II. Facts of the Case

Applying the principles set forth above, the relevant facts in the instant case are as follows. On Sunday, August 27, 1995, plaintiff prepared to board the 12:57 p.m. Metro-North train from New Haven, Connecticut, to Grand Central Terminal, where plaintiff worked for Metro-North as a clerk in the Station Master's Office. As was her usual practice, plaintiff walked along the platform to the last two train cars where she could gain special access to the train using a key provided to her as part of her employment. At that time, the doors of all of the train cars were locked and could only be accessed by Metro-North employees.

As plaintiff was approaching the relevant train car, two women walking in front of her reached the car first and "keyed" open the train doors. At the time, plaintiff recognized one of the women as a Metro-North employee. Plaintiff has subsequently identified the other woman as Samantha Byrd, also a Metro-North employee.

Plaintiff began to board the train behind the women when Byrd turned and elbowed plaintiff in the chest. Plaintiff tried to regain her balance and enter the train, but was pushed away by Byrd. Byrd told plaintiff, "You cannot get on this train, I'm responsible for who gets on and off this train." When plaintiff eventually entered the train and attempted to walk toward the end of the train car away from Byrd, Byrd followed plaintiff and told her, "Somebody should teach you some manners." Plaintiff showed Byrd plaintiff's Metro-North employee railroad pass and asked Byrd whether she had a pass. Byrd responded that she had a "key" to the train.

Plaintiff later located the train conductor and described the incident and the women. Upon arrival at Grand Central Terminal, plaintiff reported the incident to the police and provided a voluntary statement of the details of the incident.

On August 23, 1996, plaintiff brought this action against Metro-North and against an unknown individual identified as "Jane Doe", who plaintiff has in the course of discovery identified as Byrd. As of May 1998, Byrd had not been formally named as a defendant or served with a copy of the complaint. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May 31, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter "Opposition"]. The motion before the Court is solely by Metro-North, for summary judgment in its favor.

III. Discussion

A. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff avers a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on defendants' alleged violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and her rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applicable. Assuming, without deciding, that Metro-North is a municipal entity constituting a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, plaintiff's claim must nonetheless fail because plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that Metro-North was the "moving force" underlying plaintiff's alleged injury.

It is well-settled that liability may not be found against a municipal entity under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Spencer v. Doe, 139 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.1998). Instead, a plaintiff must prove at least that the municipal entity was the "moving force" behind the wrongdoing, Bryan County, 117 S.Ct. at 1388, either by showing (i) that the conduct of which plaintiff complains was directly "undertaken by a municipal policymaker", Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 248 (2d Cir.1998), that is, by an employee of Metro-North who has final policymaking authority regarding a particular relevant issue, see McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 1737, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), or (ii) that the alleged misconduct occurred as a direct result of the individual defendant's compliance with an official policy or custom, such as a policy entailing inadequate training or supervision, see Bryan County, 117 S.Ct. at 1388.

Plaintiff has failed to establish an issue of material fact as to this element of her § 1983 claim. Plaintiff concedes that she "does not assert a Monell type § 1983 claim in this lawsuit. No official policy or custom is claimed by her complaint." Opposition at 4. Moreover, even if the above concession reflects a mistaken belief by plaintiff that Monell claims may not be premised on the actions of a final policymaker, plaintiff's complaint and the evidence submitted cannot reasonably be construed to suggest a final policymaker was involved in the incident. Absent such allegations and at least some accompanying evidence, plaintiff's putative § 1983 claim is simply an impermissible claim for respondeat superior liability. Summary judgment in favor of defendant Metro-North on this claim is, therefore, appropriate. In addition, to the extent plaintiff purports to assert a § 1983 claim against "Jane Doe", a/k/a Samantha Byrd, in her official capacity, judgment is also granted on that claim, since "[a] claim against a government officer in [her] official capacity is, and should be treated as, a claim against the entity that employs the officer". Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 818 (2d Cir.1997).

B. Claim Pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act

Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Metro-North pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. FELA provides in pertinent part:

Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate] commerce ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier ... for such injury ... resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier....

45 U.S.C. § 51.¹

Before proceeding to an assessment of Metro-North's specific arguments regarding plaintiff's FELA claim, it is worth stating the basic liability principles underlying FELA. FELA is a broad remedial statute which has been given a liberal construction by courts in order to accomplish its goals. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 117 S.Ct. 2113, 2117, 138 L.Ed.2d 560 (1997); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561-62, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987). The Act imposes liability on railroads either for direct negligence (such as negligent maintenance or supervision) or for negligent acts by its employees, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. See 45 U.S.C. § 51; see also Masiello v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 748 F.Supp. 199, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1990). With respect to the traditional common-law negligence elements embodied in FELA, such as the elements of duty, foreseeability and causation, the proof requirements under FELA are substantially relaxed as compared with common-law negligence claims, so as to promote submission of FELA claims to a jury for decision. See Goldwater v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 101 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir.1996); Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.1989); Johannessen v. Gulf Trading & Transp. Co., 633 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1980...