King v. W. Virginia's Choice, Inc.

234 W.Va. 440

766 S.E.2d 387

Carol KING, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.WEST VIRGINIA'S CHOICE, INC., Defendant Below, Respondent.

No. 13–1255.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Oct. 14, 2014.

Decided Nov. 7, 2014.

Cameron S. McKinney, Esq., The Grubb Law Group, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Patrick E. McFarland, Esq., Patrick E. McFarland, P.L.L.C., Parkersburg, WV, David K. Hendrickson, Esq., Barbara A. Samples, Esq., Christopher S. Arnold, Esq., Hendrickson & Long, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

LOUGHRY, Justice:

The petitioner (plaintiff below), Carol King (“Ms. King”), appeals from the October 31, 2013, final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Through this order, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondent (defendant below), West Virginia's Choice, Inc. (“WV Choice”), and dismissed the action with prejudice. Ms. King asserts that the circuit court erred in its legal conclusion that she is not entitled to overtime compensation under the state's Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards¹ (“MWMHS”) because she is subject to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).² Upon our consideration of the appendix record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, the applicable legal authority, and for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit court's final order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The material facts of this case are undisputed. WV Choice is a West Virginia corporation that provides in-home companionship services to persons who are unable to care for themselves due to either age or infirmity. These services are provided following a medical assessment by a physician and pursuant to a plan of care prepared by a trained nurse. At any given time, WV Choice has as many as 2000 employees, all of whom are referred to as in-home direct care workers. To the extent its employees perform incidental household work, which rarely occurs, such work does not exceed twenty percent of the work performed in any given week by any direct care worker, including Ms. King. The employees of WV Choice do not provide trained nursing services or any services that would be the equivalent of trained nursing services.

On January 14, 2011, Ms. King was hired by WV Choice as an in-home direct care worker to provide companionship services to the elderly or infirm. These services include meal preparation, bed-making, prompting clients to take medications, washing clothing, and assisting clients with personal care, such as dressing and personal grooming. WV Choice states that these services are typical of the in-home companionship care services provided by Ms. King and its other direct care worker employees.

On September 5, 2012, Ms. King filed a class action complaint against WV Choice in the circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for unpaid “overtime” compensation for herself and all other similarly situated employees.³ Ms. King alleged that WV Choice violated the MWMHS by failing to pay her for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week at a rate of one and one-half times her regular rate, as provided in West Virginia Code § 21–5C–3 (2013).⁴ Because the damages claim of Ms. King was entirely dependent upon whether WV Choice is an “employer,” as defined by the MWMHS, the circuit court directed the parties to file briefs and dispositive motions on this issue.⁵

On or about August 14, 2013, WV Choice filed its motion for summary judgment, and the parties submitted their respective memoranda of law. On August 28, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion and, by order entered October 31, 2013, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of WV Choice.

In its summary judgment order, the circuit court found that MWMHS only applies to “employees” and “employers” as defined under the MWMHS in West Virginia Code § 21–5C–1 (2013). At the time this action was instituted, the statutory definition of “employer” included the proviso that “the term ‘employer’ shall not include any ... corporation ... if eighty percent of the persons employed by him are subject to any federal act relating to minimum wage, maximum hours and overtime compensation.” W.Va.Code § 21–5C–1(e).⁶ Applying this statutory provision as written, the circuit court concluded that the question of whether WV Choice meets the definition of “employer” under the MWMHS is dependent upon whether eighty percent or more of its employees are “subject to” a federal act, not whether they are “entitled to” overtime wages under a federal act.

In addressing the question posed, the circuit court found that the undisputed evidence established that more than eighty percent of WV Choice's employees, including Ms. King, are subject to the FLSA, a federal act which relates to minimum wage, maximum hours, and overtime compensation. The circuit court further found the FLSA also applies to WV Choice as an enterprise engaged in commerce. Concluding that WV Choice does not meet the statutory definition of “employer” under the MWMHS and, therefore, the MWMHS did not apply, the circuit court dismissed, with prejudice, Ms. King's overtime compensation claim filed under the MWMHS. It is from this final order that Ms. King appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Our review of the circuit court's summary judgment ruling is plenary. See Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ”). Against this standard, we will consider the parties' arguments.

III. Discussion

A. “Employer” for purposes of the MWMHS

Through this appeal, we are called upon to apply the definition of “employer,” as set forth in West Virginia Code § 21–5C–1(e),⁷ to the undisputed facts of this case. The parties acknowledged during oral argument that our resolution of this matter hinges on what is meant by the undefined phrase “subject to” in the proviso found in West Virginia Code § 21–5C–1(e). This exclusionary proviso states that “the term ‘employer’ shall not include any ... corporation ... if eighty percent of the persons employed by him are subject to any federal act relating to minimum wage, maximum hours and overtime compensation.” W.Va.Code § 21–5C–1(e). Ms. King contends that the words “subject to” mean “entitled to,” whereas WV Choice asserts that this phase means “governed by or affected by.”

As we have previously explained, “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968) ; see also Syl. Pt. 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970) (“Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.”); Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”).

Recognizing that a court's duty is not to construe but to apply an unambiguous statute, we afford “[u]ndefined words and terms used in a legislative enactment ... their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W.Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171 (1984). While Ms. King argues that “subject to” is synonymous with “entitled to,” we find that these phrases have very different meanings and import. The phrase “subject to” is defined as “under authority of”⁸ and “governed or affected by.”⁹ Conversely, the phrase “entitled to” is defined as to “give (someone) a legal right or a just claim to receive ... something”¹⁰ and “to give a right ... to.”¹¹

The Legislature has frequently employed the phrase “entitled to” when referring to someone or something having a right to a specific benefit. See W.Va.Code § 5–10–2(11) (2013 & Supp.2014) (“is an employee ... entitled to credited service”); W.Va.Code § 7A–2–1(c) (2012) (“Consolidated local governments ... are entitled to all state and federal monetary assistance to the same extent a municipality or county is entitled to such assistance.”); W.Va.Code § 9–4–2 (2012) (“Recipients ... shall be entitled to have costs of necessary medical services paid out of the fund[.]”); W.Va.Code § 10–1A–4 (2012) (providing that interstate library district may “be entitled to receive any federal aid for which it may be eligible[ ]”); W.Va.Code § 15–1F–8 (2014) (“Members of the organized militia in the active service of the State shall be entitled to the same reemployment rights granted to members of the reserve components of the armed forces of the United States by applicable federal law.”); W.Va.Code § 23–4B–2 (2010) (“For the relief of persons who are entitled to receive benefits by virtue of Title IV of the federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969”); W.Va.Code § 48–1–231(a) (2014) ( “ ‘Individual entitled to support enforcement services under the provisions of ... Title IV–D of the federal Social Security Act’[.]”).¹² We find it significant that the Legislature affirmatively chose to use the words “subject to” in the exclusionary proviso of West Virginia Code § 21–5C–1(e), rather than employing the phrase “entitled to,” as it did in many other statutes.

In addition to requiring courts to apply a statute by giving words the meaning commonly attributed to them, we have further instructed that

“ ‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ” Martin v. Randolph County Board of Education, 195 W.Va. 297, 312, 465 S.E.2d 399, 414 (1995), quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391, 397 (1992).

Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dept., 195 W.Va. 573, 586, 466 S.E.2d 424, 437 (1995) ; see...