McBride v. People

511 P.3d 613

Timothy Robert MCBRIDE, Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 20SC717

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 21, 2022

Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jacob B. McMahon, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE HOOD, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, dissented.

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 We granted certiorari to decide "[w]hether there is liability under section 42-4-20[6](1), C.R.S. (2020), where a vehicle's tail lamps emit any white light, regardless of whether they emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear."

¶2 We now conclude that section 42-4-206(1), C.R.S. (2021), is plain and unambiguous and means what it says: there is liability under that section when a motor vehicle's tail lamps do not "emit[ ] a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear." Nothing in that section mandates that a vehicle's tail lamps must "shine only red light," as the division below concluded. See People v. McBride, 2020 COA 111, ¶ 13, 490 P.3d 810, 814. And because the prosecution did not present substantial and sufficient evidence that would have allowed a reasonable jury to find that the tail lamps of the car that defendant Timothy McBride was driving failed to emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for a tail lamp violation.

¶3 We thus reverse the judgment of the division below and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶4 One night, while surveilling an area near a hotel for illegal drug trafficking, a Mesa County sheriff's deputy in an unmarked patrol car watched a Lincoln Town Car with two occupants pull into the hotel's parking lot, park for less than ten minutes without anyone exiting the vehicle, and drive away. The deputy relayed this information to the other members of his team, and a second deputy began following the Lincoln from another unmarked patrol car, looking for a reason to pull the Lincoln over.

¶5 As she followed the Lincoln, the second deputy noticed that the car's tail lamps were broken and that someone had tried to fix them with red tape but that the tape had melted, allowing the bulbs to emit "some white light." The second deputy also observed the driver of the Lincoln commit what she perceived to be a second traffic infraction, namely, failing to use a turn signal when exiting a roundabout. At that point, the second deputy relayed to a third deputy, who was in a marked patrol car, what she had seen and asked the third deputy to execute a traffic stop.

¶6 Upon pulling behind the Lincoln, the third deputy saw that the car's tail lamps were damaged and were emitting white light (he did not indicate that he saw only white light). He then initiated the traffic stop, identified the Lincoln's driver as McBride and his passenger as M.S., and proceeded to use dispatch to run both occupants through law enforcement databases to determine whether they had any prior criminal history. This database search revealed that McBride had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and the deputy arrested him.

¶7 In the meantime, additional officers and a police dog arrived on the scene, and the dog alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics in the Lincoln. Officers then searched the car and found a baggie containing methamphetamine and a handgun that was pushed between the driver and front passenger seats under a purse. M.S. also had drug paraphernalia on her person.

¶8 As a result of the foregoing, the prosecution charged McBride with (1) possession of a controlled substance, (2) a special offender sentence enhancement for possessing a firearm during the commission of the first offense, (3) possession of a weapon by a previous offender ("POWPO"), (4) a tail lamp violation, and (5) a traffic infraction for failure to signal for a turn.

¶9 The case proceeded, and McBride filed a motion to suppress all evidence, police observations, and statements obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing, among other things, that the stop was unlawful because the deputies did not have a reasonable suspicion that McBride had committed any traffic offenses. Specifically, as pertinent here, McBride asserted that section 42-4-206(1) requires that a vehicle's tail lamps emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred feet to the rear. He argued that even if the deputies observed a white light, it was inconceivable that they did not also observe a red light, and "there is no statutory prohibition to any white light so long as the red light is visible."

¶10 The trial court conducted a hearing on McBride's motion and then denied that motion, ruling that the deputies had a reasonable suspicion that McBride had committed the two traffic offenses. As to the tail lamp violation, the trial court observed that in People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 463 (Colo. 2011), this court had stated, "Driving with a broken taillight justifies an investigatory vehicle stop." In addition, the trial court reasoned that because the red tape on the Lincoln's tail lamps was "ragged and pulling away" so that white light could "leak out of the red area," it was reasonable for the deputies to have concluded that the tail lamps would not emit a red light visible from a distance of five hundred feet.

¶11 The case proceeded to trial, and at trial, both deputies who had driven behind the Lincoln testified as to the condition of its tail lamps. The second deputy explained that after she began following the Lincoln, she observed from her position "immediately behind" that vehicle that its tail lamps were broken and that someone had tried to fix them by applying red tape that had subsequently melted. This allowed the deputy to see "some white light emitting from those bulbs." The third deputy similarly testified that when he got behind the Lincoln, he saw that its "tail lights were damaged and they were emitting white light." Based on this observation and the information that he had received from the second deputy, he then initiated the traffic stop. Through the third deputy, the prosecution also introduced two photos of the Lincoln's rear bumper and tail lamps, and the deputy explained that the photos showed the "red tape that was sort of pasted around the broken tail lights" on both sides of the car.

¶12 After the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief, McBride moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, but the trial court denied that motion.

¶13 The jury subsequently convicted McBride of POWPO and the two traffic offenses but acquitted him of possession of a controlled substance, which mooted the special offender sentencing enhancement charge. Thereafter, the trial court imposed a two-year prison sentence on the POWPO offense and assessed monetary penalties for the two traffic infractions.

¶14 McBride appealed, arguing, among other things, that (1) the evidence at trial did not support the traffic infractions, (2) the trial court had erred in denying his suppression motion, and (3) the evidence did not support his POWPO conviction. The division ultimately agreed that the evidence did not support either the traffic infraction for failure to signal or the POWPO conviction, but it affirmed the finding of a tail lamp violation. McBride, ¶¶ 1, 8-9, 21, 40, 66-67, 490 P.3d at 812-13, 815, 818, 822.

¶15 Regarding the tail lamp violation, the division reasoned that to promote uniformity and apply the statute's plain language, " ‘red’ must mean ‘red’ and only ‘red.’ " Id. at ¶ 14, 490 P.3d at 814. In support of this determination, the division observed that the statute does not say that a tail lamp must shine red along with any other colors; it says only "red." Id. Moreover, in the division's view, the use of additional colors would detract from the requisite uniformity and the uniform enforcement of the law. Id.

¶16 The division further noted that section 42-4-206(3) "requires ‘a tail lamp or a separate lamp’ to illuminate the rear registration plate ‘with a white light.’ " McBride, ¶ 15, 490 P.3d at 814 (quoting § 42-4-206(3) ). This suggested to the division that tail lamps can include white lights, but only to illuminate the rear plate. Id.

¶17 And the division observed that other provisions in the traffic code allow or require tail lamps in colors other than red. Id. at ¶ 16, 490 P.3d at 814. This indicated to the division that "when the legislature says ‘red’ it means only ‘red’ "; when it says another color, it means only that color; and "where more than one color is permitted, the legislature says so." Id. at ¶ 17, 490 P.3d at 815. To conclude otherwise and to allow vehicles to emit white light (even if mixed with red) from their tail lamps "could ... lead to confusion and accidents" because "specific colored lights on a vehicle carry significance" and "[t]his uniformity of lighting helps drivers ascertain what direction a car is facing and whether it is backing up." Id. at ¶ 18, 490 P.3d at 815.

¶18 The division deemed its interpretation of section 42-4-206(1) to be consistent with that of the majority of other jurisdictions to have considered similar statutes. Id. at ¶ 19, 490 P.3d at 815 (collecting cases). In addition, it believed that its statutory construction comported with this court's decision in Brant , 252 P.3d at 463, in which we stated that driving with a broken tail lamp justified an investigatory stop for a violation of section 42-4-206. McBride, ¶ 20, 490 P.3d at 815.

¶19 Proceeding then to apply its statutory...