Miller v. Wood

229 W.Va. 545

729 S.E.2d 867

Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner

v.Justin Brant WOOD, Respondent.

Joe E. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner

v.Mark Thompson, Respondent.

Nos. 11–0815, 11–0891.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted May 22, 2012.

Decided June 18, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “Mandamus lies to require the discharge by a public officer of a nondiscretionary duty.” Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. Greenbrier County Airport Auth. v. Hanna, 151 W.Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967).

2. “A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist—1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; 2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and 3) the absence of another adequate remedy.” Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969).

3. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

4. In determining what constitutes a conviction for purposes of applying West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(a) (2010), a person is convicted when the person enters a plea of guilty or is found guilty by a court or jury. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1a(e) (2010), a plea of nolo contendere (no contest) does not constitute a conviction for purposes of W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(a) (2010) except where the person holds a commercial drivers' license or operates a commercial vehicle. Accordingly, a person entering a nolo contendere (no contest) plea to a second or subsequent offense defined in W. Va.Code § 17C–5–2 (2010) is entitled to an administrative license revocation hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. “In the construction of a legislative enactment, the intention of the legislature is to be determined, not from any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather from a general consideration of the act or statute in its entirety.” Syllabus Point 1, Parkins v. Londeree, 146 W.Va. 1051, 124 S.E.2d 471 (1962).

6. “Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.” Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

7. “Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.” Syllabus Point 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving and Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975).

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq., Attorney General, Scott Johnson, Esq., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elaine L. Skorich, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Michael L. Solomon, Esq., Solomon & Solomon, Morgantown, WV, for Respondent Justin Brant Wood.

Harley O. Wagner, Esq., The Wagner Law Firm, Martinsburg, WV, and Jason M. Glass, Esq., Glass Defense Firm, Clarksburg, WV, for Respondent Mark Thompson.

BENJAMIN, Justice:

These two consolidated appeals are brought before the Court by Joe E. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter referred to as “the Commissioner”), the petitioner herein, challenging two separate orders of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County holding that the nolo contendere pleas of the respondents, Justin Brant Wood and Mark Thompson [“respondents”], do not constitute convictions under W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(e) (2010), thus entitling each of the respondents to an administrative hearing prior to having their drivers' licenses revoked. Herein, the Commissioner argues that the circuit courts erred in granting extraordinary relief to the respondents and prohibiting the Commissioner from automatically revoking the respondents' drivers licenses because the nolo contendere pleas constitute convictions under the applicable law. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the orders of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County and remand these matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts involved in these consolidated appeals are virtually identical in that both respondents pled nolo contendere (no contest) to driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), an offense defined in W. Va.Code § 17C–5–2,¹ and both had previous DUI convictions and/or revocations within the preceding decade. The Commissioner automatically revoked the respondents' drivers' licenses taking the position that a nolo contendere plea to a second DUI (or greater) offense is a conviction. Disagreeing, the drivers each filed a petition for a writ of extraordinary relief in the circuit court, which the circuit court granted, holding that an automatic revocation was impermissible. The specific facts and procedural history of each respondent's case are set forth below.

Justin Wood

On February 3, 2010, respondent Justin Brant Wood was arrested for DUI in Monongalia County, West Virginia by the Morgantown City Police Department. ² On February 17, 2010, the Commissioner issued an Order of Revocation, revoking Wood's drivers' license, based upon its receipt of the DUI Information Sheet from the investigating officer of the February 3, 2010, arrest. On March 2, 2010, Wood requested an administrative hearing on the February 17, 2010, Order of Revocation. An administrative hearing was scheduled for September 30, 2010. Prior to the administrative hearing, Wood pled no contest to DUI on July 16, 2010, in the Municipal Court of Morgantown. By a second Order of Revocation dated August 12, 2010, the Commissioner revoked Wood's privilege to drive a motor vehicle based upon notice from the clerk of the Morgantown Municipal Court that Wood was “convicted” of the offense of DUI. Following that order, Wood filed a “Petition for Appeal” ³ with the Circuit Court of Kanawha County arguing that because he pled no contest to DUI in Morgantown Municipal Court, he was not “convicted” under the applicable law and thus, there was no basis for the Commissioner's August 12, 2010, Order of Revocation. The circuit court, Judge Louis Bloom, concluded that under W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(e) (2010)⁴, Wood was not convicted of a DUI offense because he pled no contest. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the Commissioner was required to hold an administrative hearing on its February 17, 2010, Order of Revocation.

Mark Thompson

On September 28, 2010, respondent Mark Thompson was arrested for DUI. ⁵ He requested an administrative hearing on the license revocation, and the hearing was scheduled for April 29, 2011. On February 8, 2011, Thompson pled no contest to DUI in the Berkeley County Magistrate Court. On March 25, 2011, Thompson received an Order of Revocation, effective April 27, 2011, revoking his privilege to operate a motor vehicle based on his no contest plea. The Order of Revocation stated that the Commissioner had received notice that Thompson was “convicted” of driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol and for refusing to submit to the secondary chemical test. On April 6, 2011, the Office of Administrative Hearings sent a letter to Thompson stating that because they had received an abstract of judgment ⁶ showing a DUI conviction, his hearing scheduled for April 29, 2011, was cancelled.

On April 18, 2011, Thompson filed a Writ of Prohibition and Application for Stay in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County arguing that under W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(e), the Commissioner acted in violation of state law in cancelling his previously scheduled administrative license revocation hearing and revoking his privilege to operate a motor vehicle based exclusively on the no contest plea to DUI. The circuit court, Judge Tod Kaufman, granted the Writ of Prohibition and found that a nolo contendere plea was not a conviction under W. Va.Code § 17C–5A–1a(e) and that Thompson was entitled to a ruling on the merits of his drivers' license revocation.

Following the entry of these circuit court orders, the Commissioner filed the instant appeals. Because these matters allege identical assignments of error, this Court consolidated the cases for purposes of appellate review.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

In respondent Woods's case, the circuit court granted the driver extraordinary relief through a writ of certiorari. In respondent Thompson's case, the circuit court granted the driver extraordinary relief through a writ of prohibition. The Commissioner avers that granting extraordinary relief through writs of certiorari and prohibition was in error because these forms of relief extend only to prevent usurpation of power by a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal and does not extend to ministerial acts. State ex rel. Noce v. Blankenship, 93 W.Va. 273, 116 S.E. 524 (1923). See also Kump v. McDonald, 64 W.Va. 323, 61 S.E. 909, 910 (1908); State ex rel. Potter v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 226 W.Va. 1, 2, 697 S.E.2d 37, 38 (2010). The Commissioner further argues that the act of revoking a license is not quasi-judicial, but ministerial; it only becomes quasi-judicial after initiation of adversarial proceedings. DeRosa v. Bell, 24 F.Supp.2d 252, 256 (D.Conn.1998).

Although extraordinary relief was procedurally granted in these cases through writs of certiorari and prohibition, because the circuit courts' orders awarded relief...