My-Lein L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

551 F.Supp.3d 100

MY-LEIN L., Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

1:20-CV-00446 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed July 30, 2021

Justin David Jones, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff.

Judith Cohen, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Represented by counsel, Plaintiff My-Lein L. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 15; Dkt. 19), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 20). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 19) is granted and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 15) is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on December 8, 2016. (Dkt. 12 at 19, 65, 75).¹ In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning April 1, 2013, due to migraines, a chipped tailbone, and degenerative disc disease. (Id. at 19, 56-57, 66-67). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on March 31, 2017. (Id. at 19, 76-83). A video hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Robert Wright on January 2, 2019. (Id. at 19, 30-55). Plaintiff appeared in Buffalo, New York and the ALJ presided over the hearing from Albany, New York. (Id. ). On February 21, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 16-25). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on February 14, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 5-7). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).

II. Disability Determination

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ's Decision

In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on June 30, 2018. (Dkt. 12 at 22). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since April 1, 2013, the alleged onset date. (Id. ).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "anemia, metro menorrhagia, obesity and headaches." (Id. ).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. ). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listing 7.02 in reaching his conclusion, as well as considering the effect of Plaintiff's obesity as required by Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 02-1p. (Id. ).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). (Id. ).

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id. at 24).

At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Id. ). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 24-25).

II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, to remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not rely on opinion evidence in assessing the RFC, as he assigned only partial weight to every medical opinion in the record. (Dkt. 15-1 at 1, 10-15). Plaintiff contends that, as a result, the ALJ "relied on raw medical data" to make the RFC finding, and "by failing to assign controlling weight to any opinion, it is unclear how the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform sedentary work." (Id. at 11). The Court has considered this argument and, for the reasons discussed below, finds it without merit.

In deciding a disability claim, an ALJ is tasked with "weigh[ing] all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole." Matta v. Astrue , 508 F. App'x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). An ALJ's conclusion need not "perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his decision." Id. However, an ALJ is not a medical professional, and "is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings." Ortiz v. Colvin , 298 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (quotation omitted). In other words:

An ALJ is prohibited from ‘playing doctor’ in the sense that ‘an ALJ may not substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion.... This rule is most often employed in the context of the RFC determination when the claimant argues either that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence or that the ALJ has erred by failing to develop the record with a medical opinion on the RFC.

Quinto v. Berryhill , No. 3:17-cv-00024 (JCH), 2017 WL 6017931, at *12 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (citations omitted). "[A]s a result[,] an ALJ's determination of RFC without a medical advisor's assessment is not supported by substantial evidence." Dennis v. Colvin , 195 F. Supp. 3d 469, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).

Plaintiff's argument, which is based on the ALJ's assignment of "partial weight" to the opinion evidence, is a non-starter. It is well settled that the ALJ is not required to formulate the RFC by adopting any one medical opinion in its entirety. See Matta , 508 F. App'x at 56 ; see also William M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 1:19-CV-1665-DB, 2021 WL 3077885, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2021) (...