Nadzhafaliyev v. Hardy

403 F.Supp.3d 663

Ali NADZHAFALIYEV, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Daniel HARDY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 17 C 4469

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed August 29, 2019

Ali Nadzhafaliyev, Elgin, IL, pro se.

Benjamin Matthew Jacobi, Bhairav Radia, Gail Lynne Reich, O'Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook, LLC, Northbrook, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Sean Gunderson, Chicago, IL, pro se.

Paul Olsson, Elgin, IL, pro se.

Abby Grason, Elgin, IL, pro se.

James Baker, Elgin, IL, pro se. Daniel Padilla, Elgin, IL, pro se.

Shirley Ruth Calloway, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HON. JORGE ALONSO, United States District Judge

Defendants move to dismiss this case on Younger abstention grounds, see Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiffs, Ali Nadzhafaliyev, Sean Gunderson, Paul Olsson, Abby Grason, James Baker, Mark Owens, and Daniel Padilla, have been involuntarily committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services and confined at Elgin Mental Health Center ("EMHC"), after a state court found them either not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI") or unfit to stand trial ("UST") on criminal charges. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of EMHC's "loss of privileges" ("LOP") disciplinary policy, alleging that defendants, employees of EMHC, took advantage of the policy to violate plaintiffs' due process rights.

Plaintiffs allege that, in an effort to "incorporate therapeutic methods," EMHC has adopted a "coercion-free environment," in which patients are governed not according to a system of rules and punishment but according to a set of "expectations." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 38.) The posted "Environmental Expectations" are as follow:

(a) We are expected to practice respect and dignity for other patients and staff—which include no violence or fighting and no foul language.

(b) We are expected to adhere to safety practices which maintain the safety of all patients and staff.

(c) We are expected to maintain and respect the environment which includes no destruction of [any] other's property and keeping our living spaces and working spaces clean.

(d) We are expected to take care of our own property and not to borrow, lend, share, or give things away—which includes any other personal items.

(e) We are expected to keep ourselves appropriately clean, groomed, and dressed both on and off the unit.

(Id. ¶ 29.) If an EMHC staff member "determines in his or her sole discretion" that a patient is not meeting the community's "expectations," the staff member can place the patient on LOP status. (Id. ¶ 32.) The consequences of being put on LOP status may include the following:

(a) No vending, pop time, or snack box.

(b) No order out the following week.

(c) No gym time

(d) No library

(e) No 1-South

(f) May attend all structured groups off unit. Must be escorted by staff.

(Id. ¶ 33.) Additionally, a patient on LOP status may be prohibited from certain "treatment activities" including "physically active treatment." (Id. ¶ 34.)

Placement on LOP status is documented in the patient's medical chart, and plaintiffs allege that it can affect whether they are issued "Pass Privileges," which permit them to travel around and off the EMHC campus. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 36; see id. ¶ 47.) NGRI and UST patients generally must be held in a "secure setting," and any loosening of restrictions on their security, in the form of off-grounds or unsupervised on-grounds privileges, must be approved by court order, which "may include such conditions on the defendant as the Court may deem appropriate and necessary to reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment and the safety of the defendant and others." See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (NGRI) ; 725 ILCS 5/104-31 (UST). Every ninety days, EMHC must file a "treatment plan report" with the supervising court, which must "provide a current summary" of progress on the items covered by the patient's treatment plan.¹ 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (NGRI) ; 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (UST). The report may also recommend off-grounds privileges or unsupervised on-grounds privileges for the court's consideration and approval. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) ; 725 ILCS 5/104-31. For a UST patient, the supervising court is to set a hearing, with notice to the defendant and his attorney, every 180 days to review the progress of the patient's treatment. 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2). An NGRI patient has the right to file a "petition for treatment plan review" every 180 days, upon which the supervising court "shall set a hearing to be held within 120 days." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(e).

At court hearings, LOP status can be—and, allegedly, "regularly is"—the basis of denial of a conditional release, see 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) ; 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4, or of pass privileges for EMHC patients. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 38; see id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that the "review process" for LOP status is "grossly lacking," "ineffective," and "futile," and they have "presented Defendants with numerous ... grievances pertaining to the ... LOP system" (id. ¶¶ 43, 56; see id. ¶ 52), but nothing has changed.

Plaintiffs each describe specific incidents in which they were put on LOP status arbitrarily, unjustly, or based on false accusations of wrongdoing. For example, Nadzhafaliyev was put on LOP status for restraining another patient during a soccer game, but only after the other patient tried to punch him; Baker was accused of surreptitiously passing contraband to Nadzhafaliyev, but they were only conversing; Gunderson was accused of keeping contraband food items, despite no notice that keeping the food in his room was wrongful; Olsson was blamed for an insect infestation in his room that he did not cause; Owens was blamed for an unprovoked attack on him by another patient; and Padilla was blamed for not knowing the expectations, despite his learning disabilities. Plaintiffs allege that they were denied pass privileges or conditional releases based in part on these LOP incidents and others, as documented in their medical records. In some cases, plaintiffs suffered other harmful or demeaning consequences. For example, Baker and Nadzhafaliyev were strip searched in the incident concerning the alleged passing of contraband, and Nadzhafaliyev, Baker, Gunderson, and Olsson were deprived of computer equipment, at least temporarily, sometimes as a consequence of their LOP status, sometimes after searches by EMHC staff.

II. Legal Standards for Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). "Both a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and a Rule 12(b)(1) motion share the same purpose: not to decide the merits of the case, but to test the sufficiency of the complaint." O'Pere v. Citimortgage Bank, N.A. , No. 14-CV-10230, 2015 WL 6859289, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2015).

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. Richards v. Mitcheff , 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must " ‘give the defendant fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). The complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; that is, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

"In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, [courts must] accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, but [they] ‘need[ ] not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’ " Alam v. Miller Brewing Co. , 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ). "Only when the plaintiff pleads itself out of court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)." Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).

"A motion to dismiss on abstention grounds does not fit neatly into Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6)," but when such a motion "asks the Court to decline jurisdiction," as defendants' motion does, "it fits more comfortably under Rule 12(b)(1)." Bolton v. Bryant , 71 F. Supp. 3d 802, 809 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ; see also Powell v. Saddler, No. 12 C 2928, 2012 WL 3880198, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012) ("Because Younger abstention concerns whether courts should exercise jurisdiction that they have over the parties' claims, motions to dismiss on Younger grounds are best construed as motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion seeks dismissal of an action over which a court allegedly lacks subject matter jurisdiction." O'Pere , 2015 WL 6859289, at *2. The Court analyzes the motion the same way it analyzes Rule 12(b)(6) motions, accepting as true plaintiffs' allegations and drawing reasonable inferences in their...