People v. Jones

2021 IL 126432

190 N.E.3d 731

454 Ill.Dec. 749

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Robert Christopher JONES, Appellant.

Docket No. 126432

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed December 16, 2021.

Rehearing denied January 24, 2022

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defender, and Mark D. Fisher, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner Robert Christopher Jones was a juvenile in 2000, when he pled guilty to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction relief, petitioner sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging his 50-year juvenile sentence violated the eighth amendment protections in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The trial court denied his motion for leave, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that petitioner's claims did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB, 2020 WL 3839693. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the United States Supreme Court's most recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi , 593 U.S. ––––, ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1312, 209 L.Ed.2d 390 (2021), we affirm the appellant court's judgment.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 1999, when petitioner was 16 years old, he was charged in La Salle County circuit court with eight counts of first degree murder; two counts of armed robbery, a Class X felony; one count of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony; and one count of home invasion, a Class X felony. Petitioner confessed to entering the home of George and Rebecca Thorpe at 2 a.m. armed with a knife. He knew they were home at that time, and he intended to take their money. The Thorpes were an elderly couple whom petitioner considered to be his great-aunt and great-uncle. Petitioner stated he did not know how many times he stabbed George before he moved to Rebecca's room and began to stab her as she reached for the telephone. He also did not know how many times he stabbed Rebecca before he covered her face with a pillow to stop her from making "gurgling" sounds. After taking Rebecca's purse and lockbox, petitioner fled the scene.

¶ 4 After abandoning a potential insanity defense, petitioner agreed to enter a fully negotiated guilty plea. According to the plea deal, he would plead guilty to one count each of first degree murder and residential burglary and two counts of armed robbery in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining charges. Under the terms of the agreement, petitioner would be sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 50 years for the murder, 30 years for each armed robbery count, and 15 years for the residential burglary, with credit being given for the time he already spent in custody. He was 17 years old when he agreed to enter into the plea agreement.

¶ 5 After reviewing the factual predicate for the charges and the terms of the plea agreement and giving the appropriate admonishments, the trial judge found the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Petitioner waived the preparation of a presentence investigation report as well as any hearing on mitigating and aggravating factors. In May 2000, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the terms of the parties’ fully negotiated plea agreement.

¶ 6 Petitioner did not timely seek to withdraw his guilty plea or appeal from that judgment. He did, however, later file a pro se postconviction petition seeking relief. In that petition, petitioner argued that his defense counsel was ineffective and that his sentence constituted an unconstitutional violation of his due process rights. The trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, and that dismissal was upheld on appeal. People v. Jones , 345 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 309 Ill.Dec. 231, 863 N.E.2d 863 (2004) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ).

¶ 7 Petitioner later filed a pro se successive postconviction petition, arguing that both the provision automatically transferring certain juvenile cases to adult criminal court and the requirement in the Illinois truth-in-sentencing statute that he serve every day of his sentence were unconstitutional under the principles the United States Supreme Court found applicable to juvenile offenders in Miller , 567 U.S. 460, Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In petitioner's motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition, filed two weeks after that petition, he noted that his guilty plea and the subsequent judgment were entered in 2000, years before Miller was decided. He also asserted that the mandatory statutory scheme that applied to him at that time was void when applied to juvenile offenders. The trial court denied petitioner's motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition.

¶ 8 On appeal, petitioner argued the claims in his pro se successive petition met the cause-and-prejudice standard, requiring his case to be remanded to the trial court for appointment of counsel and additional postconviction proceedings. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the denial of leave to file the successive postconviction petition. It agreed with the trial court that petitioner did not satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test and held that his sentence was not mandatory because he voluntarily entered into a fully negotiated plea arrangement. The appellate court also explained that petitioner was unable to receive relief under Miller because he did not receive a life sentence when he could be released from prison at the age of 66. 2016 IL App (3d) 140537-U.

¶ 9 In his initial petition for leave to appeal to this court, petitioner argued his plea was void because it was premised on a now-unconstitutional mandatory life sentence. We entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its judgment and reconsider those contentions in light of People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763, where we held that a sentence of more than 40 years constitutes de facto life for a juvenile offender. After reexamining those issues, the appellate court vacated its prior decision and again affirmed the trial court's dismissal of petitioner's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, with Justice Wright specially concurring. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB.

¶ 10 The appellate court reasoned that petitioner's fully negotiated guilty plea stipulated to a 50-year sentence that was only later declared to constitute de facto life, effectively waiving any eighth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) sentencing challenge based on the principles in Miller. In addition, he could not challenge the sentencing scheme at the time as it applied to him because his fully negotiated plea agreement precluded it from ever actually being applied to him. Because petitioner was therefore unable to establish the "prejudice" prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, the appellate court's judgment affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB, ¶¶ 14, 19. The court later denied petitioner's motion for rehearing.

¶ 11 Petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court's revised judgment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019), and this court allowed that petition.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Before this court, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether the appellate court erred by finding that his 1999 guilty plea, entered into while he was a juvenile, bars him from filing a successive postconviction petition alleging that his 50-year de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment of the federal constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ) under the rationale in Miller and its progeny and (2) the appropriate remedy under the facts of this case if petitioner raised a valid Miller claim.

¶ 14 We begin our examination by addressing a question of first impression in Illinois: whether petitioner's guilty plea, entered into when he was a juvenile, precludes him from raising a Miller claim. Because that issue presents a pure question of law, it is subject to de novo review. People v. Bailey , 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 25, 421 Ill.Dec. 833, 102 N.E.3d 114.

¶ 15 Petitioner argues that the sentencing scheme in place at the time of his guilty plea violated the eighth amendment protections noted in Miller. He asserts that, if he had gone to trial and been convicted of committing two first degree murders as a juvenile offender, he would have faced a mandatory life sentence under the then-existing statutory sentencing scheme. To comport with Miller , however, the trial court was required to use its discretion when deciding whether to impose a life sentence on a juvenile offender. Because the mandatory life sentence required by the statutory scheme precluded the trial court from exercising its discretion in imposing the proper sentence, petitioner asserts that the scheme was unconstitutional as applied to him as a juvenile offender.

¶ 16 The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the federal constitution's eighth amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders are premised on the fundamental concept of proportionality. The Court has viewed the application of that concept "less through a historical prism than according to ‘ "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." ...