Ramos v. County Of Suffolk

707 F.Supp.2d 421

Rochelle RAMOS, Plaintiff,v.COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and Alfred Tisch, in his official capacity as Suffolk County Sheriff, Defendants.

No. 07-cv-1250 (ADS)(ETB).

United States District Court E.D. New York.

April 26, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jon Norinsberg, Esq., PLLC, by Jon L. Norinsberg, Esq., Bennitta L. Joseph, Esq., of Counsel, New York, NY, for plaintiff.

Suffolk County Attorney's Office, by Assistant County Attorney Arlene S. Zwilling, Assistant County Attorney Susan A. Flynn, Hauppauge, NY, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge:

This case arises out of allegations by plaintiff Rochelle Ramos that a physician's assistant at the Suffolk County jail sexually assaulted her while she was incarcerated in that facility. The matter was tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff now moves for (1) a partial directed verdict in her favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), and (2) a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the plaintiff's Rule 50(b) motion and grants the plaintiff's Rule 59 motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rochelle Ramos asserts that on December 29, 2005, while she was an inmate at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility in Riverhead, NY, a physician's assistant named Gary Feinberg sexually assaulted her during a routine medical examination. Feinberg died in March of 2006. On March 23, 2007, Ramos brought the present 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages against Feinberg's estate, the County of Suffolk, the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office, and Alfred Tisch, the Suffolk County Sheriff. After discovery was concluded, all of the defendants moved for summary judgment. The claims by Ramos against Feinberg's estate and the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office were dismissed by order of this Court dated September 8, 2009. However, her claims against Suffolk County and Tisch survived. These remaining causes of action asserted derivative liability against Suffolk County and Tisch, based on an alleged municipal policy or practice that lead to the assault. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

On November 9, 2009, the plaintiff proceeded to a jury trial against Suffolk County and Tisch, seeking to prove that (1) Feinberg had assaulted the plaintiff, and (2) the defendants had a policy or practice that led to this assault. The parties began the trial process by selecting a jury and arguing motions in limine, and during this time, and the Court issued three rulings relevant to the plaintiff's present motion.

In the first of these rulings, the Court permitted the defendants to amend a previous Local Rule 56.1 statement in which the defendants admitted that Feinberg had in fact assaulted Ramos. Prior to moving for summary judgment, the defendants had filed a statement of facts “as to which [they] contend[ed] there is no issue to be tried.” This statement of facts included the admission that “[o]n or about December 28, 2005, Ramos was subjected to a sexual assault by Gary Feinberg, who was working as a Physician's Assistant in the Medical Unit at the jail.” (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 3.) A footnote referred to the assault as “alleged.” ( Id.) When the Court highlighted this statement just prior to jury selection, the defendants asserted that this admission was accidental, and that they had intended to refer to the assault at all times as “alleged.” Over the plaintiff's objection, the Court accepted the defendants' explanation, and permitted them to revoke this material admission.

Second, the plaintiff moved to exclude at trial all evidence of her substantial history of drug abuse. The Court found that evidence of the plaintiff's drug use impacted the plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages, but that this was the only issue for which this evidence would be admissible. In so ruling, the Court explicitly held that the plaintiff's drug history would not be admissible for the purpose of impeaching the plaintiff's credibility. (Tr. at 21:4-5 (“Here, [the drug use history] has nothing to do with credibility. That's out.”).) The Court also warned the defendants' counsel not to refer to the plaintiff's drug use except with regard to the issue of emotional distress damages.

Third, the plaintiff moved to exclude evidence that she had been arrested for making a false statement to the police. The Court ruled that the fact of the arrest was admissible because it affected the plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages, but that the reason for the arrest was not admissible. Thus, the Court ruled, “I'm going to let you cross-examine her on, have you ever been arrested before this and after this, and not go into what the reason for the arrest is.” (Tr. at 14:6-9.)

At the trial, the plaintiff offered her own testimony recounting Feinberg's assault in support of her allegation that it took place. In addition, her testimony was corroborated by:

1) notes from Gary Feinberg confirming that he examined her on the day of the alleged abuse, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 48);

2) the plaintiff's own sworn complaint of the assault, dated the day after it took place, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 21);

3) a report by the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office Internal Affairs Section, stating that a medical exam “revealed an irritation to [the plaintiff's] right vaginal area,” and that Ramos's complaint against Feinberg was “founded”, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 22);

4) a detailed sworn statement by Suffolk County jail inmate Tunisia Ivory, alleging that Feinberg sexually assaulted her approximately two weeks before he allegedly assaulted the plaintiff, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 28);

5) a detailed sworn statement by Suffolk County jail inmate Linda Kennedy, alleging that Feinberg sexually assaulted her approximately two weeks after he allegedly assaulted the plaintiff, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 29);

6) typed notes from the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office recording that another Suffolk County jail inmate, Marie Catterson, made a similar allegation during the same period of time, (Pl.'s Tr. Ex. 32); and 7) testimony at trial by Lowrita Rickenbacker, a former inmate at Suffolk County jail, alleging that Feinberg sexually abused her from February 2005 through January 2006, (Tr. at 952:7-14).

Significantly, no evidence was admitted at the trial that conflicted with the plaintiff's testimony that the sexual assault by Feinberg took place.

In addition, during the plaintiff's testimony at trial, evidence of the plaintiff's drug history came in both during her direct examination and cross-examination on the issue of damages. Also, counsel for the defendants questioned the plaintiff at some length concerning the alleged false statement she had made to the police. However, the plaintiff never admitted to making a false statement to the police, and consistent with the Court's ruling, the arrest itself was never introduced to impeach the plaintiff's denial. While defense counsel represents to the Court that she recalls that the plaintiff did admit at trial to filing the false report, no such evidence appears in the trial transcript, and this representation is thus unavailing.

After both parties rested, each presented their closing statements. Defense counsel argued in summation, among other things, that Ramos had not proven that Feinberg assaulted her. Counsel questioned the “tone” of the plaintiff's written complaint, and pointed out that it was unusual that Ramos recalled certain details from the assault, such as the physical condition of Feinberg's shoes and the fact that officers outside the exam room were eating jalapeño-flavored potato chips. Defense counsel also argued that it was suspicious that Ramos did not complain about the assault until the day after it happened, even though she had several opportunities before then to speak with various correctional officers.

Then, defense counsel made two additional statements to challenge the plaintiff's allegation of assault, to which the plaintiff now objects. First, despite the Court's ruling that the plaintiff's drug use was admissible only on the issue of damages, defense counsel exhorted the jury to consider the plaintiff's drug use in assessing liability, stating:

Why didn't [the plaintiff] make an outcry [about the alleged abuse]? I think there is a clue in this evidence as to why she didn't. Because she said Gary Feinberg said to her, be a good girl. I'll get you some medication. I'll make it easier for you. And you know what, ladies and gentlemen? She's an admitted drug addict and that could be why she didn't say a word.

(Tr. at 1372:7-12.)

Shortly thereafter, defense counsel told the jury that the plaintiff had recently filed a false statement with the police, in spite of the fact that no evidence supported that allegation. Noting that the plaintiff had submitted her sworn description of Feinberg's alleged assault, defense counsel then stated:

Well, you know what we know about Ms. Ramos? She's a person who files false statements with the police. She walked into a police station not long ago and filed a false report about being robbed, and it was not true.

(Tr. at 1380:5-8.) Again, no such evidence was adduced at the trial.

On November 24, 2009, the jury returned a verdict, answering only the first question on the verdict sheet. That question read:

PRELIMINARY QUESTION

1. Did the plaintiff Rochelle Ramos prove that she was sexually abused by Physician's Assistant Gary Feinberg on December 29, 2005?

YES __________ NO __________

If your answer to question 1 is “NO”, you have found a verdict in favor of the defendant in both causes of action. In that event, cease deliberations, the foreperson should sign and date the Verdict Sheet and advise the Court by note that you are ready to return to the courtroom to announce your verdict.

The jury answered “NO” to this question, and thus answered no other questions and found a verdict in favor of the defendants.

On ...