S.C. Progressive Network Educ. Fund v. Andino

493 F.Supp.3d 460

SOUTH CAROLINA PROGRESSIVE NETWORK EDUCATION FUND, Plaintiff,

v.Marci ANDINO, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission; John Wells, in his official capacity as Chair of the South Carolina State Election Commission; and Joanne Day, Clifford J. Edler, Linda McCall and Scott Mosley, in their official capacities as members of the South Carolina State Election Commission, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-03503-MGL

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

Signed October 9, 2020

Jack Emerson Cohoon, Burnette Shutt and McDaniel PA, Columbia, SC, Ananda V. Burra, Pro Hac Vice, Debra L. Greenberger, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan S. Abady, Pro Hac Vice, Matthew D. Brinckerhoff, Pro Hac Vice, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff Abady Ward and Maazel LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jane W. Trinkley, Mary Elizabeth Crum, William Grayson Lambert, Burr and Forman LLP-Cola, Columbia, SC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

MARY GEIGER LEWIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an election law case. The plaintiff is the South Carolina Progressive Network Education Fund (the Network). It filed its lawsuit against Marci Andino, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the South Carolina State Election Commission; John Wells, in his official capacity as Chair of the South Carolina State Election Commission; and Joanne Day, Clifford J. Edler, Linda McCall and Scott Mosley, in their official capacities as members of the South Carolina State Election Commission (collectively, Defendants).

In the Network's complaint, it alleges a severe undue burden on its right to register voters in violation of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the South Carolina voter registration deadline during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court has jurisdiction over the matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Pending before the Court are the Network's motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, both asking the Court, among other things, to "[o]rder Defendants to extend the Voter Registration Cutoffs to a date no sooner than October 19, 2020[,]" Complaint at 27.

Having carefully considered the motions, the response, the reply, the supplements, the record, and the relevant law, the Court is of the opinion the motions must be denied.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual History

"[T]he Network is a non-partisan and not-for-profit organization working to register voters ahead of the November election." Complaint ¶ 5.

"This year, South Carolina, like the rest of the country and world, is grappling with the devastating and enduring effects of the COVID-19 pandemic[.]" Id. ¶ 4. Since "April 6, 2020, when South Carolina imposed a stay-at-home order and other restrictions on day-to-day interactions ... to mitigate the effects of the pandemic, ... the Network was effectively prevented from registering voters in the normal course of its activities and was forced into a much less effective ‘pandemic mode’ of registration." Id. ¶6 "The Network tried to register as many voters as possible ahead of the Voter Registration Cutoffs notwithstanding the pandemic conditions, and adapted to these new circumstances.... Unless the Voter Registration Cutoffs are extended, the Networkwill not be able to register eligible voters that they would have been able to reach in a normal year. As a result, many South Carolinians will be disenfranchised." Id. ¶ 7.

"South Carolina requires that all voters register to vote no later than [thirty] days before the election." Complaint ¶ 2 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 7-5-150 ). "That means that any South Carolinian who wishes to vote in this year's election on November 3, 2020[,] [was required to] register by Sunday, October 4, 2020. Because many county, in-person facilities are closed on weekends, some voters [had] to register in-person by Friday, October 2, 2020." Id. ¶ 3. "The cut off for internet-based registrations [was] October 4 and mailed registrations [were required to] be postmarked by October 5." Id.

In the sworn declaration of Brett Bursey, the Network's Executive Director, he attests, "[i]f the voter registration deadline were extended, [the Network] would be able to register additional voters, both through in-person and remote contacts." Bursey Decl. ¶ 65. He further states that "an extension of the voter registration deadline would serve the public interest amidst the pandemic and would enable [the Network] to successfully register significantly more South Carolinians." Id. ¶ 71.

The Network, in their prayer for relief, requests the Court to:

a. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing the Voter Registration Cutoffs this election cycle;

b. Order Defendants to extend the Voter Registration Cutoffs to a date no sooner than October 19, 2020;

c. Declare that enforcement of the Voter Registration Cutoffs as applied under the pandemic conditions in South Carolina is unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments;

d. Award [the Network] reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs;

e. Retain jurisdiction to ensure all Defendants’ ongoing compliance with the foregoing orders; and

f. Grant such other and further relief that this Court deems just and appropriate.

Complaint at 27-28.

B. Procedural History

The Network filed its lawsuit and motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on the same day. Defendants subsequently filed a response in opposition to the motions, after which both parties filed supplements to their earlier filings. Thereafter, the Network filed a reply in support of its motions.

The Court, having been fully briefed on the relevant issues, is prepared to adjudicate the two motions.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Article III Standing

" Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may consider only ‘[c]ases’ and ‘[c]ontroversies.’ " U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Thus, "a plaintiff seeking relief in federal court must first demonstrate that [it] has standing to do so, including that [it] has a personal stake in the outcome[.]"

Gill v. Whitford , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1923, 201 L.Ed.2d 313 (2018) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To establish standing, "[t]he plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). An injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 1548.

When the Court undertakes a standing analysis, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See United States v. Phillips , 883 F.3d 399, 405 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that, in questions concerning standing, the Court "view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff] and draw all reasonable inferences in [its] favor.").

B. Factors to consider in the granting motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

The substantive standards for granting a request for a temporary restraining order and entering a preliminary injunction are the same. See Virginia v. Kelly , 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying preliminary injunction standard to a request for temporary restraining order).

Both "are intended to meet exigent circumstances[.]" Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp. , 685 F.2d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). It "is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). "[T]he party seeking [either of these types of relief] must prove [its] own case and adduce the requisite proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the conditions and circumstances upon which he bases the right to and necessity for injunctive relief." Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City of Denver , 628 F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980).

A temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction should issue only when the plaintiff can "[1] establish that [it is] likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [it is] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and [4] that [injunctive relief] is in the public interest." Winter , 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. The burden is on the party seeking injunctive relief to show it is entitled to the relief, not the burden of the other party to show the movant is not entitled. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters , 415 U.S. 423, 443, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974).

"[A]ll four requirements must be satisfied." Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009). Thus, even a strong showing of likely success on the merits cannot compensate for failure to show likely injury. Winter , 555 U.S. at 21-22, 129 S.Ct. 365. And, irreparable injury alone is insufficient to support equitable relief. See id. at 23, 129 S.Ct. 365 (holding irreparable injury was likely to occur, but holding injunctive relief was improper because of the burden on the government and impact on public interest). In other words, "[a temporary restraining order or a] preliminary injunction shall be granted only if the moving party clearly establishes entitlement." Di Biase v. SPX Corp. , 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).

"Given [the] limited purpose [of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction], and given the haste that is often necessary ..., [they are] customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on...